


The background of the cover is a solid red color. In the center, there is a black silhouette of a person wearing a hooded jacket, standing with their back to the viewer. In the distance, a faint city skyline is visible against the red background. The title 'QUEER APOCALYPSES' is written in large, bold, white capital letters, centered over the silhouette.

QUEER APOCALYPSES

Elements of Antisocial Theory

Lorenzo Bernini



Queer Apocalypses

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Elements of Antisocial Theory

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To Tommaso, again and again
To Michele (again and again)
To Francesca

Physicists say that holes are not the absence of particles but particles traveling faster than the speed of light. Flying anuses, speeding vaginas, there is no castration.

[Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari]

Homosexuality exists and does not exist, at one and the same time: indeed, its very mode of existence questions again and again the certainty of existence.

[Guy Hocquenghem]

Sex is not a fatality: it's a possibility for creative life.

[Michel Foucault]

THE SELF-PORTRAIT OF A QUEER RESEARCHER IN ROMEO AND JULIET'S CITY: PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

VERONA, ITALY, SOUTHERN EUROPE

Careful! The book you are holding in your hands “incorrectly attributes the significance of political theory, or better yet, of real and true philosophical reflection to homosexual liberation movements, and thus gives rise to quite a few suspicions of manneristic intellectualism.” Or, at least, one of the members of the board that evaluated my publications at the *Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale* [National Scientific Qualification] held in Italy in 2014 has claimed this to be the case. Another board member considered an article of mine (Bernini 2011c) written in Portuguese that spoke of the transgender experience as a subversion of heterosexual binary logic to be “of little relevance.” I was competing in the “political philosophy” discipline, and, all things considered, it went pretty well: while I continue to make a researcher’s salary—which, while small, I cannot complain about given the economic crisis—I obtained the title “associate professor,” and in the next six years I will be able to participate in competitions held by Italian Universities for the purposes of filing positions to which this title corresponds. Many of my colleagues will not have this same opportunity. Even though the Political Philosophy Commission has not appreciated the type of research that I direct, it has deemed me qualified for the role to which I aspire; in other philosophical, sociological and literary fields, instead, the majority of researchers that work on sexuality have not obtained their qualification because of the “little disciplinary relevance” ascribed to their work. This reality has outraged many, but has surprised no one. The reasons for this are indeed evident: The Ministry of Education, Universities and Research

does not consider feminist studies, gender studies, and queer theories to be discrete disciplinary sectors, and the scientific communities within existing disciplines find it difficult to recognize the dignity of academic research in these areas. The two opinions I have laid out above may serve as examples: in Italy the critique of compulsory heterosexuality and sexual binarism is considered “of little relevance” even in a discipline like Political Philosophy.¹ And the choice to thematize the sexual position of the subject of research and the ways that queer theories are indebted to the matured reflections within LGBTQIA movements, give rise to “suspicions of manneristic intellectualism.” More precisely, if I may hazard an interpretation of what this euphemistic and pompous expression hides and simultaneously reveals, this choice is met with resistance because it assumes the import of both a methodological, and a political stance, and thus elicits diffidence in those who consider themselves the keepers of the presumed neutrality of university knowledge. In Italy, those who work within gender studies or queer theories, whether they want to be or not, are militant intellectuals who challenge academic conventions and disrupt the heterosexist common beliefs active in the university and in the country. Thus these scholars occupy a liminal position: their referential community is that of activists more so than academics, and their readers and interlocutors belong more to LGBTQIA movements than to the universities. So, since movements and activists offer neither salaries nor scholarships, the destiny of these scholars is marked by a choice between a hardened but noble amateurism at home and legitimized research that receives more peaceful professional affirmation abroad.

My story, however, has been different. If I had to situate the evaluations of the Commission for the National Scientific Qualification within the frame of my academic career, I must admit—with a certain coquetry—that I went looking for them. When I was a philosophy student at the State University in Milan in the nineties, when I pursued my doctorate in political studies at the State University of Turin in the early aughts, and when I was a temporary researcher in various Italian universities, I did not take a single course on feminism, gender studies, or queer theories, because there weren’t any, and I did not meet a single teacher who was willing to tutor me in any of these subjects. No one encouraged me to pursue this path, many, in fact, tried to dissuade me. Even my doctoral research on Michel Foucault’s critique of political modernity was considered “not very educational” and I was forced to extend its scope to include Jürgen Habermas’ attempt to refound political modernity. Not very adept at foreign languages and too lazy to pursue my fortune abroad, or perhaps

too stubborn to admit defeat in the place I called home, for a long while I cultivated my interests outside the university, while simultaneously working on the more traditional themes that were forced on me by the institutional curriculum. An academic position for what I felt a pressing need to study seemed an impossibility. Then the impossible happened: in 2008 I was given an open-ended research position (a position which has since been eliminated because of the university reform put into effect due to the economic crisis) at the State University of Verona, and I was chosen precisely because of those publications which, until that moment, I had had to keep hidden during official academic occasions. The president of the evaluating committee, Adriana Cavarero—a feminist philosopher who, during her youth, had struggled to obtain academic acknowledgment in Italy even when her name was already known abroad—had evidently decided to take advantage of the hiring opportunity to promote gender studies and queer theories. It was extremely fortuitous, it would have been very difficult for me to get hired by a different committee, and I found myself in the right place at the right time. But it was also a sign of the times: it is undeniable that compared to when I was a student, a doctoral student, and a research fellow, something in Italy is definitely changing. In the span of just a few years: publishing imprints dedicated to LGBT studies² and to lesbian feminist and queer theories³ have popped up; a gender studies magazine⁴ was started; and summer schools and conferences dedicated to research on sexuality have been organized—often, but not always, because of initiatives by activist students within feminist and LGBTQIA movements. Still no women’s studies or gender studies departments exist, but interdisciplinary research centers focusing on sexuality are surfacing, one of which, PoliTeSse—Politics and Theories of Sexuality—was founded by me through the State University of Verona in 2012.⁵ A new sensitivity is spreading in Italian universities, and I am proud to contribute. And as a result, both inside and outside of academia, new forms of resistance are springing up in response: the results of the National Scientific Qualifications are just one example.

The city of Verona, in this sense, is paradigmatic. In 2010, when I taught a course on the challenge that queer theories present to the heterosexist conception of the human which serves as the foundation of the classic philosophy of modernity (ch. 5–6, *infra*), letters written by worried mothers appeared in “L’Arena,” the local newspaper. Furthermore, a representative of Christus Rex, a traditionalist Catholic association, wanted to express his grievances to the head of my department. The protests,

however, proved unsuccessful, and the members of *Christus Rex*, after disseminating a public statement in which they accused me of teaching “*frocismo militante*” [“militant faggottism”], had to content themselves with a “reparative mass.” The episode might make you smile if it wasn’t indicative of a commonly felt sentiment in the city; a city in which the *Lega Nord* [The Northern League]⁶ governs, and reactionary Catholicism tied to neofascist movements has managed for quite some time to influence institutional choices. In February 1994, when the European Parliament promulgated the first resolution that recommended that member states provide equal juridical treatment for homosexual citizens, it caused great turmoil among the Veronese right wing, and in July 1995 the Verona city council, the only one in Italy, approved a motion to vote down its implementation. Twenty years have passed since then and not only has that motion never been rejected, but in August 2014 the city council voted a new order of the day that—with the intention of defending “natural families formed by the union between a man and a woman” from the “unprecedented cultural aggression that would want to equate those natural families with the unions of people of the same sex through the recognition of their right to adoption and to the ‘production’ of children by means of a surrogate”—asks the mayor and the council to “gather the concerns of parents and teachers in regards to plans for affectivity and sexuality instruction, as well as performances and educational materials that seem to conflict with their moral and religious principles.” Three months later, the Veneto region approved the “celebration of the natural family,” which would take place every year in all schools on the day preceding Christmas break. In March 2014,⁷ for that matter, the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research prevented the distribution of educational pamphlets about sexual difference that the National Anti-Racial Discrimination Office (UNAR), in compliance with a new recommendation of the committee of ministers of the European Council, was about to widely disseminate to teachers all over Italy. A few days earlier, the president of the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), Cardinal Angelo Bagnasco spoke out against turning public schools into “reeducation and indoctrination camps.” And a few days later, during his meeting with the International Catholic Child Bureau, Pope Francis declared that “children have a right to grow up in a family with a father and a mother,” and that parents have the right to give their children a religious education. To point to the dangerous ideology that Catholic parents have the right and duty to take a stand against, Bagnasco used an interesting expression now

common among vaticanists, an expression that Pope Francis' entourage would use during the extraordinary Synod on the Family a few months later: "teoria del gender" ["theory of gender"].⁸

The phrase was coined in the mid nineties, and has since received significant editorial support (Galeotti 2010; Montfort 2011; Anatrella 2012; Peeters 2013). Joseph Aloisius Ratzinger also used it when he was still pope during the pre-Christmas talks to the Roman Curia in December 2008, and again during the pre-Christmas talks to the Roman Curia in December 2012, in an effort to hinder the planning of the French law on gay marriage that would get passed in April 2013. The rhetorical force of this expression lies in its singular form, which tendentiously reduces two vast fields of knowledge into one incoherent entity: the theory of gender is, in fact, none other than a caricature of gender studies and queer theories. Tony Anatrella—a priest, psychoanalyst, and author of, among other texts, the entries "Homosexuality and homophobia" and "Juridical recognition of homosexual unions" in the *Lexicon* of the Pontifical Council for the Family (2003)—presents it as an anti-Christian ideology that took the place of Marxism after the fall of the Berlin wall, but unlike Marxism, it has reached a hegemonic position both in the UN and the European Union. In his opinion the theory of gender: denies the essential value that sexual difference assumes in the couple, in the family, and in the children's upbringing; it supports women's empowerment, the exclusion of men from procreation, and the spread of homosexuality; it inspires laws aimed at disrupting the natural order; and it views as unjust the fact that only women can give birth and men cannot breastfeed. Thus, for this prelate, it is about "a vision that is not linked to reality, which sets the stage for unsettling questions for the future" (Anatrella 2012: 36–38, translation Julia Heim). Ever since those who hold the highest positions within the Vatican, beginning with Pope Benedict XVI, have become mouthpieces for this stance, the alarm has sounded and has proliferated all of Catholic public opinion and European political culture: in the last two years communities of believers and oratories have mobilized against the theory of gender; all over Europe, but especially in France and Italy, groups have protested against the promotion of rights and the reduction of the discrimination against LGBTQAI people; even some Italian institutions like the municipality of Verona are against it—the municipality is no longer as isolated as it was in 1994—and the Veneto region voted in favor of resolutions that defend the "natural family."

In Verona, on September 21, 2013, the Famiglia Domani [Family Tomorrow] and Movimento Europeo Difesa della Vita [European

Movement for The Defense of Life] associations organized a conference that obtained the support of the district and the province in Verona, and, with a few variations, was replicated in other cities.⁹ Entitled *La teoria del gender: per l'uomo o contro l'uomo?* [*The Theory of Gender: For or Against Man?*], the symposium opened with greetings from Bishop Giuseppe Zenti and mayor Flavio Tolsi, and continued with speeches whose objective was to defend the right to label homosexuality a disease.¹⁰ Their arguments were based on an interesting reconstruction of the history of Western thought according to which “the theory of gender is a complex of theories that have their basis in a philosophy of rebellion of man against nature, and thus against God” (de Mattei 2014: 29, translation Julia Heim). This history began with humanism, continued with the Enlightenment, with positivism, and with evolutionism, and ultimately led to the nihilism of totalitarianism in the 1900s. For the presenters, only in the Middle Ages did men and women live in accordance with nature and with God, when Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologiae*, taught that in the end of times human beings would be brought back to life with body and soul, and their bodies would be whole: “Nails and hair will rise again, genitals will rise again, they will not be needed for reproduction, but only for the integrity of human nature” (de Mattei 2014: 33, translation Julia Heim). In other words, it was meaningful to the speakers that they mention that we will rise up males and females as God created us (Genesis 1, 27), encouraging us to populate the world (Genesis 9, 1). No one said what will happen to intersex people on the day of Judgment, maybe they won't rise up at all, but one might intuit that it will truly be a rip-off for transsexual people who have undergone hormone therapy and plastic and reassignment surgeries. During the conference few words were uttered about the destiny of lesbians, while more attention was paid to gays who—it was said—mainly expose themselves to HIV by using their anuses in ways that do not “conform to its shape and function” (Atzori 2014: 58, translation Julia Heim), and thus in ways that are contrary to the nature intended by God.

MODERNIST HALLUCINATIONS AND ANTISOCIAL ANTIDOTES

In the face of this misogynist and heterosexist crusade, it would have been reasonable to expect a strong and unified position taken, if not by associations of university instructors,¹¹ at least by the feminist and LGBTQIA intelligentsia. Instead, in March 2014, Luisa Muraro, a prominent spokesperson for the “theory of difference”—a theory that boasts a

hegemonic position in Italian feminism—sent a letter to the newspaper “il manifesto” to express her opposition to projects of “educational reform inspired by the theory of gender.” And a month later, the gay journalist and historian Giovanni Dall’Orto published an article in “Pride,” the monthly about gay locales, entitled *Contro la teoria queer* [*Against Queer Theory*] which, paradoxically agrees on a number of occasions with the texts written by detractors of the theory of gender, especially in terms of the misinformation, of the conceptual confusion, and of the scarce consequentality within the arguments. The article accuses me, as well as Marco Pustianaz, Christian Lo Iacono, and Edizioni ETS¹² of having “obtusely” imported a set of incomprehensible theories from the United States to Italy, theories that would affirm that “talking about two ‘genders,’ male and female, is the product of a social construction caused by the ‘gender binary’ dictated by ‘heteronormativity’” and thus “there can be as many genders as you’d like” and “homosexuality does not exist” (Dall’Orto 2014: 30, translation Julia Heim).¹³ The spreading of gender studies and queer theories in Italian society has thus met with a lot of resistance not only in academia and conservative environments, but in administrations, educational institutions, and even within feminist and LGBTQIA movements. In this context, the ecclesiastic elite’s reduction of the fields of knowledge to the distorted and confused interpretation of Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity, risks becoming hegemonic. Perhaps the release of *Apocalissi queer: Elementi di teoria antisociale* [*Queer Apocalypses: Elements of Antisocial Theory*] in Italy in October 2013 may have helped clarify things a bit by showing how the complexity of the debate on the queer within the United States would have great difficulty being summed up in one “theory,” but that was certainly not my main motivation for writing the book. Instead of trying to “inform” interlocutors who have no intention of being informed, my intention was to confirm the prejudices of the detractors of gender studies and queer theories—professors, Catholics, feminists, gays—and show how justified their fears are. Even if the theory of gender, in the singular, does not exist, queer theories exist, and above all queer movements and subjects that mean to challenge male power and the heterosexist order, to give more power to women and sexual minorities, to multiply genders, and redefine kinship. They are theories, subjects, and movements that mock traditions and natural laws, and have no intention of asking forgiveness or looking for justifications for their abjection, nor any interest in the pity offered them by Pope Francis whom the Italian left seems to love so much. If it is true that God is love,

they couldn't give a fuck about being loved. The most astute answer to Italian Catholic integralism that I happened to hear was one given by a trans woman activist, Daniela Pompili, who is active in the Verona movements. When Daniela heard that, according to Thomas Aquinas, humans will come back at the end of times with their "real sex," she reacted with enthusiasm: "I can't wait: I'll finally have a vagina without having to get surgery!" What I have written certainly cannot compete with the expressiveness of this reaction, and yet in the (few) words that make it up, I recognize the spirit of the (excessive number of) words that comprise my book. Far from expressing the hope of being able to rise again to the truth of sex at the end of times, my friend Daniela's¹⁴ campy quip gets its strength from her certainty that she has already risen to the "truth" of *her* sex in this time. Queer subjects don't need the judgment of God's so-called Earthly representatives to approve their drives and their sexual desires, nor do they need this judgment in order for them to make use of their bodies, their vaginas, their clitorises, their penises, and their anuses any way they please. Condemned to the solitude of their singularity just like all human beings but in a different way than other human beings, they don't need to find redemption in a universal order (divine, natural, moral, cultural, civil, social, or political) that will confer meaning onto their existence. To the contrary, they can simply get enjoyment from their own senseless, irredeemable negativity, from the unsettling affect that their infamy has on any idea of universal order. As Daniela Pompili's comeback shows, if the apocalypse is the subversion of the present time and the advent of another world in this world, queer subjects—independent of the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, and the upholders of the tradition who want to cure LGBTQIA subjects and lead them back to a healthy heterosexuality, and of the preachers of "the right sort of progress" in which women will be women and gays will be gays in the most appropriate way—have no need for an apocalypse, because for them, the apocalypse, or rather apocalypses, plural, have been happening for a long time. And they keep happening, every moment, even in Italy.

It will become evident while reading that this book does not peacefully cohere to an antisocial position developed in the United States (Bersani 1996, 2010; Edelman 2004)—an "obtuse" import, to say it like Dall'Orto, of theses that were developed in a context that varies greatly from the Italian one. It is true that the book partially recounts the queer debate on antisociality in the United States, which is still not well known in non-Anglophone Europe where queer theories are often confused with

gender studies and integrated into feminism within Butler's thought. But, just as a theory of gender doesn't exist, one singular antisocial theory to which one must adhere doesn't exist either. And what I have attempted to do is retrace the presence of antisocial theoretical elements within a debate that is not born, in my opinion, in the United States universities in the nineties, but (at least) in the European gay liberation movements of the seventies. I hope that my perhaps overly-detailed reconstruction of the crusade against the concept of gender has served to clarify why today, whatever the commissioners of the National Scientific Qualification think, it is not a pose in Italy to acknowledge the debt that queer theories owe to queer movements, and that contemporary queer thought in the United States owes to the European gay, lesbian, and feminist thought that preceded it. Left more or less on their own in their protests against homotransbiphobic conferences¹⁵ and the vigils of the Sentinelle in piedi [Standing Sentinels],¹⁶ Italian LGBTQIA movements cannot let their disappointments or delusions stop them from critical engagement. The panic that was created around their claims places them before an obvious fact: despite all the efforts toward mending the public's image of homosexuality from the stigma of disease and death, and spreading a respectable image of lesbians and gays, despite the pressures from parties on the left and on the right to obtain social recognition for their couples, in the public debate homosexuality is still considered an unnatural practice that deserves AIDS as its divine punishment, as if it had never freed itself from an ancient social stigma. All of this deserves a reflection that is not merely a verification of failure, but one that makes sense of this failure and uses it to reconsider its political agenda. In this situation my effort has been to trace the presence of elements of antisocial queer theory before queer theories, within the reflections developed in the gay liberation movements of France (Hocquenghem 2000) and Italy (Mieli 1994, 2002) in the seventies, and reposition them within those uncomfortable interstices that occur in the Italian public sphere when LGBTQIA movements are able to get a foothold in academia, or simply when young LGBTQIA activists enroll in universities. I have done nothing more, and nothing less. The Ministry of Education Universities and Research may be able to prevent the distribution of the UNAR's antidiscrimination pamphlets to teachers, but it cannot limit the research freedom of its instructors: from the position I hold in the university—I hope because of merit, but surely because of luck—I have at least satisfied my urge, once more, to spread a bit of bad education (Edelman, publication forthcoming). After all, am I or am

I not a “professor of militant faggottism?” If this book does not represent a simple accession to the antisocial position, it is first and foremost because it is directed ideally, if not “at society,” at a potential, discontinuous, ephemeral queer community—a “tribe” without civilization, but not devoid of history (ch. 3, *infra*)—that emerges in the backlight of society, or better yet, in its negative.

As for possible accusations that this work contributes to a cultural imperialist operation, they should be directed elsewhere. I do not at all believe that reconstructing a debate on the queer that was carried out in the United States is equivalent to directing one’s gaze “forward” toward a future that we must help to develop even in the old Europe—even in Southern and Eastern Europe. To the contrary, as I have already mentioned, for me queer apocalypses represent a collapse of times in which the past rises up in the present. In the global world in which numerous temporalities coexist and space has lost its stability, my suggestion is to look around and look backward, in order to understand here and now where we are (where we have always been?). Throughout my book I reproach Leo Bersani for having constructed an ontology of homosexuality that begins with identificatory models from the 1800s, and Lee Edelman for putting too much trust in a structuralist psychoanalysis that freezes the sexual in an unalterable symbolic order that “precedes” every culture (ch. 1, 2, 3, *infra*). When confronted with such strong hypotheses I prefer to follow the tradition of philosophical skepticism of which Michel Foucault (1976) was just one of the great spokespeople: I believe it is worthwhile for LGBTQIA movements and subjects to continue to doubt every alleged truth about sex, not only when it comes from Vatican leaders but also when it comes from queer theories from the US, and to always remain in tune to what, in actuality, calls into question consolidated ways of thinking and feeling. Thus, I do not believe that everything remains immobile on the chessboard of sexuality, that the passing of time and the action of human beings leave no trace, or that the surface of the symbolic order is not scratched by the intense activity of the imaginary. For more than twenty years, it seems to me, however, Italian LGBTQIA communities and the intellectual environments close to them suffer the effects of a kind of delusion that transfigures lesbians and gays into champions of an egalitarian and liberal modernity in which love defeats power, and affectivity neutralizes the disturbing force of sexuality. Marzio Barbagli and Asher Colombo’s *Omosessuali moderni* [*Modern Homosexuals*], published in 2001 and revised in 2007 is considered, to this day, one of the most

extensive and detailed researches on the homosexual condition in Italy. The thesis put forth, with the participation and enthusiasm of the two sociologists, is that since the seventies, even in Italy, the redefinition of identity has been achieved through a process that, in the United States and in Northern Europe, has definitively transformed the “inverts” or “pederasts” of the past into the gays and lesbians of the present.

Unlike homosexuals of the past, modern homosexuals no longer make love to heterosexuals or to people of the opposite sex, but only to other homosexuals. They don't present themselves as effeminate men or masculine women. They no longer define their behavior and those of others as passive and active. They no longer have social and sexual relationships that are asymmetrical, relationships of superiority or inferiority, of domination and submission, but relationships of reciprocity and equality (Barbagli and Colombo 2007: 15, translation Julia Heim).

The arrival of “modernity” from the northern part of the world into Italy would thus have cancelled the identification models of “Mediterranean sexuality,” in which what is decisive is not the gender of the subject and the sex of the object of desire, but the role that sexual practices occupy, in particular activity or passivity during penetration. Already in the eighties and nineties, a widespread “orientalist” prejudice (Said 1978; Puar 2007) shared by Italian scholars, among whom the very same Dall’Orto mentioned above (1990),¹⁷ led to the belief that such identification models were still present, if residually, only in North African and South American countries, and in the “less industrialized” areas (Dall’Orto 1990: 796) of Italy, Spain, and the Balkans. Since the aughts, many including Barbagli and Colombo seem to be worried about freeing Italy from this backward image, as if gays and lesbians, in order to be worthy of juridical recognition for their couples, have to give up parts of themselves that are considered—according to the criteria of liberal respectability—“politically incorrect.” One does not have to be a sociologist to notice that in reality the interpretive rules of so-called “Mediterranean sexuality” still deeply permeate the experience of lesbian and gay communities, their relationships in meeting and cruising spots, their interactions in chat-rooms, not just in Italy, but throughout the globalized world. Antisocial queer theories, with their critique of liberal subjectivity, indeed seem to constitute a valid antidote to the modernist hallucinations afflicting sexual minorities. If queer studies can contribute to the reflections of Italian LGBTQIA

movements, whether or not they continue to be qualified using the English word “queer,” in my opinion, it will not be because of their utopian content, nor because they allow for new hope for a better future to be imported from the United States, but because, in referring to the past, they allow for a critical and disenchanted understanding of the present, an understanding of, for instance, the aggressive return of a religious conservatism within the public discourse that reminds sexual minorities of the negativity they still represent. And because they allow us to realize that Italy does not need the United States to feel queer. I am not just thinking of Mario Mieli here, but also, just to give a few recent examples: of the testimonies about the world of the “femminielli,”¹⁸ the “travestite,”¹⁹ and the transsexual and transgender people that were collected by Porpora Marcasciano (2002, 2007, 2008), the president of the Movimento di Identità Transessuale [Transsexual Identity Movement] in Bologna; of the history of the fascist persecution of the “arrusi”²⁰ reconstructed by Gianfranco Goretti and Tommaso Giartosio (2006), members of the association of homosexual parents Famiglie Arcobaleno [The Rainbow Families]; and of the account about the lives of “frocì”²¹ during the second postwar produced by Andrea Pini (2011), one of the founders of the Circolo di Cultura Omosessuale Mario Mieli [Society of Homosexual Culture Mario Mieli] in Rome. Even these studies, however, only partly produce antisocial effects, and only in a limited sense of the word. They show just how recent the desire for social integration—that today takes the shape of the liberal way of life—is for sexual minorities, and that in a very recent past their existence was carried out largely on the margins of society, where they expressed their own particularity through experimentation with different ways of life that were certainly not easy. But at the same time they contribute to the construction of something that resembles a collective history in which we can recognize a community.

To step away from activism and return to academia—the antisocialist purists will once more have to forgive me—it is downright hard for me not to be tempted to give some projections about the future (ch. 3, *infra*): the reason I founded the Research Center PoliTeSse at the University of Verona is that I would like to help make the position of those who practice studies of sexuality in Italy more comfortable, and to form a scientific and activist community that can support young researchers who would like to undertake this kind of research. Nevertheless, I must say a few words to illustrate the paradoxical advantages that the current situation, despite everything, affords those who would like to do theory. The absence

of disciplinary sectors dedicated exclusively to research on sexuality, of established traditions and of “authorities” to whom entrust oneself do limit career possibilities, but at the same time these lacks “force” a criticalness and make great amount of freedom “necessary.” Devoid of defined borders and acknowledged canons, feminist studies, gender studies, and queer theories cannot help but carry out an interesting disturbing action that ends up unsettling even their own boundaries. This kind of dedication in Italy means experimenting with innovative hybridizations, making the borders between disciplines more porous, practicing forms of parasitism, contagion, and scientific bastardization that provoke resistance in university corporations, but offer interesting occasions for thought. In terms of this book, for example, the lack of an established tradition of Cultural Studies in Italy has made it easier to give a critique of a certain psychoanalytic convention present within this line of research in the United States, and to attempt to lead queer theories back to that European continental philosophy (namely, non-Anglo-Saxon) from which they originally arose (Foucault 1976). The recourse to the tradition of conceptual history solidified in Europe (Brunner, Conze, Koselleck 1972–1997; Richter 1995) has allowed for an investigation of the origin of liberal thought in the contractualist tradition of the 1600s, and for an insertion of elements of anti-social theory within the classic philosophy of modernity. Thomas Hobbes’ individuals (ch. 5, *infra*) vs. Bruce LaBruce’s gay zombies (ch. 4, *infra*): an unlikely conflict. Yet it seems to me that this has a lot to do with my experience within the Italian University. Doesn’t the political neutrality of the research subject defended by the Political Philosophy Commission at the National Scientific qualification correspond to the sexual neutrality of the individual that Hobbes places in the state of nature as the foundation of political modernity (ch. 6, *infra*)? Isn’t it an attempt to reestablish, in secularized form, that peaceful totality to which the Catholic detractors of the theory of gender aspire? And the negative force of the sex drive that antisocial theories insist on instead continually avoids?

Studies on sexuality in Italy today face at least two risks: a hardly-specialized eclecticism, and an excessive ease of interpretations. Aware of having run both these risks, I assume every responsibility.

Lorenzo Bernini
Verona
January 2015

NOTES

1. Probably the fact that the article in question was published in Portuguese in a Brazilian magazine, and not in English in an American magazine was also a factor in its being considered “of little relevance.”
2. Like the *LGBT* series: *Studi di identità di genere e orientamento sessuale* [*Studies of gender identity and sexual orientation*] run by Francesco Bilotta for Mimesis Edizioni.
3. *Áltera* for example. *Collana di intercultura di genere* [*Series of Interculturality of Gender*] run by Liana Borghi and Marco Pustianaz for Edizioni ETS, where in 2013 the first edition of this book was published, and also, *áltera. Politiche e teorie della sessualità* [*Áltera. Politics and Theories of Sexuality*] that I run within the same publishing house along with Olivia Guaraldo and Massimo Prearo. Other series deal with feminist and LGBTQIA questions along with other themes, like *Difforme* [*Different*], run by Flavia Monceri again through Edizioni ETS, and *liminalia*, run by Cirus Rinaldi for edizioni Kaplan.
4. “AG About Gender—Rivista internazionale di studi di genere” [International magazine on gender studies].
5. See the center’s website: www.politesse.it, and the page dedicated to it on the University of Verona site: <http://www.dfpp.univr.it/?bibliocr&id=200&tipobc=6>.
6. The political party founded in 1989, which has its origin in the fusion between the Liga veneta and the Lega lombarda, two previous groups that fought for the autonomy of the regions of northern Italy, which are richer than the southern ones. Today it gets votes from all over the national territory, including the south, and is mainly characterized by its hostility toward “irregular” immigrants and homogenitoriality. Its latest slogan is “Prima gli italiani” [“Italians first”].
7. Thus, under the bipartisan government whose prime minister is the Secretary of the Democratic Party Matteo Renzi.
8. In the *Relatio post disceptationem* pronounced by General Speaker Cardinal Péter Erdő, during the opening of the discussion, he read, in fact, that “unions between people of the same sex cannot be compared to marriage between a man and a woman” and that “it is not even acceptable that they want to exert pressure on the behavior of the pastors or that international entities influence the financial aid for the introduction of legislation inspired by the ideology of gender.”
9. On January 17, 2015 an analogous conference was held in Milan as well, backed by the Lombard region, whose president, Roberto Maroni, is also a member of Lega Nord. The logo of the Expo also appeared on invitations to the universal exposition of 2015 that would be held in Milan a few months later.

10. Two days earlier a controversial plan for a law was approved in the House against discrimination and homotransphobic propaganda, it never became an actual law because still to this day it has never been put on the discussion calendar of the Senate. The speakers of the Verona conference were: Roberto de Mattei, Mauro Palmaro, Luca Galantini, professors in the History of the Church, the Philosophy of Rights, and the History of modern rights at the European University of Rome, respectively; Dina Nerozzi, a professor of Psycho-Neuro-Endocrinology at the University Tor Vergata of Rome; Chiara Atzori, an infectologist at the Luigi Sacco Hospital of Milan, Matteo D'Amico, a teacher of Philosophy and History in Ancona. See the acts: Family Tomorrow, European Movement in Defense of Life 2014; and my comment in Bernini 2014.
11. On the occasion of the suspension of the distribution of the UNAR anti-discrimination pamphlets to teachers, only the Società Italiana delle Storiche [The Italian Society of Historians] expressed disappointment to the Minister of Education, University and Research Stefania Giannini, in a letter that is accessible at the site http://www.immaginiamicheravenna.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/LetteraSIS_genere.pdf (last accessed January 20, 2015).
12. The publishing house that published the first edition of this book (see note 3, *supra*). Stuningly, in the short list of authors given by Dall'Orto there are no women.
13. For Dall'Orto "the fundamental thesis of the queer is that homosexuality does not exist."
14. I met Daniela in May 2008, during the seminar *Elementi di critica Trans* [*Elements of Trans Critique*], which I discuss in the "overture" *Singing Beneath the Moon*, *infra*.
15. For example in Verona, after the conference on September 21, 2013, on November 9, 2013 a counter-conference organized by LGBTQIA associations was organized that was ironically entitled *Contro natura? Lesbiche, gay, bisessuali, asessuali, trans*, intersex/dsd si interrogano sul loro posto nel creato*. [*Against Nature? Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Asexuals, Trans*, Intersex/DSD Question Their Place in Creation*].
16. The *Sentinelle in piedi* movement has brought a method of protest to Italy from the analogous French movement *Les Veilleurs debout*. The protesters occupy a square, standing approximately two meters from one another, all turned in the same direction, and for one hour they silently read texts inspired by Catholicism. Since September 2013, following the House's approval of the plan for the law against homotransphobia (note 11, *supra*) events of this kind have happened in many Italian cities, among which are Arezzo, Bologna, Ivrea, Lecce, Milan, Naples, Reggio Emilia, Rome, Turin, Treviso, Varese, and Verona. Each time the Standing Sentinels are

protested against by LGBTQIA associations, which are at times joined by student movements and squatters.

17. "The Mediterranean paradigm may be defined as an attempt to interpret and harmonize exclusive homosexual conduct employing the same conceptual framework as that in use for heterosexuality. Its most salient characteristic is the sharp dichotomy between the one who is considered the 'homosexual' in the strict sense, that is the one who plays the insertee role, as against the one who plays the inserter role (the 'active')." (Dall'Orto 1990: 796). According to Dall'Orto, Mediterranean sexuality is characteristic of patriarchal societies in which, because of women's segregation, the sexual exuberance of men before marriage finds its release in passive men who assume an identity that is in some way feminine, even when those people are not transgender. For Dall'Orto, this model is not compatible with the modern gay movement whose members would not have any doubt about belonging to the masculine gender. In Chap. 2, I, however, will maintain that "from the seventies through today, though psychology insists on considering gender identity (male and female) and sexual orientation (heterosexual and homosexual) as two completely distinct components of a person's personality, the term 'gay' has come to mean not only a preference in one's object of desire, but a precise social identity, perhaps a real and true gender."
18. The term "femminiello" in Neapolitan dialect is the masculine form of the diminutive "femminiella," which means "little female," and is used to point to a specific social identity that is rooted in Neapolitan culture. There has been evidence since early modernity of this identity (Valerio and Zito 2010, 2013), and some elderly femminielli are still alive. Given its precise role at the margins of society, only in an imperfect way could the femminiello be defined as a transgender man or woman, or a passive effeminate homosexual.
19. "Travestita" in Italian is the female form of "travestito" ["transvestite"]. The nickname was used ironically in gay circles in the seventies to indicate the transvestitism of effeminate gays which did not necessarily correspond to what today we would call a transgender identity.
20. In Sicilian dialect "arruso" is an epithet used to speak disparagingly about passive homosexual men.
21. "Frocio" is the disparaging word used in the Roman dialect to speak about a homosexual man: Pini uses it to point to the experience of homosexual men in Italy before the arrival of the concept of the gay identity.

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SINGING BENEATH THE MOON (OVERTURE)

There is a painting by Klee entitled Angelus Novus. It shows an angel as if he was about to depart from something he is staring at. His eyes are wide open, his mouth gaping and his wings stretched out. This is what the angel of history must look like. He has turned his face to the past. Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe that is continuously piling rubble upon rubble and hurling it in front of his feet. He would rather like to stay, awaken the dead and join together what has been broken apart. But a storm is blowing from the direction of paradise; it has got caught in his wings, and it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. The storm drives him irresistibly into the future to which he turns his back while the pile of debris in front of him is growing up to the sky. This storm is what we call progress.

(Walter Benjamin, *Theses on the History of Philosophy*)

1. Castiglione degli Ubertini (Arezzo), May 2008. The sunny countryside, the smells of spring, an agrotourism, about thirty people. For three days they talk about sex and politics; with seriousness, but also with irony, they narrate life-stories, they share their own senses of themselves with each other. They laugh frequently, and every so often someone gets emotional. Every night there is a big party. The small community celebrates its rites in the clear moonlight: singing oldies until far into the night, imitating the divas of old. Three days, two nights: a brief period of time for an event that will leave its mark. About forty years since Sylvia Rivera¹ launched that famous bottle—or stiletto?—that sparked to the Stonewall riots, the body of Italian associations dedicated to her has given rise to an original experience: the first Italian seminar on transsexuality and transgenderism

whose speakers are trans women and men—no longer the object of study for others (psychiatrists, psychologists, surgeons, endocrinologists...), but subjects of their own knowledge.

The occasion stemmed from the proposal put forth by ONIG (the National Observatory on Gender Identity), to include transexuality in the list of “rare diseases,” so that the National Health Service, even without large-scale experimentation, can cover the hormones necessary for transitions.² But the debate does not end there: the refusal—shared by all those who were present—of every form of pathologizing of transexualism and transgenderism is a starting point for reflections on the personal experiences of each individual, and for collective reflection on the history of an entire movement. When is a trans identity “born”? What other ways can it be named? Is being trans a psychiatric disorder as it has, since May 2008, been labeled by the DSM IV (and how it will be labeled in five years by the DSM 5³), or is it a “meaningful human experience”⁴? None of these questions get answered during these three days; the answers are always multiple, and often each of the participants has a different one. All of the voices singing together remain polyphonous, without ever joining in unison. And all the perked ears are aware of the much welcomed differences, which are never judged.

My ears were among them. Not being trans, I had the honor of being one of the “privileged witnesses” present at the seminar. Along with a few others, I would take on, as I would later discover, the role of “mediator with the ‘notorious’ queer world”.⁵ With the typical arrogance of those who come from academia, gratified by the invitation, I was sure that I would have a lot to say, to comment on and to teach. Instead, however, I discover the pleasure of staying silent: realizing that all of my philosophy has been put in check by the encounter playing out before me, and largely I listen, I observe and I learn a lot. I learn, for example, that ethics is a practice that applies to singularities, not a theory that has to do with universal categories. That each singularity exceeds the universal to which the theory forcefully tries to trace it back. And finally that, despite all this, with caution and modesty, one can and must continue to think, subjecting the theory to the careful scrutiny of practice, vivifying it with experience and with respect for the experience of others.

2. After having the privilege of participating in such an important moment for the Italian trans movement, in Bologna in June 2008 I was also fortunate enough to be a speaker at *Intersex Pride*, organized by the collective Antagonismogay, which was one of the first efforts to politically

thematize the intersex question in Italy. I was also asked to speak at the conference *L'intersessualità nella società italiana* [*Intersexuality in Italian Society*] which was held in Florence in September 2010 after the opening of the first Italian “center for intersex people and their relatives and friends” by Ireos, “the self-directed queer community”, within the same city.⁶ These two events will one day perhaps be celebrated as the inaugural moments of a new political subjectivity. In the United States, during the last twenty years, the intersex movement has worked to build a stable alliance with other movements—so much so that it is now commonplace to use the expression “LGBTQIA movements” (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual-transgender, queer, intersexual, asexual)—and has had several victories in terms of medical protocol reform for the treatment of intersexuality. In Italy, however, though support groups for people affected by intersex “syndromes” and their relatives have existed for some time now, like the asexuality movement, the political intersex movement has only just begun.⁷

Compared to the United States, the majority of European states, some states in Central and South America and South Africa, Italy has seriously delayed establishing civil rights for its citizens, which certainly makes it a less-than-welcoming place for sexual minorities. As I was writing this book, France, New Zealand, Uruguay and Argentina have followed the road already traveled by Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and South Africa, all of which have approved a law that grants lesbian and gay couples full rights to marry and adopt. England is headed down the same path. In the United States, where homosexual marriages are recognized in seventeen of the fifty states as well as the capital, Washington, DC, Barack Obama launched his second presidential mandate affirming that there is a continuity between the demand for civil rights by black citizens and the demand being made by sexual minorities; he then asked the Supreme Court to abrogate the norm that defines marriage as a “union between a man and a woman”. Even in Brazil and Mexico City they recognize some rights for homosexual couples, and in Argentina you need only go to the Office of Vital Statistics to change the official sex on your legal documents. In Colombia there is a law that enforces the illegality of performing genital mutilation on intersex people who have not yet reached the age of consent. In Italy, however, where women are still seriously underrepresented in politics and in the workforce more generally, the law restricting trans people’s ability to change the sex on their legal documents is still quite backward,⁸ lesbian and gay

couples are not legally recognized, and there is no anti-discrimination law explicitly sanctioning homophobia and transphobia—like the one included in the post-apartheid South African constitution. Italy has always been characterized by a legislative gap, which used to, at least until the advent of Fascism,⁹ make it a destination for homosexual men's tourism. Today, however, this gap has made it inhospitable for a significant number of its own citizens. The women's, lesbian, gay and trans movements have affected insufficient change despite their long history in the country.

Intellectual scholarship and academic life have also long been affected by this conservative, if not reactionary climate: unlike what happens in some of the most prestigious foreign universities, in Italian universities there are no fields or positions for feminist, lesbian, gay or trans studies. Yet nevertheless the number of scholars who might be considered “mediators” between the trans movement, or between the beginnings of the intersex or asexual movements, and the “notorious queer world” is far higher than it was five years ago: recently, in Italy, there has been a real proliferation of queer editorial, academic and cultural initiatives.¹⁰ One could read this hiatus between the late dissemination of an intellectual trend—which, moreover, is rumored to have already passed in North America (Penney 2013)—and the undeniable backwardness of the context in which it took root as the umpteenth confirmation of the snobbery of Italian intellectuals: proving once more that the university is so far removed from the rest of society, and that theory is as far from practice. But it is also possible to read the situation differently and say to the contrary that precisely in Italy, precisely today, queer reflections are indispensable: for laying the groundwork to create opportunities for those who have been unable speak, for lifting the Italian lesbian and gay movement out of its sense of defeat, for deconstructing the way in which political action is currently thought of and its successes and failures evaluated.

3. With the intention of investigating this possibility, in April 2009, Marco Pustianaz invited twenty-five scholars and activists to define the concept of “queer” and speak critically about its translatability within the Italian context. The results became *Queer in Italia* [*Queer in Italy*] (2011), an anthology that documents a crucial stage in the history and political culture of Italy. After remembering that in Italy, just as in the United States, “oppositional LGBTI movements whose objective is not the inclusion of sexual minorities in society, but the transformation of the society, call themselves queer”, in that book I defined queer as “the theoretical deconstructionist awareness according to which every identity is built through

cultural meanings endowed with a story, and as such they are mobile and alterable.” I then specified that for me this constituted above all “an *ethics*, a way of being of the subject in *relation* to others” (Bernini 2011b: 40). This answer took into account the prevalent reception of the queer within philosophy and political studies in Italy and Europe, understood largely through comparisons to our feminism with *gender studies* in the United States. Until very recently, within the European cultural debate, “queer” mainly pointed to theories that were considered complex and counterintuitive, but also heart-warming in their progressiveness. Michel Foucault (1976, 1984a, b) is the progenitor and Judith Butler (1990, 1993, 1997, 2004b) the most illustrious exponent of these theories in which the subject’s ontological reliance on the social does not exclude the possibility of politically “dislocating” the social in search of more livable and pleasurable ways of life.

In fall 2010, as the book Pustianaz edited was waiting to be released, Teresa de Lauretis meaningfully and disquietingly altered Italian awareness of the queer when she was invited to Bologna by a network of LGBTQI collectives. In an impassioned seminar on Freudian sexual theory (Freud 1905), she illustrated a line of thought that, rather than imagining new strategies of subjectification and new communities, supports the breaking of social relations and wishes for the suppression of the subject in pleasure by insisting on the ties that the sex drive has with masochism and the death drive. Leo Bersani (1996, 2008, 2010), Lee Edelman (2004) and in part de Lauretis herself (2010): a diverse constellation of authors and an alternative conception of the queer, in which psychoanalysis and cultural studies become instruments for a dense political polemic oriented in opposition to the philosophy of Foucault and Butler. This book is dedicated to discussing the contribution that these “antisocial queer theories” can supply to philosophical-political reflection at a time when the debate around the sex question, even in Italy, seems to be monopolized by the marriage question. My intention is thus to fill a gap, to provide some details on the debate in the United States that serve as the backdrop for Butler’s already well-known theories, and to open up reflections on the queer which have been too imbalanced toward the lesbian feminist side by accounting for reflections developed in large part by gay men thinkers. The subject, as you will see, is incandescent and requires a multidisciplinary approach which, in addition to political philosophy and the history of political thought, also involves the history of political movements, psychoanalytic theory, cultural studies and an attentive and constant observation

of current events. Rather than a systematic schema, a rhizomatic structure is then necessary that nevertheless does not make the reconstruction of an overall view impossible.

4. The Frankfurt School, feminist thought, Deleuze and Guattari, along with Foucault: philosophy has long learned how politically significant sex is and how much western modernity has tried to conceal sexual difference beneath the principle of a presumed equality for all individuals before the law. The first three chapters, which constitute the first part of the book, offer a reconstruction of the genesis of academic queer theories (Butler 1990; Kosovsky Sedgwick 1990; de Lauretis 1991), as well as some examples of the contribution of gay thought to the criticism of the modern political subject, and serve as a reminder of how this thought has always fed off of its comparison to the practices of social movements. Through the course of analysis, the French theorist Guy Hocquenghem (2000; first ed. 1972) and the Italian activist Mario Mieli (2001; first ed. 1977) are nominated, along with Foucault (1976), the representatives of different positions in the intense debate on sexual liberation which, in the 1970s, critically compared itself to the myth of revolution. These two gay activists—the former of which employing an approach reminiscent of Deleuzian “schizoanalysis” and the latter cohering to Marcusian “Freudomarxism”—used provocative concepts such as “anal desire” and “original transsexuality” to allude to unknown models of political subjectivity. These two knew how to theorize the transformative spirit of the time, which would, however, shortly be crushed by the dual trauma that constituted the birth of the queer in the 1980s: the AIDS crisis and the falling of the Berlin Wall. Foucault himself died during the epidemic in 1984, leaving behind a constructivist theory of sexuality that would prove very successful.

Bersani and Edelman can thus be considered the queer prosecutors of a tradition of European gay thought resurrected in the United States at a time marked both by the failing of a whole political imaginary and a set of academic triumphs of “Foucauldianism” in gender studies. When the transgressive potentialities of the sexual, so evident in Mieli and Hocquenghem, in US universities were neutralized by the prevalence of the concept of “gender” above that of “sex”, Bersani (2010; first ed. 1987) began a heated polemic against the common ideas of “liberal” and “political correctness” generated, in his opinion, by Foucauldian thought. From the 1980s to today, the US thinker (1996, 2008) has gone down a political path that repeatedly insists on anal passivity as a symbol of the death

of the male subject, a symbol that homosexuality has always represented for the heterosexual society—and that AIDS has only “rendered literal”. Nonetheless, and not without contradiction, he has never stopped sharing Foucault’s aspiration to produce new styles of gay existence, not even when it was evident that styles of gay existence would be subsumed by the most traditional of lifestyles, namely the concept of family based on marriage. Within this new context, in the 2000s, Edelman (2004) re-elaborated Bersani’s use of the psychoanalytic concept of “the death drive” into an “imperative of enjoyment” in response to Hocquenghem’s invitation to shed any “civilization” ideal. Using Lacanian language, Edelman positions the modern political subject—perennially seized by an imaginary that requires sacrificing the present for a future epitomized by the reproductive family—against a queer subject consumed by a drive that forces its radical adherence to the present; and he contrasts the sexual liberation movements to the static nature of society’s refusal.

The second part of the book constitutes an attempt both to save the sexual from the oblivion reserved for it by a certain Foucauldian mainstream queer theory and to limit the risks of anti-politics and solipsism contained in antisocial queer theory. There are three argumentative strategies that will be put into play, and each has its own corresponding chapter, permeated by its own apocalyptic imaginary. The first adopts a method typical of North American queer theory, namely the use of common cinematic figures to substantiate concepts. This strategy seeks to show how the evolution of the zombie from the Caribbean myths to the films of Bruce LaBruce may be seen as a metaphor for embracing the negativity of the drive without the closure of any or all forms of society or with the dissolution of the political subject. LaBruce shows how in contemporary cinema homosexuality continues to be an occasion for a resignification of reinforced codes: his gay zombies regain self-awareness and are not contagious, they don’t bring death but renew life, they prefer solitude to the flock and yet do not give up their search for companionship. They are, in essence, the symbol of a gay-becoming that challenges heteronormativity as much as it challenges contemporary homonormativity, but resists being resigned to categorically representing death.

Remembering that Bersani, de Lauretis and Edelman’s common polemic objective is not the subject of politics *tout court*, but a well-defined “liberal subject,” from which Foucault would be blamed for not taking sufficient distance, my second strategy toward approaching antisocial queer theory follows, instead, an interpretative tradition reinforced by European political

philosophy. The purpose of this is to show how this anthropological model was developed by an absolutist philosopher in the 1600s and not by a liberal politician. It was in fact Thomas Hobbes (1969, 1984, 2007) who made the “individual” the correlate of state sovereignty, and to suspend him in an eternal present, of which the future—as Hocquenghem and Edelman warned—is a mere projection. With the aim of neutralizing the danger of religious wars, the state, in Hobbesian theory, functions as a time machine that presses the future against the present to produce a compulsory sociality in which the transformation foretold by the Messiah is postponed to the end of time; the collective imaginary is so bound by the reality of a human nature that only the sovereign is authorized to interpret. Those who renounce politics in the name of the drive would thus be responding to an imperative that comes from afar, unless they are not renouncing politics but rather abandoning the heterosexist politics of waiting for a queer politic rooted in the present.

The trans seminar of Castiglione degli Ubertini and the intersex initiatives in Bologna and Florence, like the gay liberation movements of the 1970s, are proof of the fact that waiting for institutional recognition is not necessary to establish new ties, practice new communities and give voice to those who are still without—to sing individual and collective stories beneath the moon. The last chapter provides a conclusion that returns to the book’s beginning, like a light-hearted invitation to inhabit the queer time of memory. From this ill-fated observatory that is Italy, the progress of sexual minority rights seems a relentless river whose banks our country has only just brushed against. But instead of giving in to depression looking at a future which in other places seems already present, and from here seems unreachable, the queers could turn their gaze backward, like Klee’s angel so celebrated by Benjamin (1955; eng. trans. 1999, p. 249), and ironically contemplate the “debris” left behind. Certainly, it won’t be possible for them “to wake the dead and put the pieces back together”—only in Bruce LaBruce’s films can queer zombies come back from the dead—but who knows if, evoking the “prophetic voices” of those who have witnessed the birth of contemporary gay movements like Hocquenghem, Mieli and Foucault, they won’t discover that there is something to save, something from the past that they could be missing should they reach those who seemed to precede them.

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NOTES

1. Sylvia Rae Rivera (1951–2002), American trans activist is remembered for being at the frontlines of the Stonewall riots. On the night between the June 27 and 28, 1969, she launched an empty bottle of gin at police as they performed a normal raid at the Stonewall Inn—an establishment in the Village (New York) frequented by lesbian, gay and “transvestite” people. June 28 is celebrated all over the world as a day of pride for LGBTQIA (lesbian, gay bisexual, transsexual-transgender, queer, intersex and asexual) people.
2. In Italy, the cost of drugs is only paid for by the National Health Service when it is prescribed for a pathology that appears among the therapeutic recommendations concerning the same drug listed by the National Manual; until a pathology appears under the therapeutic recommendations for a drug, the effectiveness of the drug must be shown by a large-scale and well documented experiment. “Rare” diseases are considered an exception to this; the drug must be free-of-charge even without large-scale experimentation—which cannot be carried out given the low number of cases present within the national territory.
3. The DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) is the official list of mental disorders published by the APA (American Psychiatric Association). Since its first edition (1952) it has been considered the reference book for psychiatrists worldwide. Homosexuality was officially removed from the DSM only after a decision by the APA on May 17, 1990—this is why May 17 is celebrated as an “international day against homophobia”—while transexuality and transgenderism are still present. In the fourth edition of the DSM (published in 1994 and revised in 2000) both identities were catalogued as GID: *Gender Identity Disorder*. The

choice to keep or eliminate this “psychiatric affliction” was one of the most debated topics within the scientific community prior to the publication of the fifth edition of the manual, which launched in May 2013. In place of the GID the caption “*Gender Dysphoria*” appears. While, since 1990 gays and lesbians have all suddenly healed, beginning in 2013 trans people are at least afflicted merely by a “dysphoria,” which is considered a lesser affliction than an “identity disorder.”

4. Here are the titles of the discussions during the three days: *Our history from negation to visibility, from oppression to liberation, Consonance and dissonance in the words they call us: stereotypes, representation, meaning and significance, Pathology or meaningful human experience?*
5. I found this out when the tapings of the conversations during the seminar became the book *Elementi di critica trans* [*Elements of Trans Critique*] (Arietti et al. 2010). I read Marcasciano’s introduction: “The decision was made to open it up to a however possibly small number of people, [...] defined as ‘privileged witnesses’, who could introduce a particular point of view given their proximity to the questions posed, people in the scientific, political or cultural spheres who had offered ideas and shown particular interest and awareness of transsexual experience. Among these witnesses were: Pia Covre, the leader of the civil rights committee for prostitutes; Renato Busarello, Cristian Lo Iacono and Lorenzo Bernini serving as mediators between the ‘notorious’ queer world...” (13).
6. The “center for intersex people and their relatives and friends” was then moved to the TRANSGenere Consulting headquarters in Torre del Lago (Lucca).
7. While the different forms of intersexuality have been considered by the medical world to be pathological conditions and syndromes, in the fourth edition of the DSM (cf. note 3) asexuality was equated with HSDD: Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder. Thanks to the asexual movement in the United States, which in a little more than a decade was able to have an effective discussion with the APA, the exemptions to the fifth addition of the DSM (which are not among the diagnostic criteria), affirm instead that such a dysfunction should not be diagnosed to people who identify as asexual.
8. Law 164/82 does not, in fact, allow for the so-called small solution, namely the possibility to change one’s gender on documents without undergoing sexual reassignment surgery. Recently, in rare cases, there have been instances of flexibility with regard to the interpretation of the law.
9. Not even during Mussolini’s dictatorship was any law enacted to explicitly sanction homosexual acts. As Lorenzo Benadusi (2005) has shown the enforcement of the Fascist model of virility entailed not only the repression of homosexuality with the practice of confinement it also entailed the systemic use of accusations of “pederasty” as an instrument of delegitimization

for political opponents and to gain control of accounts within the national Fascist party.

10. The publication of works on the subject has increased substantially since 2010: Pustianaz et al. 2000; Antosa 2007; Bernini 2010a; Di Stefano 2010; Monceri 2010; Pustianaz 2011; Antosa 2012; Arfini and Lo Iacono 2012; Asquer 2012; Chemotti and Susanetti 2012; Ellena et al. 2012; Rinaldi 2012; Trappolin 2013.

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PART I

Elements of Antisocial Theory

Genealogical Exercises

Poor Tony Krause looked godawful: sucked-out, hollow-eyed, past ill, grave-ready, his face's skin the greenish white of extreme-depth marine life, looking less alive than undead, identifiable as poor old Poor Tony only by the boa and red leather coat and the certain way he held his hand to his throat's hollow as he walked, that way Equus Reese always said always reminded him of black-and-white-era starlet descending curved stairs into some black-tie function, Krause never so much walking as making an infinite series of grand entrances into pocket after pocket of space, a queenly hauteur now both sickening and awesome given Krause's spectral mien, passing across the Grille's window, his eyes either on or looking right through the two skinny girls plodding ahead of him, following them out of the window's right-hand side

(David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest)

1.1 FROM THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE...

From the nineteenth century, in English, “*queer*” is used as a pejorative epithet against homosexual men. It comes from the German “*quer*,” which, in turn, is derived from the Latin verb “*torquere*,” meaning “transverse,” “diagonal” or “slanting.” “*Queer*” is thus the opposite of “*straight*” and—since heterosexuality is traditionally associated with moral recti-

Translation by Julia Heim

tude—"heterosexual." It can literally be translated into Italian as "storto" ["crooked"], "strano" ["strange"], "bizzarro" ["bizarre"], but semantically, queer is equivalent to "checca" ["fairy"] or "frocio" ["faggot"]. Different genealogies of queer theories are possible that pass through the histories of slavery, racial violence and critical race studies (Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, Hortense Spillers), but in the academic sphere, the first one to be generally credited with putting the adjective "queer" next to the noun "theory" is Teresa de Lauretis (1991), who in February of 1990 held a conference at the University of Santa Cruz (California) entitled "Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities." The expression "queer theory" does not appear instead in the two books published that same year which are often considered the inaugural texts of queer philosophy and queer cultural studies, respectively: *Gender Trouble* by Judith Butler and *Epistemology of the Closet* by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. In order to find the philosophical origins of these American academic queer theories, however, one must go even further back in time, to at least 1976, when *The Will to Knowledge*, the first volume of Michel Foucault's *History of Sexuality*, was published in France. It served in fact as a fundamental reference for de Lauretis, Butler, Kosofsky Sedgwick and all the scholars that followed and continued to develop critical scholarship about sexuality.

In addition to being a theoretical tool, the term "queer" also takes on a political use by radical groups who are dissatisfied by the majority of LGBT movements' fight for civil rights, and who contest the reassuring image of sexual minorities as victims of discrimination whose only desire is to be assimilated into existing societies (matrimony, adoption, the right to serve in the military, and all the juridical support that would guarantee the comforts of a bourgeois homosexual life). These radical groups who promote antagonistic politics, these are the "queers." For example, in Italy the term "queer" is mostly used by those on the left fringes of the LGBT movements, who, more intensely than their peers, fight with righteousness, without compromise, and perhaps with extremism, for social recognition and for the rights of transsexuals and transgendered and intersex people, for prostitutes, and for gay, lesbian and transmigrants or those belonging to ethnic minorities and low social classes.

It is hard to establish whether the queer political groups were born before or after the theoretical use of the term "queer." In a note within the paper taken from that famous conference in February of 1990, de Lauretis specifies that when she used the term, she was not aware of the existence of Queer Nation.¹ The official date of the founding of the association is, in fact, March 20, 1990, when 60 or so activists arranged to meet at the Lesbian,

Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Community Services Center of Greenwich Village in New York and create an action-oriented group whose aim was to fight homophobia and promote the visibility of sexual minorities. In the months that followed, other groups with the same name were founded in San Francisco and other North American cities. Instead of reassuring public opinion by promoting a conformist image of sexual minorities, instead of fighting for equal rights like a lot of gay and lesbian movements in the United States and instead of promoting a message of peace and tolerance toward sexual minorities, the activists of Queer Nation—using, as Butler (1993: 21) would say, a “reworking of abjection into political agency”—chose to present themselves as a threat to the respectability and calm of bourgeois life, and favored a protest style that was in equal parts provocative, aggressive and parodistic. The *Queer Nation Manifesto*, for example, published on the occasion of the 1990 Gay Pride Parade in New York, with sermon-like tones (“brother, sister...”), insisted on the dangers that a heterosexist society constantly holds for queer people, and called the sexual minorities to action to form an “army” that would fight for a different world: not to obtain pockets of tolerance within society, but, to the contrary, to make every social space “a lesbian and gay space”:

How can I tell you. How can I convince you, brother, sister, that your life is in danger: That everyday you wake up alive, relatively happy, and a functioning human being, you are committing a rebellious act. You as an alive and functioning queer are a revolutionary. There is nothing on this planet that validates, protects or encourages your existence. It is a miracle you are standing here reading these words. You should by all rights be dead. Don't be fooled, straight people own the world and the only reason you have been spared is you're smart, lucky or a fighter. Straight people have a privilege that allows them to do whatever they please and fuck without fear. But not only do they live a life free of fear; they flaunt their freedom in my face. [...]

Being queer is not about a right to privacy; it is about the freedom to be public, to just be who we are. It means everyday fighting oppression; homophobia, racism, misogyny, the bigotry of religious hypocrites and our own self-hatred. (We have been carefully thought to hate ourselves.) And now of course it means fighting a virus as well, and those homohaters who are using AIDS to wipe us off the face of the earth. Being queer means leading a different sort of life. It's not about the mainstream, profit-margins, patriotism, patriarchy or being assimilated. It's not about executive directors, privilege and elitism. It's about being at the margins, defining ourselves; it's about gender-fuck and secrets, what's beneath the belt and deep inside the heart; it's about the night. Being queer is “grass roots” because we know that everyone of us, every body, every cunt, every hearth and ass

and dick is a world of pleasure waiting to be explored. Every one of us is a world of infinite possibility. We are an army because we have to be. We are an army because we are so powerful. (We have so much to fight for; we are the most precious of endangered species). And we are an army of lovers because it is we who know what love is. Desire and lust, too. We invented them. We come out of the closet, face the rejection of society, face firing squads, just to love each other! Every time we fuck, we win. We must fight for ourselves (no one else is going to do it) and if in that process we bring greater freedom to the world at large then great. [...] Let's make every space a Lesbian and Gay space.²

To understand the meaning of the provocative and furious feeling within Queer Nation's behavior, two events that serve as the backdrop should be kept in mind: the falling of the Berlin Wall and the failure of the utopian hopes for sexual revolution that had characterized the gay, lesbian and transmovement in the years preceding the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic. The movement was in fact created by the militant activists of ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) in a moment marked by a lack of institutional commitment in the United States to help protect those with AIDS, and by a large media campaign against gay and transgender promiscuity in New York and San Francisco.

Numerous queer authors from the United States, and from California in particular, subsequently distanced themselves from Queer Nation not for its provocative behavior, but for its presumed lack of radicalness, criticizing the association because its claim-seeking behavior (the search for social and juridical recognition for sexual minorities) would have positioned them among the "liberals."³ It is, however, without a doubt that the queer movement and queer theories have and still carry the sign of the same traumatic dual origin (Wagner 1993).⁴ Foucault himself, in 1984, fell victim to AIDS—probably contracting the HIV virus during his stays in California. But beyond the symbolic meaning that can retrospectively be lent to this biographical date, the theoretical reason for which *The Will to Knowledge* can be considered the founding text of queer philosophy is that Foucault employed a polemic against the doctrines of the sexual revolution that were in vogue during the seventies and that he called "Freudomarxism."⁵ What Foucault was careful to spell out was that the action that power exerts on sex is not simply repressive, and that sexuality, far from being a nucleus of natural desires that would free people once and for all from the weight of the capitalist superstructures and guarantee a happy and peaceful future for humanity, is itself a product of modernity's power/knowledge structure, the "sexual apparatus" whose history can be

reconstructed. In his opinion, the current categories used to classify sexual identity—heterosexuality, homosexuality, transsexuality—do not simply describe the nature of bodies and desires; they mold this nature and give it a fixed form. Modern sexual identities, to be precise, are the result of the joint action of the so-called human sciences and the administrative and educative apparatuses of the state that govern these sexual identities and apply normative criteria to the life of the population (to every single component of the population) based on these sciences. Thus, we are dealing not with data but with constructions that, as rigid as they appear, are historically produced and can historically be modified. Sexual minorities do not occupy a position outside the sexual apparatus, and are not simply oppressed. They are not pure creatures in whose hands the destiny of the revolution would be entrusted: to the contrary, they are scandalously impure creatures, who are themselves products of the sexual apparatus like those rejects that are indispensable for its functioning.⁶ (Is heterosexuality not defined by its distinction from homosexuality? And is n't there a prime spot for homophobia among the attributes of heterosexual masculine identity?)

In the history laid out by Foucault, the sexual apparatus has its origin in Europe, in the spiritual practices of medieval monastic communities, and spread to all of society when the fourth Lateran Council (1215) established the confession requirement for all believers and underwent a process of secularization with the advent of modernity and the formation of the state. Confession is its driving force, and it attributes the stature of the subject's fundamental "truth" to sex, understood as sexual desire. In order to emerge, this truth requires the intervention of another who has not just a hermeneutic or maieutic role, but also the role of pastoral guide. While these roles were initially assigned to priests in the confessional, starting in the nineteenth century, when the state assumed what Foucault calls "biopolitical" functions, educators, pedagogues, medics and psychiatrists produced knowledge about sex and determined its regulation.⁷ The human sciences thus take the place of the Christian directive, as sexual transgression extends from the legal and moral sphere to the natural one. Sexuality therefore becomes delineated in sexual identities: no longer are the acts that are performed or abandoned by the subject the only objects of judgment; the presumed personality that accompanies the subject and these acts also faces this scrutiny. According to Foucault, even psychoanalysis, particularly in its "revolutionary" use by the seventies movements, belongs to the sexuality apparatus. It does not really matter that the pastor promises salvation through the liberation *from* desire or

through the liberation *of* desire: desire is nevertheless understood as a truth of sex to which the subject is subjected. In the first case, it is a temptation you *must* resist; in the second case, it is an inclination that you *must* indulge; but in both cases, the subject has no choice but to obey a truth (*his or her* truth) that others have set for him or her: “Tell me what your desire is and I will tell you who you are” (Foucault 1982a; Eng. trans. 2011: 389).

From Foucault’s open perspective, sexual liberty does not consist in recovering the truth of a “natural” desire that is always present in all the individuals of the human race, nor in the liberation of a multitude of desires that would constitute the particular truths of every individual. Instead, sexual liberty consists in the creative use that each human being can make of the human body in search of “artificial” pleasures that are thus neither true nor false.⁸ Foucault responds to the designs of what he calls “the great sermon” of the sexual revolution (1976: 7), by proposing an anarchic resistance—full of thought and body experimentation but agenda-less—as a form of struggle against the sexuality apparatus. Thus, Foucault concludes, for example, an interview from June 1982, published posthumously in August 1984 in the gay American magazine *The Advocate*:

I think that one of the great experiences we’ve had since the last war is that all those social and political programs have been a great failure. We have come to realize that things never happen as we expect from a political program, and that a political program has always, or nearly always led to abuse or political domination from a bloc—be it from technicians or bureaucrats or other people. But one of the developments of the sixties and seventies which I think has been a good thing is that certain institutional models have been experimented without a program. Without a program does not mean blindness—to be blind to thought. For instance, in France there has been a lot of criticism recently about the fact that there are no programs in the various political movements about sex, about prisons, about ecology, and so on. But in my opinion, being without a program can be very useful and very original and creative, if it does not mean without proper reflection about what is going on, or without very careful attention to what’s possible.

Since the nineteenth century, great political institutions and great political parties have confiscated the process of political creation; that is, they have tried to give to political creation the form of a political program in order to take over power. I think what happened in the sixties and early seventies is something to be preserved. One of the things that I think should be preserved, however, is the fact that there has been political innovation, political creation, and political experimentation outside the great political parties,

and outside the normal or ordinary program. It's a fact that people's everyday lives have changed from the early sixties to now, and certainly within my own life^[9]. And surely that is not due to political parties but is the result of many movements. These social movements have really changed our whole lives, our mentality, our attitudes, and the attitudes and mentality of other people—people who do not belong to these movements. And that is something very important and positive. I repeat, it is not the normal and old traditional political organizations that have led to this examination. (Foucault 1984c: 29–30)

Seven years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, even—in his view—from the end of the Second World War, Foucault learned a lesson from history that it would take many others much longer to understand, and that the queer movement would later reaffirm in the nineties: to preserve freedom, it is necessary that political parties not seize political creativity in the fight to gain power and that it not be seized by abstract projects that a few experts violently impose upon reality. The form that freedom takes to express itself is not the agenda for the future, but transformative research that has to do with the life of the subject and the subject's relationship to the other and to collectivity in the present.

According to Foucault, this is eminently true for the practices of the sexual liberation movement. For example, in the above-mentioned interview, referencing both Gayle Rubin's lesbian feminism (1981)¹⁰ and his personal experiences within the Californian gay community,¹¹ Foucault takes sadomasochism as an example of a kind of experimentation that questions codified roles and establishes unforeseen relationships:

For instance, look at the S&M subculture, as our good friend Gayle Rubin would insist. I don't think that this movement of sexual practices has anything to do with the disclosure or the uncovering of S&M tendencies deep within our unconscious, and so on. I think that S&M is much more than that; it's the real creation of new possibilities of pleasure, which people had no idea about previously. The idea that S&M is related to a deep violence, that S&M practice is a way of liberating this violence, this aggression, is stupid. We know very well what all those people are doing is not aggressive; they are inventing new possibilities of pleasure with strange parts of their body—through the eroticization of the body. I think it's a kind of creation, a creative enterprise, which has as one of its main features what I call the desexualization of pleasure. The idea that bodily pleasure should always come from sexual pleasure as the root of *all* our possible pleasure—I

think *that's* something quite wrong. These practices are insisting that we can produce pleasure with very odd things, very strange parts of our bodies, in very unusual situations, and so on. (Foucault 1984c: 165)

Foucault does not value the self-destructive impulse or the desire repressed by social conventions in sadomasochism, but rather the possibility to experiment with new forms of pleasure and to develop new forms of identity (ivi: 168). Continuing the controversy against the political use of psychoanalysis undertaken in *The Will to Knowledge*, in this interview (166), Foucault reiterates that for practices of resistance against the current sexual apparatus, strategic support should not be looked for within interior desire, but within exterior pleasure. He then concludes with a call to the gay movement:

Not only do we have to defend ourselves, not only affirm ourselves, as an identity but as a *creative force*. (164, my emphasis)

In 1972, four years before the publication of *The Will to Knowledge*, in *Le désir homosexuel* [*Homosexual Desire*], Guy Hocquenghem, the 25-year-old founder of FHAR (Front Homosexuel d'Action Révolutionnaire, or "Homosexual Front of Revolutionary Action"), had also rejected the idea that political planning, especially when accompanied by a sacrificial mandate for generations to come, is suited to gay activism. Hocquenghem had, however, explained his reasoning by insisting on the subversive nature of homosexual *desire*, which he considered nonassimilable to the familial and reproductive norms dominant not only within the patriarchal social system but within the capitalist system as well: he maintained that since homosexual desire was anal desire, it was not future oriented.¹² Despite their lexical differences and the fact that Foucault only very rarely mentions Hocquenghem in his texts, the (few) reflections that the great philosopher makes about homosexuality are much more indebted to the young activist than he ever admitted.¹³ In fact, following Deleuze and Guattari (1972), Hocquenghem's use of the term "desire"—a term very unpopular with Foucault—was anti-Oedipal. For Deleuze and Guattari, in fact, desire is the same "creative force" Foucault speaks of, and not the attempt to compensate for the lack created by the ban on incest of which the psychoanalyst speaks.¹⁴ And yet, borrowing from Hocquenghem's thought, a part of recent queer literature (Edelman 2004: 30–31) has carried out

a dual-maneuver in leaping beyond the pleasure principle (in other words beyond Foucauldianism) and returning to Freud.¹⁵

In 1988, at the young age of 40, Hocquenghem also falls victim to AIDS. One year prior, Leo Bersani, the other author of note within this literary subset, in his article *Is the Rectum a Grave?* ([1987] 2010²), begins a line of research that identifies the specificity of masculine homosexuality not through the productivity of desire or hedonist creativity, but through the death drive.

1.2 ...TO THE DEATH DRIVE

In what he believes to be an elaboration of Sabina Spielrein's¹⁶ intuition, Freud (1929: Eng. trans. 1961: 77) maintains that "besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever larger units"—which in homage to Empedocles and Plato he calls "Eros" in addition to "libido"—there is another drive that exists in humans which works in its opposition "seeking to dissolve the units and to bring them back to their primeval, inorganic state." According to Freud, psychoanalysis could not explain the structural phenomena of human existence without the support of this hypothesis. These phenomena include those that, like wars, characterize the history of the species as well as those, such as the compulsion to repeat traumatic experiences in waking or dreaming life, that characterize the psychic life of the single subject.¹⁷ In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), the father of psychoanalysis identifies this drive with a destructive tendency, the primary sadism; in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1929), however, masochism becomes primary, a self-destructive impulse that becomes an aggressive force if projected onto others. In Freud's ethics, the acknowledgment of the primary and inescapable nature of this death drive (*Todestrieb*) is certainly not equal to a mandate that forces the indulgence of the self-destructive and antisocial human impulses: if the death drive is "the greatest impediment" to civilization (1929: Eng. trans. 1961: 81), namely, to the evolution of the human species toward a peaceful coexistence, the political mission of psychoanalysis consists in opposing it. For a certain number of American thinkers beginning with Leo Bersani, the (im)politic mission of queer theory consists instead in embracing the death drive, in celebrating it as that which bestows upon sexual perversions their most precious worth—the negative worth of unproductivity, of abjection and asociality.

Bersani already references psychoanalysis in *The Freudian Body* (1986); following Jean Laplanche, he associates the death drive, understood as masochism and primary narcissism, not just with the search for physical pain and suicidal tendencies, but above all with the “enjoyment” (*jouissance*) that comes from the symbolic dissolution of identity, from the *self-shattering*, from the erasure of the confines that separate the subject from the world. This dissipative human tendency will be questioned by Bersani in his later work—from *The Culture of Redemption: Marcel Proust and Melanie Klein* (1990) to *Intimacies* (2008)—but, borrowing once more from Laplanche, he finds, from his early research on, an evolutionary explanation that will not be questioned later:

The origin of the excitement inherent in this erasure may, as I speculated in *The Freudian Body*, be in the biologically dysfunctional process of maturation in human beings. Overwhelmed by stimuli in excess of the ego structures capable of resisting or binding them, the infant may survive that imbalance only by finding it exciting. So the masochistic thrill of being invaded by a world we have not yet learned to master might be an inherited disposition, the result of an evolutionary conquest. This, in any case, is what Freud appears to be moving toward as a definition of the *sexual*: an aptitude for the defeat of power by pleasure, the human subject’s potential for *jouissance* in which the subject is momentarily undone. (1996: 100; emphasis mine)

Sadomasochism would thus be a necessary consequence of the peculiarities of human birth: as in recent times, with completely different aims, more than any other scholar, Adriana Cavarero has recalled (2007, 2008, 2011, 2014), every human comes to the world unarmed, defenseless, totally dependent and in need of care, the absence of which would result in an inability to reach a state of adulthood and presumed autonomy. This original exposure to care, and to the power—and eventually violence—of the other, as Judith Butler would add, taking from Foucault, is precisely what equips the sexual apparatus with the opportunity to discipline the subject’s identity according to historically determined criteria for normalization that guide the caretakers’ (the parents’ and/or any number of educative figures) action. Thus, this original exposure also makes possible a collective action that is geared toward “dislocating” the normative system from which subjects emerged. But what Bersani is trying to describe in this passage is not the forcing of a normatized sexuality onto the identity of the subject in modernity, but rather a structural process that pertains to

the human condition anytime and anywhere. Of primary interest to him and to many others that followed him is not the historical phenomenology of that power apparatus that Foucault calls sexuality, but the ontology of an incontrovertible human fact that “comes before” any historical positioning: what Bersani Freudianly calls “the sexual.” This change of perspective is well illustrated by Teresa de Laurentis, first in *Soggetti eccentrici* [*Eccentric Subjects*] (1999a) and then in *Freud’s Drive* (2008, 2010²).

Distinguishing the Freudians from Freud and the Foucauldians from Foucault, de Laurentis invites a distrust of an easy comparison between essentialism and constructivism in the theories of sexuality. While Kosofsky Sedgwick, in *Epistemology of the Closet*, recognized that the alternative between the two approaches produces an irresolvable dichotomy in the modern conception of sexuality, for de Laurentis (2010: 43), Freud and Foucault’s methodologies are not at all “antithetical or incommensurable.” Instead, they can be integrated in a complex vision of sexuality that recognizes the historic character of current sexual identities while accounting for the “stubborn” character of the drive, to avoid the mistake of thinking that desire can be easily manipulated by reason and subordinate to a personal life plan or collective political plan.¹⁸ In *Soggetti eccentrici* [*Eccentric Subjects*], challenging Judith Butler’s theory of gender performance in *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies That Matter*,¹⁹ de Laurentis writes:

In the United States, in an intellectual context strongly adverse to the concept of the unconscious, the first volume of Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* was welcomed with open arms as the antithesis of Freudian theory, and it promoted an easy and false opposition between the two views of gender and sexuality that fall under the terms essentialism and constructionism. The first, that dates back to Freud, declares sexuality to be innate. The second, borrowing from the Foucauldian analysis of the “technology of sex”, declares sexuality to be a social construction. But the formula, in being as reductive as it is widely publicized, that places innate sexuality attributed to Freud (essentialism) head to head with socially constructed sexuality attributed to Foucault (constructionism), is based on a dual misinterpretation: first, sexuality is not innate in Freud, if anything it is the drive (and even this would be called into question), while the other sexuality is none other than a fantasmatic construction; second, what Foucault means by sexuality—social technology, a set of power apparatuses elaborated over time by the whole of society—is not something that the individual can reappropriate or subvert and transform neither with surgery nor with performance. (de Laurentis 1999b: 108–109, translation by Julia Heim)

In *Freud's Drive*, de Lauretis (2010: 45) explains Foucault's diffidence toward psychoanalysis through a reconstruction of the French cultural context of the seventies which was dominated by the widespread dissemination of Lacan's thought, and thus by an interpretation of Freudian theory that privileged the topographical Freudian model (conscious-preconscious-unconscious)—centered around the concept of the unconscious—over the structural model (id-ego-superego), centered instead around the drive. Following Laplanche's theory as well, despite the evidence of oscillation present in Freud, de Lauretis maintains that the father of psychoanalysis did not mean to ascribe sexuality to the sphere of the innate or the natural by using this category. "Drive" is not, in fact, synonymous with "instinct": in distinguishing between the two concepts, Freud freed human sexuality from the exigencies of biological reproduction. According to de Lauretis (61), "drive" is not truly a concept, but a "conceptual figure" that points to a hybrid space between the somatic and the mental, between the individual and the relational:

As stimuli pass from the interior of the body to the mind, they traverse a non-homogeneous space in which they are first transformed into their delegate, something that is no longer bodily stimuli but something else, something that Freud names drive; this drive, then, links itself to a mental image, an idea, an affect or an emotion, which acts as its delegate to consciousness. In other words, the drive exists in a space between corporeal stimuli and mental representation, a space of "psychical locality" that is not just non-homogeneous but more precisely heterotopic: it is the space of a transit, a displacement, passage and transformation—not a referential but a figural space (62–63).

De Lauretis mentions that, with the use of the term "biopolitics" to reference the action of the power of the modern state on society through the governing of the biological processes of the population, Foucault never meant to dissolve the body's materiality by making it a discursive effect or epiphenomenon of power: in *The Will to Knowledge*, a determined sexual identity is attributed to each individual by sexuality, the biopolitical apparatus which vests the individual body.²⁰ In Foucault, basically, biopolitics finds its playing field precisely in that bastard land between the biological and the social, between the corporeal and the symbolic, which, according to Freud is inhabited by the drive. In their parallel struggle toward the Cartesian rational subject's mastery of the self, the philosopher and the

psychoanalyst agree that in this space the singular consciousness has no sovereignty.²¹ Foucault does not manifest a specific interest in elaborating an ontology of the bodily subject on which the bio-powers of the sexuality apparatus operate, but this does not prevent de Lauretis, and Bersani before her, from filling this gap using Freudian metapsychology, or more precisely the reinterpretation that Laplanche makes of this metapsychology precisely at the time when Foucault was writing *History of Sexuality*.

The concept of the drive—not yet associated with the notion of death—appears in Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), in which he analyzes the genesis of the sexual drive [*Sexualtrieb*]. According to the Freud of these papers, this drive develops in infancy in relation to the bodily functions that are tied to survival (nutrition, the search for heat, discharge and the need for cleanliness), without however coinciding with biological needs. The sex drive in fact is inscribed on the body by the sensorial stimulation of the organs that make these functions possible, in particular the orifices through which biological exchanges between the body's internal and external occur (nutrition, defecation, urination, etc.), which are the focus of the caretakers. Thus, it is not innate, but appears as an effect of neonatal experiences with the other. As de Lauretis notes, in *Vie et mort en psychanalyse* [*Life and Death in Psychoanalysis*] (1970), Laplanche further develops this hypothesis stressing the fact that the process of the sexualization of the erogenous zones is not immediate, but has an autoerotic origin: pleasure coming from the stimulation of these areas of the body turns into sexual excitement when the infant learns to separate this pleasure from vital functions, substituting the real object capable of satisfying need (the maternal breast, or other parts of the body of those who care for him) with the fantasy of this satisfaction. According to Laplanche, the sex drive does not have a biological origin; rather, it comes from a process of psychically elaborating experiences of bodily contact between the infant and the other—a process in which the other fulfills not just the function of the object, but above all an active role. The infant's erogenous zones arouse intense fantasies (conscious or unconscious) in whoever nurtures, cleans, cares for and handles them: the sexual thus emerges as a drive that is “implanted” in the body of the newborn during the newborns first interactions with his caretakers, marked necessarily by the intrusive relationship that Laplanche calls “primary seduction.”

Laplanche returns to this argument later, in the essay collection *La révolution copernicienne inachevée* [*The Unfinished Copernican Revolution*] (1992a), where he once again insists on the traumatic origin of the sexual:

before being structured by language, the baby is bombarded by enigmatic sexual messages that exceed his or her comprehension, that excite his or her body and implant themselves without being registered by the baby's consciousness. The infant's destiny will therefore be to reproduce this excitement, each time trying to obtain that which increasingly escapes him or her, to reinterpret what he or she will never understand using the emotive and cognitive instruments that will slowly mature, in a repetition compulsion which will maintain a masturbatory foundation even when it is newly directed at others.²² In these writings, Laplanche further distances himself from Freud: he specifies, in fact, that the drive, though perceived by the subject on the surface of the body's contact with the world, in reality is positioned in a more abstract place, situated not at the confines of the somatic, but at the confines of the psychic, between the ego and the other. The drive is thus not a direct consequence of instinct, but a traumatic result of it, a metonymic derivative, a "perversion." In the *Masochisme et théorie de la seduction généralisée* [*Masochism and the General Theory of Seduction*] conference (1992b), Laplanche dryly affirms that the drive is to the ego as pain is to the body.

The drive as the ego's wound is thus like a threat to psychic integrity, like a force that, even when it erupts in the sexual sphere, leads the subject to a state of passivity that is most familiar (the original exposure of the newborn to the free will of the external world on which he or she is completely reliant). The drive as a fantasy of the dissolution of the self, that even when it is sexual pushes the subject toward death—no longer understood in the Freudian sense as a definite return to the inorganic, but in the Laplanchean sense as a temporary undoing of the self's unity.²³ Bersani reworks this interpretation of the drive, understood alongside primary masochism and masturbatory narcissism, in *The Freudian Body*, and again in *Is the Rectum a Grave?*. In the latter, on a page in which Freud is associated with George Bataille, we read, for example:

The sexual emerges as the *jouissance* of exploded limits, as the ecstatic suffering into which the human organism momentarily plunges when it is "pressed" beyond a certain threshold of endurance. *Sexuality, at least in the mode in which it is constituted, may be a tautology for masochism.* (Bersani 2010: 24)

The break between Bersani and Foucault happens precisely in the relationship between sexuality and masochism. In *Is the Rectum a Grave?*, in

fact, psychoanalysis is used not just to integrate the Foucault's thought, but to posit astute objections in its regard: according to Bersani, like the majority of thinkers, before and after him, who have reflected on the sex–politics relationship, and like the majority of people more generally, “Foucault did not like sex.”²⁴ Bersani specifies that he does not want to allude to that residual puritanism that is sometimes possible to identify even among the freest intellectuals; instead, he wants to refer to an aversion, a repugnance, a fundamental disgust for sex that can coexist even with the most transgressive perspectives:

In saying that most people don't like sex, I'm not arguing (nor, obviously, am I denying) that the most rigidly moralistic dicta about sex hide smoldering volcanoes of repressed sexual desire. When you make this argument, you divide people into two camps, and at the same time you let it be known to which camp you belong. There are, you intimate, those who can't face their sexual desires (or, correlatively, the relation between those desires and their views of sex), and those who know that such a relation exists and who are presumably unafraid of their own sexual impulses. Rather, I'm interested in something else, something both camps have in common, which may be a certain *aversion*, an aversion that is not the same thing as a repression and that can coexist quite comfortably with, say, the most enthusiastic endorsement of polysexuality with multiple sex partners (4).

The aversion to sex, according to Bersani, can take on either a “malignant form” or a “benign form.” Numerous examples of the former can be taken from the analysis of how the Reagan administration and a large part of the public in the United States reacted to the onset of the AIDS epidemic in the eighties, on the one hand using the occasion to criminalize the sexual promiscuity typical of the gay “lifestyle,” and on the other hand preferring to invest in prevention campaigns geared toward heterosexual people instead of toward the protection of the categories that were most being hit with the syndrome, namely homosexual men and heroin users—excluding in this way the main victims of the crisis from the public discourses around it. In this regard, Bersani follows the reconstructions of Simon Watney in *Policing Desire: Pornography, AIDS, and the Media* (1987), but uses the book as an example of the “benign form” of the aversion to sex: the attempt to liberate sex from what disgusts us about it, sugar-coating its nature to adapt it to the good image that we have made of ourselves. Bersani takes his cue for the provocative title of his article from Watney, but if for Watney it was the action of the “symbolic

machinery of repression” that made the public assimilate the “rectum” with the “tomb” after the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic, according to Bersani, AIDS merely made literal the death threat that homosexual sex has always represented in the heterosexual imaginary. In other words, for Bersani, the rectum *is* the tomb of a certain form of subjectivity that is proud of itself, male chauvinistic and homophobic. And the gay movement should in no way attempt to free it from this fatal flaw—which Watney would seemingly like to do—but should instead celebrate it as a location privileged by the drive:

But what if we said, for example, not that it is wrong to think of so-called passive sex as “demeaning”, but rather that *the value of sexuality itself is to demean the seriousness of efforts to redeem it*? “AIDS”, Watney writes, “offers a new sign for the symbolic machinery of repression, making the rectum a grave” [1987: 126]. But if the rectum is the grave in which the masculine ideal (an ideal shared—differently—by men *and* women) of proud subjectivity is buried, then it should be celebrated for its very potential for death. Tragically, AIDS has literalized that potential as the certainty of biological death, and has therefore reinforced the heterosexual association of anal sex with a self annihilation originally and primarily identified with the fantasmatic mystery of an insatiable, unstoppable female sexuality. (Bersani 2010: 29–30)

Bersani’s thought is thus equal parts symbolic analysis and materialist criticism: calling into question the habit of positioning sex between women and sex between men within the neutral category of “homosexuality,” he lingers on the practice of anal sex between men. In his opinion, this practice is the true polemic target of those who, following the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic, have blamed the sexual promiscuity of gays: he observes that what a gay man allegedly does in a sexual relationship is hard to consider less important than the frequency with which he allegedly carries out such actions. Bersani specifies that instead, it is anal sexuality itself that is associated with the idea of an “insatiable desire” (Leo Bersani 2010: 210). Both Watney and Bersani note how in the public discourse of a United States traumatized by AIDS, homosexual men assumed a role that in the European imaginary of the nineteenth century was reserved for female prostitutes, who, at the time, were seen not only as the only ones guilty of spreading syphilis, but also as paradigmatic examples of the female ability to have multiple orgasms and thus practice uninterrupted sex. Like the tragic emergence of syphilis in the 1800s, the tragic emergence of AIDS

in the 1980s legitimized the fantasy that those who occupy the so-called passive role in penetration are carriers of an intrinsically unbridled and sick sexuality.²⁵ Gays in particular are unsettling because their existence shows that men can renounce their “natural” active-penetrative role and share the passive role of women: according to Bersani (1996: 78), homophobia is indissolubly accompanied by the more or less hidden fantasy “of males participating, principally through anal sex, in what is presumed to be the terrifying phenomenon of female sexuality”—of “the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman” (Bersani 2010: 18). The relinquishing of the active role symbolically represents not only the abdication of a position of power, but also the proof of existence, in humans, of a tendency toward the dissolution of self-domination. This tendency is in conflict with the image that the white heterosexual male, the hegemonic subject throughout millennia of history, has used to represent and promote himself. The phallogentric and homophobic male logic could not support the existence of the death drive and the consequent possibility not only of a pleasure in passivity, but of a state of enjoyment produced by this lack of control, by impotence, by humiliation:

Phallogentrism is exactly that: not primarily the denial of power to women (although it has obviously also led to that, everywhere and at all times), but above all the denial of the *value* of powerlessness in both men and women. I don’t mean the value of gentleness, or nonaggressiveness, or even of passivity, but rather of a more radical disintegration and humiliation of the self. (Bersani 2010: 24)

The conclusion that Bersani draws from these premises is that a radical gay movement should not aspire to be assimilated into a model of humanity that excludes it, identifying itself with that hegemonic subject that does not like sex for what it really is. Refuting the imperatives of the politically correct, the gays should instead recognize and lay claim to the masochistic nature not just of their own pleasure, but of their desire, which necessarily includes an amorous identification with the enemy. Sexually desiring men does not in fact mean—for Bersani in *Is the Rectum a Grave?* though in part, over time, he will change his mind—being attracted to a platonic ideal, but to male bodies on whom specific historical meanings have left their sediment: the object of this desire is inevitably compromised by the masculinity of our society, and thus even by sexism, phallogentrism, and homophobia.²⁶ Unlike what happens with other minorities, and not unlike what happens to women, being gay essentially implies an (erotic) complicity with one’s oppressor.

A gay man doesn't run the risk of loving his oppressor *only* in the ways in which blacks or Jews might more or less secretly collaborate with their oppressors—that is, as a consequence of the oppression, of that subtle corruption by which a slave can come to idolize power, to agree that he should be enslaved because he is enslaved, that he should be denied power because he doesn't have any. But blacks and Jews don't *become* blacks and Jews as a result of that internalization of an oppressive mentality, whereas that internalization is in part constitutive of male homosexual desire, which, like all sexual desires, combines and confuses impulses to appropriate and to identify with the object of desire. (Bersani 2010: 15)

For Bersani, once gays realize the particular position they occupy on the chessboard of sexuality, they should accept “the pain of embracing, at least provisionally, a homophobic representation of homosexuality” (15), and they should consequently find the courage to identify with the death drive, recognizing their own masochism and narcissism: in this way, they could make that male “ideological body” that represents the object of a perverse identification and a source of continually renewable arousal “explode” from the inside.

Bersani (20 et. seqq.; 2016–217) criticizes a certain feminism which, starting with female sexuality, tries to redeem sex and attempts to expunge the constitutive masochism from it. He especially polemicizes Catharine MacKinnon (1987) and Andrea Dworkin (1987): in his opinion, by criminalizing pornography for its representation of the female enjoyment of passivity and subordination, the two authors end up considering sex itself pornographic and wishing for a “liberal” reinvention of it. Imagining heterosexual sex as a symmetric exchange of tenderness and love, MacKinnon and Dworkin transfigure the sex act in a practice carried out by neutral disembodied, degenitalized and thus desexualized individuals. These same critiques cannot, naturally, be applied to Foucault: and yet, even Foucault—who in *The Will to Knowledge* (1976) had flung himself against “the great sermon” of the sexual revolution—is attacked by Bersani—precisely by he who was the first to invite him to Berkeley after *Discipline and Punish* (1975) was released—like one of those pastoral priests of sexual redemption. According to Bersani, Foucault's refusal to deal with psychoanalytic theory and his call for the experimentation of new pleasures confirm rather than challenge the traditional understanding of a sovereign subject who is capable of rationally governing his or her own passions, and directed toward self-preservation and profit. Even the Foucauldian attempt to interpret sadomasochism as a hedonistic search is symptomatic: pleasure, only pleasure, for Foucault, seems to construct the foothold for

resisting the sexuality apparatus. Even the interpretation of sexuality as power—present in Foucault as well as in feminism—responds, according to Bersani, to the same “compulsion to rewrite sex”:

The ambition of performing sex as *only* power is a salvational project, one designed to preserve us from a nightmare of ontological obscenity, from the prospect of a breakdown of the human itself in sexual intensities, from a kind of selfless communication with “lower” orders of being. (2010: 29)

Thus, according to Bersani, in as much as he was forced to distance himself from whatever universalist emancipative project, Foucault would not have actually been able to abandon a salvific vision of politics: incapable of turning his gaze toward the parts of male homosexuality that create disgust, the Foucault would end up defending a pluralist social model in which even the diversity of the gays would find citizenship. Under the radical surface, his hedonist rhetoric would have therefore been reabsorbed by the prospect of political redemption that lies completely within the liberal tradition. Convinced of being able to succeed where Foucault had failed, and with an unspecified “radicalism” as his only imperative, Bersani appeals to a very different tradition—among his tutelary deities, he names Freud and Bataille, but one could also add the Marquis de Sade and Friedrich Nietzsche—with the intention of defending both pornography against the puritanism of a certain kind of feminism, and sexual promiscuity against the so-called respectability of a certain gay movement. In the compulsive consumption of pornographic material, as in gay saunas, cruising bars, darkrooms, sadomasochistic and barebackers clubs, sex reveals all of its destructive force, its ability to blow up the integrity of the ego under the pressure of the death drive: in this experience, it becomes evident that sex has nothing to do with community or love (48). After *Is the Rectum a Grave?*, in an effort to account for this evidence, Bersani dedicated himself to intense research that produced results as fascinating as they were contradictory: retracing them will be for the next chapter.

NOTES

1. In the paper’s second note, it reads: “The term ‘queer’ was suggested to me by a conference in which I had participated and whose proceedings will be published in the forthcoming volume, ed. by Douglas Crimp and the Bad Object Choices, ‘How Do I Look? Queer Film and Video’ [Bay Press, Seattle 1991]. My ‘queer’, however, had no relation to the Queer Nation group, of whose existence I was ignorant at the time. As the essay will

show, there is in fact very little in common between Queer Nation and this queer theory” (de Lauretis 1991: xvii). During a conference in Bologna in March 1996, instead, de Lauretis (1999b: 104–105) admitted to having borrowed her use of the term “queer” from the movement and not from academic circles: “When I coined the expression ‘Queer Theory’ for a conference on homosexuality held at my university in 1990, the term ‘queer’ (odd, eccentric, weird) had been used disparagingly to denote a homosexual person for over a century, but it had already been reclaimed and redeemed by the gay liberation movement and was used with pride by men and women who declared themselves gay or were openly so. To define the theme of the event I was organizing I used those words instead of, for example ‘lesbian and gay sexualities’, because I wanted to start a controversy and first and foremost call into question the idea that male and female homosexuality was, independent of gender, the same form of sexuality, and secondly, that it was identifiable only in contrast to heterosexuality (which, however, feminist studies had clearly distinguished as different in men and women)” (translation by Julia Heim).

2. The first group action was a demonstration of visibility: the evening of the 13th of April 1990, a small crowd of lesbians and gays went to Flutie’s Bar, a place for straight people in South Street Seaport, and very naturally displayed homosexual affection, arousing scandal and embarrassment in the onlookers, with the intention of showcasing how public spaces are predominantly heterosexual places. The 26th of April, to protest the growing number of homosexual assaults, some Queer Nation activists climbed the sign of Badlands, a venue in the Village, and unrolled a large banner that said “Dykes and Fags Bash Back!,” it was shown again two days later in an impromptu demonstration throughout the neighborhood in response to a paper bomb which was thrown at Uncle Charlie’s, a gay night spot in the Village. Other slogans that were often used by the group were “We’re here! We’re queer! Get used to this!” and “Out of the closets and into the streets!”
3. In addition to de Lauretis’ position (cf. note 1), see also the opinion expressed by Leo Bersani in *Homos* (1996). The author dismisses Queer Nations’ actions as “antics” (74) and subsequently says: “In short, Queer Nation complicates and enriches the social with its campy replications of given forms of the social. It does not put into question sociality itself. To do *that* may be the most radical political potential of queerness” (75).
4. De Lauretis is particularly explicit in this regard (1999b: 107) in the aforementioned conference in Bologna in 1996.
5. “Freudomarxism” points to the political doctrine introduced by Wilhelm Reich (1936) and Herbert Marcuse (1955) which was widely spread among the protest movements of the seventies and which, in Italy, was originally interpreted by Mario Mieli, author of *Elementi di critica omosessuale* [*Homosexuality and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique*] (1977, 2002²).

Foucault provided a fairly schematic image of it: it is not in fact true that all authors who ascribe to this political doctrine neglected to thematize the productive action of power on sexuality. It is true however that Freudomarxism, arising from the encounter between Marxism and psychoanalysis, propagated the freedom of a presumed natural supply of erotic drives that in capitalist societies would undergo a process of repression. Reich attributed to “original” sexuality the form of reproductive heterosexuality, and Marcuse, of an “even more original” undifferentiated and totipotent infantile sexuality that he called “perverse polymorphism” (a concept developed by Sigmund Freud in 1905 in the fundamental *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*) or “bisexuality.” Mieli criticized Reich’s homophobic prejudice, he followed Marcuse’s approach and maintained that every human being is originally “transsexual.” From his point of view, every human being who followed his or her true nature would not just feel sexual desires toward people of the male and female sex equally, but would recognize how constrictive men’s and women’s social habits are (today we would translate Mieli’s use of the term “transsexuality” with “transgenderism”). Foucault could not have known the *Elements of a Gay Critique* when he was writing *The Will to Knowledge*, and later he never took Mieli’s thought into consideration (furthermore, these *Elements* have never referenced his thought on sexuality): his argument in his 1976 book (Eng. trans. 1990: 131) marks itself against Freud and Reich. Marcuse’s name adds itself to the picture in a conference in 1978 (Eng. trans. 1999:139). During the class at the Collège de France in 1974–1975 (1999; Eng. trans. 2004: 236) and in a conference in 1975 (1996: 101 et. seqq.), instead, Foucault pairs Reich to the Dutch John Van Ussel, whose book *Geschiedenis van het seksuele probleem* [*History of the Sexual Problem*] (1968), translated in French in 1972, is actually inspired more by the theses of Marcuse than those of Reich.

6. One of the limits of *The Will to Knowledge* consists in the fact that Foucault turns his attention solely to homosexuality, neglecting to reconstruct the genealogy of the concepts of transsexuality and heterosexuality. In his opinion, until the beginning of the Modern age, sodomy outlined a typology of prohibited acts, and male homosexuality became a “human kind,” characterized by an identity only after psychiatrist Karl Friedrich Westphal’s 1870 study *Die konträre Sexualempfindung* [*Contrary Sexual Feeling*]. From that moment, homosexuality stopped being a behavioral problem that the subject could choose to give up or not, and became a question related to the “truth” of a desire that required comprehension and deciphering, a truth that the subject could bring to the confessional with the priest, to the analyst’s couch, or into a silent dialogue with him or herself. What Foucault neglects to reveal is that the category of “inverted sexual sensibility” coined by Westphal does not distinguish between homosexuality and transsexuality but includes both, as they are both inversions of male and female elements of the psyche. This is how it remains in the papers of the famous

psychiatrists of the 1800s and early 1900s such as Havelock Ellis (*Sexual Inversion*, 1899), Richard von Krafft-Ebing (*Psychopathia sexualis*, 1931) and David O. Cauldwell (*Psychopathia trans-sexualis*, 1949). Only in 1954, in the paper “Transsexualism and Transvestitism as Psychosomatic and Somatopsychic Syndroms” by Harry Benjamin, was the adjective “transsexual” turned into a noun: the invert’s identity was thus split in two, giving life not just to the two identities of homosexual and transsexual but also, in contrast, to the heterosexual identity we think of today. It is no accident that this distinction was developed in the 1950s because in those years the first genital reassignment surgeries for transsexuals and for normalizing the genitals of intersex people were performed. (Cf. Pustianaz 2004 and Bernini 2010a. The argument will be continued in note 6 of Chap. 3, *infra*.)

7. The Foucauldian concepts of “disciplinary power” and “biopolitics” will be clarified in paragraph 5.1 “Hobbes’ biopolitical crystal”, *infra*.
8. “The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures” (Foucault 1976: 157; Cf. Foucault 1982a: 396).
9. Here Foucault is referencing his life as a gay man and his coming out late in life [A/N].
10. Like the essayist, novelist and transsexual poet Patrick (aka Pat) Califia (1981, 1995; Califia and Sweeney 1996), Rubin was part of Samois a BDSM (Bondage and Discipline, Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism) lesbian feminist collective.
11. The fact that it is personal testimony becomes clear in the previously mentioned interview “Le gai savoir” (Foucault 1982: 397).
12. I will return to Hocquenghem’s thought and his role in the FHAR in paragraph 3.1 “Anal struggle against the capital”, *infra*.
13. In the 1977 interview *Non au sexe roi* [Power and Sex], Foucault cites *Co-ire. Album systématique de l'enfance* [Co-anger: systematic album of childhood] that Hocquenghem edited with René Schérer in 1976, as a positive example of a vision of infancy freed from an obsession with sexuality. In an interview from 1981 (1984d), pushed by his interviewers, he briefly says that he finds Hocquenghem’s thought interesting, and that he has the impression that they agree on some points. Foucault and Hocquenghem were interviewed together on April 4, 1978, on the show *Dialogues* on France Culture radio, on the occasion of the reform of the French penal codes that would soon mean an abolishing of juridical discrimination between heterosexual and homosexual acts. The transcription of the interview was published in the magazine *Recherches* (37, 1979), and Foucault mentions the episode in “Le gai savoir” (1982a: Eng. trans. 2011: 401).
14. Foucault owes much to the critical advances in psychoanalysis put forth by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* (1972), a book to which he pays homage in his course at the Collège de France from 1975 to 1976 (1997) and for which he wrote the introduction to the 1977 English

version. From their perspective, Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* refer as much to Foucault's *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* [*Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*] (1961) as his *Les mots et le choses* [*The Order of Things*] (1966). In reference to the use that Deleuze and Guattari make of the concept of desire, Foucault (1982a: Eng. trans. 2011: 389–390) specifies that they use it: “Obviously... in a completely different way. But the problem I have is that I’m not sure if, through this very word, despite its very meaning, we don’t run the risk, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s intention, of allowing some of the medico-psychological presuppositions [*prises*] that were built into desire, in its traditional sense, to be reintroduced.”

15. I will give a detailed analysis of Edelman’s thought in paragraph 3.2 “No pity for Tiny Tim”, *infra*.
16. Sabina Spielrein (1885–1942) was the patient (and perhaps lover) of Carl Gustav Jung in Zurich, and then a pupil of Sigmund Freud in Vienna and finally an established psychoanalyst in the Soviet Union. She was shot along with her daughters at the hands of Nazi soldiers when they invaded the Soviet Union because she was Jewish. Her role in the history of psychoanalysis surfaced largely thanks to the publication of her epistolary edited by Aldo Carotenuto (1980), and is described in detail in John Kerr’s study *A Most Dangerous Method* (1994) as well as in the fourth chapter of the de Lauretis essay *Freud’s Drive*, entitled “Becoming Inorganic: Cronenberg’s eXistenZ, Virtuality and the Death Drive” (showing a certain foresight, de Lauretis associated Spielrein’s name with David Cronenberg’s production even before the release of *A Dangerous Method*, the film that the director adapted from Kerr’s book). In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920: Eng. trans. 1922: 70, note 2), Freud recognizes his debt to Spielrein when referencing her article “Die Destructio als Ursache des Werdens” (1912); he claims in the note that it is a “work which is full of valuable matter and ideas” and yet “is unfortunately not entirely clear to me.” But to tell the truth, as Kerr specifies (1994: 501), “Spielrein had not argued for anything like primary masochism. She had only been heard that way by a male Viennese audience. Even less had she in any sense ‘anticipated’ the idea of a death instinct. What she had argued was that *sexuality* brought with it such themes as that of dying in the arms of the beloved. Which is quite a different thing.”
17. Freud developed the death drive hypothesis in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, beginning with the observation of what he called “war neuroses”: soldiers who survived the First World War tended to repeat, in dream or memory, the traumatic experiences they lived on the battlefield, just as patients tend to repeat the traumatic experiences of their infancy in their relationship of transference with their analyst.
18. The second chapter of *Freud’s Drive*, where de Lauretis elaborates on her critique of the comparison between essentialism and constructivism, is entitled “The Stubborn Drive: Foucault, Freud, Fanon.”

19. The reference to Butler is explicit in de Lauretis 2010: 44.
20. As I have stated, the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics will be clarified in greater detail in paragraph 5.1 “Hobbes’ biopolitical crystal”, *infra*.
21. “Somato-power [bio-power] is not so different from Freud’s drive after all. Both are located in corporeality beyond the reach of the Cartesian rational subject, and both provide the material, bodily ground for what Foucault has called ‘the perverse implantation’ of sexuality in the subject” (de Lauretis 2010: 50).
22. De Lauretis summarizes the Laplanchean theory with these words: “At the basis of human existence, Laplanche posits an originary and universal situation, made necessary by the prematurity of the newborn; an asymmetrical relationship of passivity/activity in which the infant’s life and being are entirely dependent on the adult(s). The human being exists only by virtue of this first ‘interhuman’ relationship, which entails what Laplanche calls *primal seduction*” (de Lauretis 2010: 64).
23. “*The death* referred to in the ‘death instinct’ is not the death of the organism, but the death of this ‘organism’ which, in human existence, represents the interests of the biological organism, that is to say, *the ego*” (Laplanche 1992b, Eng. trans. 1986: 14).
24. The essay begins: “There is a big secret about sex: most people don’t like it. I don’t have any statistics to back this up, and I doubt (although since Kinsey there has been no shortage of pools on sexual behaviour) that any pool has ever been taken in which those polled were simply asked, “Do you like sex”? Nor am I suggesting the need for any such pool, since people would probably answer the question as if they were being asked, “Do you often feel the need to have sex?” and one of my aims will be to suggest why these are two wholly different questions.” (Bersani 2010: 198).
25. “Women and gay men spread their legs with an unquenchable appetite for destruction” (Bersani 2010: 211).
26. Constantly challenging the politically correct representation of male homosexuality, Bersani (2010: 208) observes that the virility of the gay leather culture and S/M (Sado/Maso) is not at all parodistic or subversive, but erotically authentic, and that gay effeminacy, above all in its camp paroxysms, often assumes misogynist meanings.

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Sicut Palea: It Must Be So Sweet to Die

*You will die child and I shall too.
But more beautiful boys than you will still
sleep in the sunshine by the seaside.
But we shall still be but ourselves.
(Sandro Penna, Guardando un ragazzo dormire)*

2.1 HOMOS/THANATOS

Along a winding path made even less direct by numerous, necessary digressions, the preceding chapter led us to the origin of so-called antisocial theories. The queer, as I have tried to explain, both in the political practice of activist movements and in academic theories, is born from a dual trauma, which entered the sexual minorities' imaginary during the eighties: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic. In this depressive climate, on campuses in the United States, the constructivist theory of sexuality bequeathed by Foucault represented an instigation to resume a directionless hedonistic activism geared toward the experimentation of new ways of life, and such activism was met with varying responses. In general, the first queer theories, when they did not proceed with Foucault's genealogical historiography (Halperin 1990), were characterized by a revivification of psychoanalysis from the hasty death Foucault had caused it; but while Butler

Translation by Julia Heim

(1990, 1997), Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990, 2003) and de Lauretis (1999a, 2010) had attempted a mediation between psychoanalytic metapsychology and Foucauldian constructivism, Bersani, instead, used Laplanche's thought to launch a frontal attack on Foucault's "liberal activism." *Is the Rectum a Grave?* celebrates the value of sex as an act of socially dysfunctional solipsistic enjoyment that isolates the subject from the community: in Bersani's disquieted ontology, the truly sexual subject, unlike the Foucauldian subject who is subjected to the sexuality apparatus, does not seek social recognition for the self, but instead is aroused by a dissipative drive that leads him or her to humiliation and a devaluation of the self. The celebration of this ascetic homosexuality continues 11 years later in the book *Homos*, in which Bersani tackles not only Foucault, but the spreading of Foucauldian-inspired queer theories and what he deems the danger of their desexualizing deviations. In his opinion, the upswing of studies on *The History of Sexuality* during the nineties risks reducing homosexuality to a mere social construct, negating its concrete materiality: as if homosexuals only had in common the homophobia to which they are subjected and there was no homosexual subject to set against the homophobic subject. Queer Nation is not even spared from Bersani's critiques. He holds Queer Nation guilty of using the term "queer" as a marker of a nonidentity-based political activism, thus depriving the lesbian gay trans movement of its sexual specificity. According to Bersani, queer theories should, instead, interrogate the dysfunctional nature of the sexual (of the death drive) in the process of constructing the individual self, and the queer movement should radically challenge the practices of "liberal" sociality by calling into question the value of sociability itself (Bersani 1996: 73). Knowing himself to be an easy object of critique, Bersani, to protect himself, specifies that his intent is not to preach the return of a stable homosexual identity or carry out a search for gay essence, but to challenge the *political correctness* of the nineties to show the disturbing character that homosexuality takes on when it does not heroically rise as a champion of tolerance and pluralism, but lies lazily about in an outlawed existence that challenges every social order:

I'm not proposing a return to immobilizing definitions of identity. To say that there is a gay specificity doesn't commit us to the notion of a homosexual essence. Indeed, we may discover that this particularity, in its indeterminateness and mobility, is not at all compatible with essentializing definitions. In evading questions of specificity, even of identity and etiology, we are setting ourselves up for that inevitable judgement day when we will be found guilty of our gayness and will begin again, uselessly, to apologize for it.

But if the kind of investigation I have in mind brings us up against some politically unpleasant facts, we may discover, within the very ambiguities of being gay, a path of resistance far more threatening to dominant social orders than vestimentary blurrings of sexual difference and possibly subversive separations of sex from gender. There are some glorious precedents for thinking of homosexuality as truly disruptive—as a *force* not limited to the modest goals of tolerance for diverse lifestyles, but in fact mandating the politically unacceptable and politically indispensable choice of an outlaw existence. (Bersani 1996: 76)

Bersani's polemic against Butler's theory of performativity is evident in these words.¹ In *Gender Trouble* (1990) and *Bodies that Matter* (1993), which in 1996, the year *Homos* was published, had already seen considerable success and circulation, Butler returns to Foucauldian theorization to affirm that gender identity is a product of the sexuality apparatus, and that the "woman" and the "man" are not something that the subject really *is*, but rather something that the subject *does* in obeying certain social norms. More specifically, for her, gender is a stylized repetition of acts that follow the script of compulsory heterosexuality, according to which the man and the woman are the "true" genders and only their reciprocal attraction is the "true" sexual orientation, while lesbians, gays, and transsexual, transgender and intersex people are abject existences. Butler maintains that the performative nature of identity makes possible a collective action by sexual minorities that would "dislocate" the norms in which they are immersed and create more "liveable" societies for them and for everyone: without necessarily having to aspire to an abstract elimination of genders, they can gradually introduce variations in the repetition of the performance of gender, laying claim to a recognition of their identities and their relationships (Bernini 2009). With these words, Butler silently passes over the sexual of sexuality, and ultimately thinks of the human as a subject in search of wellness and integration within a community of differences: if Foucault makes sexuality a game of power and pleasure, Butler makes it a gender performance. To respond to both and to contend with Gender Studies just as they are emerging and spreading throughout North American universities, Bersani provocatively positions sex, and not gender, as the focal point of his reflections.

In other passages, Bersani (1996: 35–36, 55–57, 68 et seqq.) critiques Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990: 1, 41)—first, associating her name with David Halperin (1990: 49), and then with Lee Edelman, in his early works (1994: 14–15)—as much for her categorical condemnation of any

research into the causes of homosexuality, as for her insistence on the “universal” importance of the homosexual question, and therefore for having attempted to ennoble an oppressed minority by positioning it in the center of all cultural processes of the modern Western world. Convinced that one cannot be “gay-affirmative or politically effective as gay” if there is no recognizable “specificity” of “gayness,” instead of promoting the cancellation of the heterosexual–homosexual distinction (and thus the self-cancellation of homosexuality) through the return of the mythical original bisexuality, longed for by Freudomarxism, or through a hurried move toward a new queer indeterminacy, Bersani (1996: 61) prefers to make the historical reality of homosexuality the starting point for his research. He thus equally renounces fantasizing about a natural condition that cannot be experimented with, and imagining a utopian future, and he remains anchored—as in *Is the Rectum a Grave?*—to what he considers the *hic et nunc*, in other words, to the compromise of sexual minorities with the norms of a heterosexist sexuality apparatus, inside which homosexuality finds its worth not in sharing the emphasis provided by liberal thought on difference (*heteros* in Greek) but, on the contrary, on stressing the same, the equal (*homoios* in Greek):

It is perhaps unfortunate, but not less true, that we have *learned to desire* from within the heterosexual norms and gendered structures that we can no longer think of as natural, or as exhausting all the options for self-identification. Since deconstructing an imposed identity will not erase the habit of desire, it might be more profitable to test the resistance of the identity from *within* the desire. Although there are valid grounds for questioning the assumption that desire between men, or between women, is desire for “the same”, it is also true that because our apprenticeship in desiring takes place within that assumption, homosexuality can become a privileged model of sameness—one that makes manifest not the limits but the inestimable value of relations of sameness, of homo-relations. Perhaps inherent in gay desire is a revolutionary inaptitude for heteroized sociality. This of course means sociality as we know it, and the most politically disruptive aspect of the homo-ness I will be exploring in gay desire is a redefinition of sociality so radical that it may appear to require a provisional withdrawal from relationality itself. (Bersani, 1996: 6–7)

Bersani (58–59) attempts to account for the specificity of gay *sameness* using psychoanalytic tools (and more expectedly than traditionally, he connects it to a form of narcissism that derives from the child’s identification

with the mother²), and (63 et seqq.) noting the contradictions that mark the alliance between gay movements and feminist and lesbian movements (gay men belong to the male gender and are, therefore, a minority *sui generis*, as they are able to enjoy all the pleasures of homosexuality in private while publicly making use of all the privileges allotted to heterosexual men). The last chapter of *Homos* is, however, above all a text of literary criticism: to resist the attempts of a certain gay movement to redeem itself from its abject character by cancelling its own specificity, Bersani—who is professor emeritus of French at the University of California (Berkeley)—lingers on the male homosexuality of yore (*d’antan*), as it was portrayed in three famous French novels of the 1900: *L’immoraliste* [*The Immoralist*] (1902) by André Gide, *Sodome et Gomorrhe* [*Sodom and Gomorrah*] by Marcel Proust (1922–1923) and *Pompes Funèbres* [*Funeral Rights*] (1948) by Jean Genet.

Michel, the protagonist of *The Immoralist*, is, for Bersani, a prime example of a “*gay outlaw*,”³ dedicated to travel and laziness and thus unable to be a good citizen and a good soldier—basically the antithesis of those American gays in the nineties who claimed the right to serve in the military without hiding their sexual orientation. Paradoxically, Michel’s transgressive character arises from Gide’s deep-rooted homophobia: he was horrified by the mere idea that a man could be penetrated by another man, and because of this, not only did he eliminate sex, he eliminated every capacity for relationships from the portrait of “homosexuality” in his novel. In fact, though he is a “pederast,” Michel exclusively has sexual relationships with women (his wife and a prostitute), and instead of materializing his homosexuality through sexual acts, it comes out in his ecstatic admiration for the bodies of Arab boys lying out in the sun that he encounters on the North African beaches, and with whose bodies he phantasmatically identifies his own. According to Bersani (125), through his attraction to those young male bodies, Michel experiments with a kind of narcissistic expansion of desire that dissolves his ego and at the same time impedes him from recognizing the presence of the other as other. The outlaw nature of his timid pederastic sexuality does not therefore derive from the violation of the behavioral norms that regulate sexuality in a heterosexist society but, more radically, from the fact that it takes Michel away from that statute of individuality that constitutes the condition for every regulation. A desire devoid of a subject escapes the grasp of any regulative process⁴.

Proust is even more explicit than Gide in the negation of the possibility of a homosexual relationship (and even a sexuality). According to Proust, nothing is more unnatural than a community of inverts, or—as Bersani maintains, making effective use of a dual meaning—nothing is more unnatural than the fact that the inverts “come together”:

Nothing, Proust suggests, is more unnatural than for sexual inverts to come together. I mean “unnatural” and “come” in all their semantic richness. Not only is forming groups not what inverts spontaneously do; not only do they feel revulsion in each other’s company. More profoundly, a society of inverts is also contrary to the very nature of inversion, to what constitutes the invert’s identity. Having come together, inverts are, according to Proust, compelled to see with disgust their unnatural selves reflected in the specular presence of their fellow inverts. And there is no escape from this in sexual pleasure: it is unnatural for an invert to desire another invert, and so coming together, having orgasms together, can only reinforce the disgust of their having come together socially. (Bersani 1996: 129)

Consistent with the time, Proust applies the interpretive model of inversion to homosexuality (the distinction between sexual orientation and gender identity will not spread to medical culture until the 1950s⁵): for him, the male homosexual has a feminine spirit that is evidenced by the tone of voice, gestures and even the shape of the body. Despite trying to hide it, the baron de Charlus—the second example of a “gay outlaw”—is in fact effeminate and, like a woman, desires virile men and not other inverts similar to himself. What Proust describes in *Sodom and Gomorrah* is thus a homosexuality without “*homo-ness*,” where the desire is always heterosexual. In this representation, a homosexual couple is unthinkable, and a homosexual community is even more so: the inverts do not make up a community, but a “race,” and recognizing each other, they make a sort of secret society that is held together not by reciprocal desire but by desire for heterosexual men. Bersani (130–132) specifies that he does not want to defend Proust’s point of view to maintain an improbable return to the old interpretive model of inversion, which did not distinguish at all between homosexuality and transsexuality. The scope of his reading of *Sodom and Gomorrah* is, instead, to once again point a skeptic light on the self-representation of the gay lesbian and trans community in the United States after Stonewall and the AIDS crisis: the repugnance that the Proustian inverts feel toward themselves and those like them suggests

the possibility of rethinking of the community without the worth that liberal societies uncritically attribute to it⁶. Bersani interprets Genet with the same intent, reading in his work an even more crude representation of the antisocial tendencies that can nestle within homosexuality.

Funeral Rites is in fact Genet's disturbing homage to the soldier of the *Milice française* [the French militia] who killed Jean Décarnin, the writer's 20-year-old lover, who had participated in the Communist resistance. In the book, instead of mourning, Genet expresses his gratitude to the assassin who, in reducing his lover to the status of "edible cadaver," gave him the opportunity to enrich his morbid erotic imaginary. The *Leit-motiv* of the novel is in fact a revolting celebration of sex between men: Genet sings the pleasures of *rimming* and of anal sex *a tergo* as they are expressions of a sexuality without intimacy that does not feed off generative but rather cannibalistic fantasies:

So that "charming young collaborator" who killed Jean simply makes real the death at the hearth of Genet's love for Jean. For Genet this dense network of betrayal and death—which includes ceremoniously embellished memories of rimming, a murderous ripping into the lover's entails, Genet's discovery of his love for Jean only when Jean can be imagined as an edible corpse, a limitless tenderness for the traitor who in effect served up to Genet as adorably and irresistibly lifeless—all of this documents, so to speak, the availability of homosexuality to Genet's ascetic pursuit of evil. Far from simply rejecting a homophobic emphasis on the sterility of gay love, Genet joyfully embraces what may be called the anatomical emblem of that sterility. Could it be this failure to produce life, the absence of a reproductive site in (and exit from) the male body, as well as the "wasting" of sperm in the partner's digestive tract or rectum, that makes Genet refer to the love between two males as incomparable? (159–160)

While not harboring any political sympathy for Fascism, pushed by his gratitude for Décarnin's killer, Genet even weaves Hitler's praises into the pages in which that massacre of young boys that was the Second World War is described with enjoyment and excitement. But what's even more disturbing and scandalous in the novel, as Bersani does not neglect to point out, is the praise of *betrayal*. The most wicked of acts is precisely what, for Genet, gives value not only to Nazism, considered a form of betrayal to all of humanity in its destructive and self-destructive force, but to homosexuality as well:

Indeed, a curious aim rapidly takes over: that of praising the murderous collaborator (Genet names him Riton) and, more generally, the Nazis who were Jean's (and France's) enemy. In other words, Genet mourns Jean through an act of treachery. [...] Treachery has a special function in this defiant rejection of the codes of mourning. Instead of allowing the code to stand in for him and be an impersonal witness to his grief, Genet will prove his grief to himself by the pain he feels at his betrayal of Jean. If, as he writes, it is only in losing Jean that he realizes how attached he was to him, then suffering should be cultivated as the most reliable proof of love. To treat the dead Jean treacherously is torture, so Genet must have loved Jean. The formula will serve self-knowledge in the future: "I would like to be an out-and-out bastard and kill those I love—handsome adolescents—so that I may know by my greatest pain my deepest love for them." (155–157)

In *Funeral Rites*, homosexuality is far from the condition of an oppressed minority that claims its right to be embraced by society: on par with criminality, it is an occasion to betray the human community and lead an outlawed existence. Isolation is not, in fact, a coincidental consequence, it is the precise goal of Genet's ascetic of badness: if he happens upon comrades in evil, he ends up reporting them to the authorities (163); faced with the death of the boy he loves, he can only pay homage to the assassin who has freed him from that awkward company. This "intolerable moral logic" makes Genet an extreme example of a "*gay outlaw*." For Bersani (160), he is the least "gay-affirmative" gay writer in the history of literature and *consequently* the boldest proponent of sex between men: with no intention of making homosexuality acceptable to a heterosexual public, he depicts it without censorship, bringing to light the most vile and repulsive aspects of its corporeal and symbolic dimensions. For these reasons, Bersani appreciates his "political radicalism" (172) in the face of which, according to Bersani, the recommendation to "cite" and "subvert" the heterosexist norms of queer theories starting with Judith Butler has no choice but to give way (152).

Foucault remains, however, Bersani's main polemic objective: he is the one that Genet acts to offset. In the third chapter of *Homos*, as with *Is the Rectum a Grave?* before it, Foucault is accused of having attempted to "desexualize homosexuality," and more generally of having participated in the attempt to redeem sex from the death drive, without calling into question the liberal conception of the subject and of politics. Punctually responding to some of Foucault's declarations (1982a, 1983, 1984c), Bersani reaffirms that what is most frightening about homosexuality is

not—as Foucault would have it—the possibility of carrying out relationships and ways of life unforeseen by the heterosexist society, but rather the degradation of a man to feminine masochist passivity.⁷ Then he adds that, far from being a useful instrument to renew human relationships through the use of pleasure, sadomasochism eroticizes the archaic relationships of power, like the one between master and slave, and is an accomplice to fascisms instead of an ally of the libertarian movements of the sixties and seventies with which Foucault was in dialogue:

The polarized structure of master and slave, of dominance and submission, is the same in Nazism and in S/M, and that structure [...] is what gives pleasure. S/M, far from dissociating itself from a fascistic master-slave relation, actually confirms an identity between that relation and its own practices. It removes master and slave from economic and racial superstructures, thus confirming the eroticism of the master-slave configuration. (Bersani 1996: 88 and 89)

There is no denying that *Homos* is a fascinating text whose grasp on the reader is already evidence of the seductive power of the death drive. This does not negate the fact that it is legitimate, and theoretically and politically useful, to raise a certain number of objections to Bersani; objections that can be positioned on different argumentative planes. First and foremost, it is possible to observe some holes in his theses while still acknowledging the validity of their premises. Assuming a shared project to research a gay specificity, you must notice that Bersani *di fatto* ends up assimilating *all* of male homosexuality into one variant: in the end, the man who favors passive anal relationships is the only true homosexual since he assumes that which—in the homophobic and sexist understanding of homosexuality and femininity—is the characteristic masochistic position of female sexuality (“the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman,” to use his words from *Is the Rectum a Grave?*—Bersani 2010: 18). Now, one of the achievements of queer theories—that had already quite clearly and programmatically been enunciated by de Lauretis in her inaugural 1990 conference—is the demolition of the category of homosexuality understood as a general signifier that imperialistically subsumes different particular determinations in order to negate their specificity. For de Lauretis, as for the many authors that followed her, “queer” is understood as an umbrella term that recognizes all the differences within it not to erase them but to uphold them: within the queer theoretical lens, for example, not only does a lesbian occupy

a different position within the sociopolitical topology of sexuality than a gay man, but a Black lesbian or a Latina occupies a different position than a white Anglo-Saxon lesbian—and so too with a gay Black or Latino man in relation to a white Anglo-Saxon gay man and so on.⁸ So, if race, class and ethnic differences determine the different positions occupied on the chessboard of sexuality, should they not determine sexual roles and practices even more so? To be honest, Bersani is well aware of the fact that his reflections only regard European and Anglo-Saxon gay men, and he is careful not to speak for women—whose identity, he maintains, is not marked by the same narcissism that defines gay identity (63)—but equating male homosexuality with the willingness to be penetrated, and linking that with femininity (thus equating anal penetration with vaginal penetration), as much as he says that he does not want to, Bersani ends up sharing the interpretive model of inversion with Proust, who does not account for all of the nuances of male homosexuality either. Since not all gays are “versatile”—to use a chat room term that indicates those who are willing to assume both the active and passive roles—one can conclude that in Bersani’s texts, exclusively “active” gays or “tops” are not considered truly gay, but appear as mere instruments of the masochism of the “passive” gays or “bottoms”; the gays that do not practice anal penetration actively or passively, but prefer a “soft” sexuality do not appear at all (unless they identify with the scatological exaltation of *rimming* and sperm squandering within the bowels of their partner that was sung of by Genet, who however in Bersani’s narrative takes on a fairly exceptional role). An analogous absence can be seen in terms of sadomasochism: with no intention of avoiding the fundamental role of pain in sadomasochistic sex, Bersani, in polemic with Foucault, follows Freud and emphasizes the masochistic position within S/M practices. But if we accept that the enjoyment of the masochist comes from a renunciation of power (and thus from a loss of the subject’s control over his environment and himself) and from a fragmentation of identity that allows for the loss of control through pain, then shouldn’t the sadistic power derive in mirror-like fashion from that control of the self that is necessary to dominate the other and give him pain?⁹ Like the gay *tops*, the *masters* do not have claims to citizenship in the representation that Bersani provides of sexuality, because, after all, sexuality is modeled on the tastes of the *bottoms* and the *slaves*.¹⁰ What Bersani recognizes as “gay specificity” is thus an exclusive specificity that does not account for the multiple identities that recognize themselves, for historic and cultural reasons, within the term “gay.”

A second limit to Bersani's research derives from the devaluing of gay metropolitan sociality as it has been historically constituted in the last 50 years. Perhaps because he is too attached to the models of homosexuality that he finds in Gide, Proust and Genet, Bersani seems not to want to realize how the visibility obtained by the gay liberation movements after Stonewall has had an effect not only on the collective imaginary but on the symbolic order, rendering the rigid interpretation of the gender binary that profoundly marked the novels written before the sexual revolution obsolete. I am not alluding to the dissemination, first within the LGBTQIA community and then throughout the entire society, of the "transgender" category as a marker of a sexual identity that challenges the distinct separation between female and male—a question that exceeds the scope of Bersani's reflection which is limited only to homosexuality (Bersani 2010a). I am instead making reference to the fact that from the seventies through today, though psychology insists on considering gender identity (male and female) and sexual orientation (heterosexual and homosexual) as two completely distinct components of a person's personality, the term "gay" has come to mean not only a preference in one's object of desire, but a precise social identity, perhaps a real and true gender. To maintain his thesis on the masochistic and narcissistic nature of homosexual desire, Bersani takes for granted that the object of gay desire is of the male gender: according to him, like a woman, the gay man desires men, who are also his oppressors (which would confirm their masochism). Furthermore, once again according to Bersani, though desiring them like a woman, gay men continue to identify with men (which would confirm his narcissism). Now, it would be rather reductive to assume that a gay today cannot help but desire "men" that are understood as heterosexual homophobes: they surely exist—and are most likely the majority in the Western metropolises—even gays that desire other gays and not their oppressors, but who share a common social identity and often a common lifestyle (which is why many young gays that are born in the provinces move to the big cities, contradicting Proust's argument about the asociality of inverts). What relationship model could, furthermore, be more appropriate to provide fodder for the notion of "homo-ness" or "sameness" on which Bersani so insists?¹¹

Despite all his distinctions and prudence, Bersani provides an essentialist and particularist vision of homosexuality (presenting it as the quality of a desire that makes up the essence of a particular minority category of humans) tied to the model of gender inversion (according to which gay sexual desire is comparable to a woman's). Six years before the publication

of *Homos*, in *Epistemology of the Closet* (1990), which has an entire chapter dedicated to *Sodome et Ghomorre*, Kosofsky Sedgwick had brought to light how partial such an interpretation was, acutely observing how the modern concept of homosexuality had an aporetic construction since its origin in the late 1800s, marked by three orders of contradiction. Through the course of a century and a half, in literary, sociological and medical representations of homosexuality, the inversion model was countered by the model of gender separatism (according to which for men it is a case of excess virility, and for women a case of excess femininity that determines sexual orientation), the essentialist model with that of the constructivist one (according to which homosexuality is a social construction) and the particularist model with the universalist one (according to which homosexuality—understood as a desire or social construction—does not have to do only with a minority but with all of humanity). Bersani has made clear choices between these alternatives, selecting *ad hoc* literary texts to support them, without justifying his partiality in any way. Of course, even Kosofsky Sedgwick's assertion that the contradictions of the modern concept of homosexuality are absolutely undecidable cannot be proven. After *Epistemology of the Closet*, however, research into gay "specificity" should have begun in an attempt to rectify the aporias that were brought to light. If Bersani does not bother with this problem, it seems to be because he puts excessive faith in psychoanalytic knowledge, considering it a sort of warehouse of *truth* on human sexuality. But for literary criticism, psychoanalysis is just one of the possible analytic textual approaches; and all the more so for philosophy for which it is only one of the possible narrations for constructing human ontology—among other things, it is one of the least apt for advancing the claim of producing ultimate truth. It is enough to think of the multiple contradictory interpretations of homosexuality in the history of psychoanalysis to realize the uncertain state of this knowledge. Bersani pins Freud and Laplanche against Foucault, but this does not prevent us from pinning Foucault against Bersani. For Foucault, every time a truth about humans is produced, it has normativizing and therefore coercive effects: if one holds freedom dear, it would be wise to oppose the epistemic use of psychoanalysis.¹²

A third order of objections that can be made to Bersani deal with the apparent incoherence of his project. Already in the conclusion of *Is the Rectum a Grave?*, after spending pages and pages lauding the mortal violence of the libido (and the enjoyment of being hit by it), Bersani legitimizes his reflection by making an appeal to nonviolence. Speaking

of the judgment that associates female sexuality and thus anal sex with an insatiable desire and an unacceptable self-destructive compulsion for the liberal conception of self-preservation (and surreptitiously chauvinist and heterosexist) of subjectivity, on the last page he writes:

The sacrosanct value of selfhood [...] accounts for human beings' extraordinary willingness to kill in order to protect the seriousness of their statements. The self is a practical convenience; promoted to the status of an ethical ideal, it is a sanction for violence. If sexuality is socially dysfunctional in that it brings people together only to plunge them into a self-shattering and solipsistic *jouissance* that drives them apart, it could also be thought of as our primary hygienic practice of nonviolence. Gay men's "obsession" with sex, far from being denied, should be celebrated—not because of its communal virtues, not because of its subversive potential for parodies of machismo, not because it offers a model of genuine pluralism to a society that at once celebrates and punishes pluralism, but rather because it never stops re-presenting the internalized phallic male as an infinitely loved object of sacrifice. Male homosexuality advertises the risk of the sexual itself as the risk of self-dismissal, of *losing sight* of the self, and in so doing it proposes and dangerously represents *jouissance* as a mode of asceticism. (Bersani 2010: 30)

What might seem to be a contradiction—especially if you keep in mind the Freudian thesis according to which the death drive is at the origin of aggressivity toward others—is not the result of an occasional slip by Bersani into political correctness, but the symptom of an interesting theoretical tension, or “ethic,” that is constitutive of his thought. This can be seen in *Homos* as well where, speaking of the “race of inverts” described by Proust, Bersani (1996: 131, 172) asserts that what interests him most about the repugnance of the inverts toward building a cohesive group is that the breaking of this social tie might lead to the constitution of a new type of community (“a new community of inversion”); and where he also expresses his desires for a non-oppressive sociality explaining that the only reason it seems possible “to tolerate, even to welcome” Genet’s moral abjection, is because without it the “social revolt” of these propagandists would be “doomed to repeat the oppressive conditions that provoked the revolt.”¹³ Despite doing everything to assert the value of gay narcissistic asociality and of a masochism that enjoys violence and oppression, Bersani is not able to renounce the cumbersome ideal of a nonviolent liberation of the queer community from oppression. Despite Gide, Proust and Genet, despite Freud, Laplanche and the death drive, he is not able to free himself from a fairly traditional emancipatory model.

2.2 HOMOS/EROS

To tell the truth, even when they refer to tradition, the theoretical propositions Bersani put forth after *Homos* have very little to do with the traditional—at least at first glance. In the book *Intimacies* (2008), for example, in dialogue with psychoanalyst and British literary critic Adam Phillips, who had already been Butler’s interlocutor in *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997), Bersani sings the praises of narcissism as he passingly reviews very diverse texts, from Plato’s philosophic dialogue *Phaedrus*, and the Henry James novel *The Beast in the Jungle* (1903), to Patrice Leconte’s film *Confidences trop intimes* [*Intimate Strangers*] (2004). But largely in this text, Bersani deals directly with current events, with the intention of observing collective political subjects in order to draw conclusions about the nature of the individual ego and vice versa—taking up the method introduced by Plato in *The Republic*. In the third chapter, for example, “The Power of Evil and the Power of Love,” the Bush administration’s “war on terror” after September 11, 2001, is positioned next to the crimes of Jeffrey Dahmer, the “Milwaukee cannibal,”¹⁴ to account for the role that violence plays in the affirmation of subjectivity. While he does not name Butler or her work *Precarious Life* (2004), Bersani, like Butler, maintains that the illusory sovereignty of the individual, as with the State, is constituted by the edification and defense of identitarian borders that aggressively separate the self from the other and from the communal world:¹⁵

National, ethnic, and racial identities are like personal egos in that they can be defined as historically distinct and inherently oppositional identities. Christianity and homosexuality, to take two examples of collective identity, are in reality but monolithic identitarian blocks. And yet, despite their diffused presence throughout the world, as well as their diverse modes of expression, the imaginary spaces in which they are enclosed create equally imaginary yet powerfully operative borders outside of which lies everything that is essentially different from them. Individual and collective egos must always be ready to defend those borders, and because such egos are by nature settled or congealed differences, they are inclined to define themselves, indeed to construct the unity of their being, in terms of an aggressively defensive posture toward the differences outside their identitarian frontiers. (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 85)

In the second chapter, “Shame on You”—referring to Tim Dean’s studies on the subject which would be published the following year under

the title *Unlimited Intimacy: Reflections on the Subculture of Barebacking* (2009)¹⁶—Bersani compares the “peaceful intimacy” of the bareback subculture with this aggressive form of subjectivity and relationality. “Bareback” is an adverb or an adjective that belongs to the realm of horseback riding: it indicates the activity of riding a horse without a saddle. As an extension, in gay circles, the term came to mean the desire and search for anal relations without the protective use of condoms in order to deliberately contract HIV. Since the mid-nineties, and thus starting from the widespread use of HAART (highly active antiretroviral therapy) in developed countries, the mortality and morbidity of people with HIV reduced considerably and barebacking became a real subculture, especially—but not only—in the larger cities of the United States.¹⁷ It is as if, drugged by the trauma of the AIDS epidemic, when it became less threatening, the gay community had to excrete a surplus of self-destructiveness to satisfy its repetition compulsion. There exist online communities¹⁸ and privé clubs that organize orgy parties that prohibit the use of condoms, during which being penetrated by an HIV-positive man or by many HIV-positive men, called “gift-givers” or “gifters,” is considered a sort of initiation ritual—those who submit are called “bug-chasers.” In *Intimacies*, Bersani interprets barebacking sexual rituals not as an expression of narcissistic and masochistic enjoyment, but as a complex form of spirituality directed at the dissolution of personality, and the loss of the boundaries of the self: in his opinion, bareback sex would essentially allow for the realization of a communal dimension of that impersonal *immoralism* that, in Gide, was confined to virginal solitude.

He realizes the aporias contained in the idea of a community of narcissism (thus devoid of a real relationality between subjects) based on the ascetic of the dissolution of the self (thus basically devoid of subjects who can form relationships with one another), and this unfathomable paradox seems to create a sort of enthusiasm in him—even if it is accompanied by a strong judgment of disapproval (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 55). In his opinion, barebacking concentrates the aggressivity toward the other and the divisive compulsion toward the self (the two faces of the coin that make up the death drive) in the intensity of a sexual act that removes the affirmative tendency of the ego: in deliberately unprotected sex, every reproductive request (from the self’s production and preservation instinct to the desire to multiply and procreate) becomes nulled by the infectious act.¹⁹ For Bersani, the symbolic value of the social tie in the bareback community dissolves in the real infected body, in the sterility of a sacrifice that does not

have, or look for, any justification other than that of enjoyment. A “deliberately occasional” community (another paradox) like the sex that it generates, whose members remain dreadfully alone in their “ascetic search,” like hermits in the desert searching for martyrdom, enlivened by a “spiritual love” that becomes hatred toward the self²⁰:

Barebacking’s distorted and regressive version of community also strikes me as a model of an ultimately unfathomable spirituality, a spirituality at once exalted and unrelievedly sombre. Nothing useful can come from this practice; barebacking does nothing to further the political goals of a minority community (on the contrary!), and it does nothing to transmit the presumed values of that community to future generations. The barebacker is the lonely carrier of the lethal and stigmatized remains of all those to whom his infection might be traced. He may continue to move and to act socially, but that which constitutes his most profound sociality isolates him, makes his life like that of a hermit in the desert. We are used to seeing, and even applauding, the willing submission of entire populations to the manipulations of political power, but nothing even remotely resembling this truly evil power [...] enters into barebacking. Power has played no tricks on the barebacker: from the beginning he was promised nothing more, than the privilege of being a living tomb, the repository of what may kill him, of what may kill those who have penetrated him during the gang-bang, of what may kill those who infected the men who have just infected him. (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 49–50)

The thematization Bersani has carried out with regard to bareback practices naturally arouses uncertainties similar to those I expressed regarding his interpretations of anal sex and sadomasochism. Is the equating of the active to the passive, the sadist to the masochist, and the gift-giver to the bug-chaser really so certain? If the bug-chaser is truly so enlivened by this sacrificial spirit, by the ego’s dissolutive drive, doesn’t the gift-giver affirm instead the deadly power of his ego to damage the other?²¹ A careful observation of the bareback subculture allows us, furthermore, to understand how distant Bersani’s idealization sometimes is from reality.

In *Unlimited Intimacy*, Dean describes how a real community characterized by original, and grotesque forms of “genealogy” and “kinship” (what an honor to be able to show that the virus that infected me also passed through the body of Michel Foucault!—Dean 2009: 89) formed around the practices of bareback sex in San Francisco. Unlike gay and lesbian families, relationships between barebackers do not aspire to any form of state recognition (9), but this does not make them disinclined toward

a very strong fascination with institutionality. The new forms of “kinship” in the bareback community are in fact permeated by hyper-virile military erotic ghosts (Dean 2009: 38–39, 52), and a sort of “patriotic” spirit often accompanies the search for the infection: the health of the bug-chaser is erotically sacrificed for the survival of a group whose existence depends on the rituals of the infection²². Apparently, it is not a matter of either narcissistic asociality or liberal subjectivity: similar to S/M, the bareback subculture sometimes assumes a fascist and totalitarian tone. As Dean rightly affirms, it is disturbing not so much because it distances itself from dominant values, but precisely because it reintroduces them.²³ So what would make the self-sacrifice of a gay man in order to continue the genealogical line of barebackers preferable to a soldier who sacrifices his life in the name of the American way of life? In any case, the “spiritual love” that characterizes the bug-chaser’s behavior (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 54–55) is in no way the feeling that occupies the highest position on Bersani’s value scale, because it remains tied, in its negation, to the subject’s personality (the ego is what must be renounced for the barebacker to be able to love): according to Bersani, bareback practices consist of a “critique” of the centrality of the ego, but are not yet an effective form of “resistance.”²⁴ Furthermore, the same could be said of Bersani’s entire theoretical itinerary, if it weren’t for the third chapter of *Intimacies*, where the author seems to want to elaborate on that *pars construens* that his theory still lacked, by taking it from the erotic theory that Plato elaborates in *Phaedrus*.

In the mythic narration of this dialogue, the soul, who is subject to metempsychosis, is depicted as a winged chariot, the rational part of which, the charioteer, has the difficult task of governing both the concupiscent part, the black horse (who leans toward the pleasures of the flesh and gluttony), and the irrational part, the white horse (who aspires toward honor and glory). Before becoming human, the souls-chariots are divided into 12 groups, which each follow a different divinity: in each procession, every soul tries to lift itself as high as possible to get at least one glimpse of enlightenment where the world of forms is. In *Phaedrus*, love—which in Plato, as in a large part of the Ancient Greek treatises, is conceived of in terms of pederasty—is that “divine madness” through which, in earthly existence, the memory of that otherworld flourishes: once the soul is incarnated, every man will fall in love with boys whose beauty will remind them not only of the truth they once glimpsed, but also of the specific god that was once their guide. When this happens, the boy (the beloved, *eromenos*) will fall in love, fulfilled by the image that the man (the lover, *erastes*) has of him:

The beloved loves the lover's image of him, which is of course the version of himself that makes the lover remember both heavenly beauty and the god with whom the lover's soul had flown. The boy loves a soul that he both is and is becoming, the latter as a result of the lover's pouring more and more into him the qualities of the god whose nature the lover had already seen in the boy. In Freudian terms, we might say that the boy sees and loves his ideal ego in his lover—except that this ego is not exactly something that he has lost and that he projects onto someone else, the over-valued object of love. On the contrary: it is what the lover loves in him. In a sense, the lover recognizes *his* ideal ego in the boy; desiring the boy is a way of infusing the boy with an ideal self that is both the boy's and the lover's. The lover's desire waters the smaller, less developed wings of a soul very much like his. And as the wings of the beloved's ideal nature grow, the lover is transported—driven divinely mad—by his vision of the boy becoming more and more like himself (the boy), like him (the lover), and like the god they both serve, the type of being to which they both belong. (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 83–84)

Bersani calls this strange form of love “impersonal narcissism” (85), because, according to him, the self that the beloved and the lover have in common does not belong to either of them, or rather, it does not belong to anyone: it is in fact a self, or a non-self, that does not circumscribe any limits with the other, and is alien to the feeling of identity that is constitutive of individuality.²⁵ The god that presides over amorous madness is merely a “virtual being” that reflects “the lover's type of being, his universal singularity” (86): the platonic lover thus does not love the personal characterization of the beloved—what we might, in borrowing from Cavarero, call the “embodied uniqueness”²⁶ of that soul and that body in a particular biography—but to the contrary loves his being without personal characterization, his existence as a mere example of a type. The platonic erotica is thus, for Bersani, the antidote for the (liberal) valorization of difference. Celebrating the equivalence of singularity without quality, it offers an example of a relationality without self which he considers “revolutionary”:

Naturally, each subject's type of being is not reflected in everyone else. But the experience of belonging to a family of singularity without national, ethnic, racial, or gendered borders might make us sensitive to the ontological status of difference itself as what I called the nonthreatening supplement of sameness in *Homos*. The relationality I have just sketched could amount to

a revolutionary reversal of the relational mode dominant in our culture, one that nourishes the powers of evil that govern us and with which, as long as we remain in this relational field, we are all complicit. (86–87)

We are once again faced with the theoretical tension and ethics typical of Bersani's thought, this time perhaps we are less convinced by the fact that his conclusions do not contradict his premises. In *Is the Rectum a Grave?*, the professor emeritus writes that fucking has nothing to do with community or love (22), and then goes on to affirm that the value of sex lies in being "anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving" and in constituting an antidote for violence. Then, in *Homos*, he began—*en passant*—to dream of a poorly defined new non-oppressive relationality; and in *Intimacies*, he proceeded, more systematically, to think up a sociality no longer founded on the values of self-preservation, of well-being and of social acknowledgment. What anal sex (with the use of condoms or not) and platonic love have in common in his works is the loss of the self's boundaries which makes both of them incompatible with the image that the liberal subject has of itself. However, what is surprising is that, after dedicating page after page to the exaltation of narcissistic and masochistic isolation and to the celebration of the breaking of social ties caused by the death drive, Bersani finally opts for that conservative and communal inclination that Freud, in Empedocles' and Plato's honor, called "*Eros*." Also surprising is the fact that after celebrating the enjoyment of the anal for years, he ends up promoting the model put forth by Plato, who—as Foucault rightfully observes (1984a)—was among the first to desexualize homosexual love in order to idealize it as the care that a mature man can practice on the soul of a boy with the instruments of philosophic dialogue, and certainly not with penetration.²⁷ Should we thus conclude that through the process of aging even Bersani ended up not liking sex? It seems to me, instead, that Bersani's aporias are proof of an historic difficulty: with the waning of revolutionary ideologies and their justifications for violence as an accelerator of progress, even the most radical queer critique of liberalism cannot free itself, as it says it would like to, of that normative ideal of a community of love that is found as much in Foucault's interviews, and the proclamations of Queer Nation, as it is in Butler's texts. If it were to be successful, furthermore, it would be like throwing the *baby* (namely, queer affectivity and relationality) out with the bath water (liberal sociality).

Like the Arab phoenix, *Eros* rises brightly from the obscurities of *Thanatos*. Bersani's theoretic journey seems to suggest that the themes

of community and love are inescapable for those who want to face the complex materiality of eroticism and sexuality. This is evidence of the impossibility to conceptualize the human using the categories of narcissism, masochism and the death drive without accounting for the presence, within him or her, of protective and social impulses. This does not constitute a limit, but rather an example of one of the many merits of Bersani's challenging of the political correctness of homosexuality²⁸: without fearing incoherence, Bersani betrays himself in order to turn, more and more explicitly, toward an increasingly distant past—up to Plato's classical antiquity—his research of non-oppressive and nonviolent relational modalities. Not everyone, however, feels as I do. Lee Edelman's latest research, for example, can be read as an attempt to push Bersani's antisocial ideas forward and liberate them from their contradictions. If, like Plato for Parmenides, Bersani is obsessed with the need for a critical confrontation with Foucault (to whom Bersani symptomatically dedicates a chapter of *Homos*, entitled "The Gay Daddy"), Edelman instead references Hocquenghem (an author who Bersani intentionally neglects) and, strengthened by this intellectual heredity, frees himself of any hesitation. Like killing his own father, throwing the baby out with the bath water, for him, doesn't seem to be a problem.

NOTES

1. The reference to Butler and Monique Wittig (1992) is even more explicit in Bersani 1995: 45 et seqq.
2. This thesis was already present in Freud's famous essay *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* (1910), where, as an adult, Leonardo's desire for boys is read as a way of staying faithful to his mother, identifying with the love that she nurtured him with as a child.
3. "The Gay Outlaw" is the title of the final chapter of *Homos*, dedicated to the analysis of the three novels.
4. "This is lawless pederasty—not because it violates statutes that legislate our sexual behaviour, but because it rejects personhood, a status that the law needs in order to discipline us and, it must be added, to protect us. [...] And this should help us to see what is at stake in Michel's timid sexuality. He travels in order to spread his superficial view of human relations, preaching, by his anomalous presence among foreign bodies, a community in which the other, no longer respected or violated as a person, would merely be cruised as another opportunity, at once insignificant and precious, for narcissistic pleasures" (Bersani 1996: 128–129).
5. For more on this, see note 6 of the first chapter, *supra*.

6. "The self-loathing implicit in the invert's reluctance to settle for the company of, and sex with, his fellow inverts could lead to a redefinition of community itself, one that would be considerably less indebted than we now are to the communal virtues elaborated by those who wants us to disappear" (Bersani 1996: 131).
7. "I think that what most bothers those who are not gay about gayness is the gay life-style, not sex acts themselves... It is the prospect that gays will create as yet unforeseen kinds of relationship that many people cannot tolerate'. The desexualizing of homophobia implicit in this quote from an interview Michel Foucault gave to the American Magazine *Salmagundi* was by no means incidental to the mood of a single conversation. In an interview that appeared in 1988 in the French gay publication *Mec*, Foucault said: 'People can tolerate two homosexuals they see leaving together, but if the next day they're smiling, holding hands and tenderly embracing one another, then they can't be forgiven. It is not the departure for pleasure that is intolerable, it is waking up happy'. For someone who has proposed—as I have in 'Is the Rectum a Grave?'—that homophobia may be the vicious expression of a more or less hidden fantasy of males participating, principally through anal sex, in what is presumed to be the terrifying phenomenon of female sexuality, Foucault's argument naturally, or perversely, has a strong appeal. The intolerance of gayness, far from being the displaced expression of the anxiety that nourish misogyny, would be nothing more—by which of course Foucault meant nothing less—than a political anxiety about the subversive, revolutionary social rearrangements that gays may be trying out" (Bersani 1996: 77–78).
8. "[A]n equally troubling question in the burgeoning field of 'gay and lesbian studies' concerns the discursive constructions and constructed silences around the relations of race to identity and subjectivity in the practices or homosexualities and the representations of same-sex desire" (de Lauretis 1991: VIII).
9. Bersani himself realizes this: "I am, of course, suggesting the primacy of masochism in sadomasochism. If there were such a thing as sadism unaffected by masochistic impulses, it would reveal nothing more newsworthy than the pleasure of control and domination. The appeal of powerlessness would be entirely on the side of the masochist, for whom the sadist would be little more than an opportunity to surrender" (Bersani 1996: 95). But who says then that the masochist does not exert power over the sadist? Is inflicting pain on him not in his service? As noted in the majority of S/M encounters, the two partners agree in advance on the limits that the *slave* does not want to surpass, and they often agree upon a gesture with which the masochist can order the *master* to stop. Who then exerts power over whom? And who exerts real control over their sexual relationship? Reread in terms of Hegel's master/slave dialectic, S/M assumes more complexity.

10. In *Intimacies*, Bersani responds to this objection by instituting a clear equivalence between narcissism, sadism and masochism: "The death drive as a drive to destroy others would add very little to a fundamentally non-psychoanalytic Hobbesian view of human nature. What is uniquely psychoanalytic [...] is the notion that the pleasurable power of satisfied aggression is itself a threat to the agent of aggression. In Freudian terms, the hyperbolic ego risks being shattered by its own narcissistically thrilling inflation. Thus, sadistically motivated narcissism is also masochistically satisfying. Psychoanalysis makes a concession to categorical ways of thinking by providing different, even opposing, definitions of narcissism, sadism and masochism, but psychoanalytic thinking lies outside categorical thought." (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 67–68).
11. Monique Wittig was the first in *The Straight Mind* (1980) to maintain that the lesbian "is not a woman" because she has subtracted herself from sexual relations with men, from that biological complementarity with the opposite sex that should define her in a heterosexist society.
12. This does not, in and of itself, mean opposing a heuristic and critical use of psychoanalytic theories, as with every other ontological narration, nor does it mean negating *a priori* the therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalytic practices. In *The Order of Things* (1966 Eng. trans. 1994: 376), Foucault himself defends psychoanalysis when it is removed from a generalized theory of man and is presented as particular, and thus scientific, knowledge: "invincibly linked with a praxis, with that strangulation produced by the relation between two individuals, one of whom is listening to the other's language."
13. As the collection of texts in *Prisoner of Love* (2003) shows, the revolt that Genet was thinking of was not a form of nonviolent political action—even if revolutionary violence was often contradictorily presented as the instrument for building a peaceful society in Marxist tradition. In *Homos*, however, Genet is an example of an outlawed gay existence to be interrogated and not a model to be imitated.
14. Jeffrey Dahmer (1960–1994) killed 17 young men between 1978 and 1991. The majority of his victims were African American or Asian homosexuals that he lured in bars and gay establishments by pretending to be a photographer in search of models and/or by propositioning them. Dahmer invited his victims to his home, where he drugged and strangled or stabbed them, had his way with them sexually and then cut their bodies into pieces with an electric saw. The body parts were partly dissolved in acid, partly frozen and used as food; the penis was often preserved in formaldehyde, the head was boiled to remove the flesh and then the skull was painted and used for decoration. The entire process was documented by a series of photographs. In 1991, Dahmer was arrested after one of his victims, Tracy Edward, escaped and pressed charges. Condemned to life imprisonment,

he was killed at the Columbia Correctional Institute of Portage by fellow inmate Christopher Scarver, who suffered from schizophrenia (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 57 et seq.).

15. The two analyses can be distinguished by the emphasis that Bersani places on the self-destructive character of imperialist politics, insisting on the fact that the nation requires its rulers not only to sadistically enjoy the killing of their enemy, but also to masochistically enjoy the sacrificing of their lives in war (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 68).
16. Dean had already investigated the phenomenon of unsafe sex in *Beyond Sexuality* (2000). Before publishing *Unlimited Intimacy*, the widespread practice of bareback sex was analyzed in other studies: Halkitis et al. 2005; Schernoff 2006; Halperin 2007.
17. The phenomenon has also spread through Europe, especially in the gay communities of Great Britain, Germany and France. See, for example, the novel by the French journalist and writer Erik Rémès, *Serial Fucker: Journal d'un barebacker* (2003). According to Dean (2009: 44), however, "although bareback networks flourish in European cities such as Berlin and London, there is something quintessentially North American about this subculture."
18. See, for example, <http://barebackcity.info>, where, among other things, it says: "We all know the posters of the Federal Centre for Health Education, the German AIDS Federation and other actions to prevent AIDS-infections. During various gay events, in hot spots respectively cruising areas some information material and condoms are handed out for free. Anyway the most people are not deciding rational, but let themselves be guided by their feelings and emotions. Some people, maybe you too, say: a condom is gall-ing, causes pain or reduces feelings due to its thickness. Aren't these excuses for a desire for a complete union respectively fusion? Protecting oneself from a sex contact prevents becoming one" (sic.). The site <http://www.bareback.com> more prudently urges people to take responsibility and be sincere about their HIV status even to occasional partners, and condemns the use of drugs ("Love is the drug on BareBack.com baby!").
19. "The bottom is thrillingly invested with women's power to conceive, and, in a throwback to childhood (and now unconscious) theories about the path of conception, the rectum becomes the procreative womb. But the barebacker's rectum is a grave. And this is where the reproductive fantasy becomes at once more sinister and more creative" (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 44–45).
20. Bersani (and Phillips 2008: 52) compares barebacking to Quietist heresy, condemned by the Roman Church in the seventeenth century for its mysticism of "pure love" understood as a passive waiting for God. But to tell the truth, the bug-chaser is not completely passive in terms of his destiny: it would be the case if, perhaps, he did not use a contraceptive in occasional

sexual relations and did not know the HIV status of his partner, but not if—as it happens—he deliberately searched for HIV-positive partners to infect him.

21. Bersani (and Phillips 2008:55) limits himself by saying: “This is not to deny the seriousness of spreading the infection, with or without mutual consent, but even the most ardent gift-givers seem unmotivated by the thrill of exercising murderous power.”
22. “Bareback subculture regards its most committed participants as heroes. [...] Rather than as irresponsible, destructive, or hedonistic, they are seen as heroic warriors and gay patriots.” “Barebackers sacrifice themselves on behalf of gay culture in the same way, for example, soldiers sacrifice themselves on behalf of their country during war” (Dean 2009: 56 and 57).
23. “Bareback subculture may be ethically troubling less for its radical departure from mainstream values than for its perpetuation of them” (Dean 2009: 58). Bersani (briefly) accounts for these disturbing aspects of barebacking (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 51 et. seqq.).
24. “Interpreted as a mode of ascetic spirituality, bug-chasing and gift-giving among barebackers are implicit critiques of the multiple forms of ego-driven intimacy: from the most trivial expressions of sexual vanity (bareback videos, unlike other gay porn, include singularly unattractive bodies), to the prideful exclusiveness of the family as a socially blessed, closed unit of reproductive intimacy, and even to the at once violently aggressive and self-shattering ego-hyperbolizing of racial, national, ethnic, and gendered identities. A critique but not a resistance: the awesome abjection of “pure love” can only take place in the margins of the far more viable, inventive, and destructive exercises of personal and collective ego expansion” (Bersani and Phillips 2008: 55).
25. In reaching the impersonal, which he already foresaw in the analysis of *The Immoralist* in *Homos*, Bersani’s reflections seem to be in line with much of European continental philosophy from the last 50 years that—at times drawing from psychoanalysis, at times not—has insisted heavily on this concept. It draws in fact from the body of work of authors such as Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy and Roberto Esposito. In *Third Person: Politics of Life and Philosophy of the Impersonal* (2007), Esposito traces its presence in Simone Weil, Emile Benveniste, Alexandre Kojève, Emmanuel Lévinas, Maurice Blanchot and even Michel Foucault. I prefer to exclude Foucault from the list of the philosophers of the impersonal because I maintain that his genealogical research from the seventies as well as his studies on ethics from the eighties—geared toward searching, in antiquity, for an alternative mode of subjectification than the modern one—have decidedly strayed from his structuralist and antihumanist thought of the seventies. To this end, allow me to refer to Bernini

- 2013b and 2013c. For reflections on the reasons of the emergence of this category of “impersonality” from the crisis of modern subjectivity, see Lisciani Petrini 2012.
26. The term “embodied uniqueness” is used in Cavarero’s work since *In Spite of Plato* (1990: 6).
 27. In the Symposium, Socrates refuses the advances of the young and beautiful Alcibiades, as he prefers to be the teacher of his soul and not the possessor of his body. The desexualization of the love between a man and a boy is also evident in *Phaedrus* (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 252D-533C).
 28. Bersani’s theses are indirectly confirmed by the use of the category “politics of disgust” by “liberal” author Martha Nussbaum (2010) to point to the social and juridical discrimination of lesbians and gays that she hopes will be overcome in the name of a “politics of humanity.” Nussbaum, however, does not cite Bersani, instead she dwells on Dean’s *Unlimited Intimacy*, revealing some details about the run up to its publication: “Many people were unwilling to see the press publish a book that could be seen as advocating ‘risky behavior.’ [...] The press would not have batted an eye had the editor recommended a book on mountain climbing or car racing or boxing or smoking or drinking; books on these topics are ubiquitously published by reputable publishers, including university presses. [...] Sex, and particularly gay sex, was singled out for special scrutiny, as if frank talk about it was a kind of nuisance. Finally good sense and academic freedom prevailed and the press decided to publish Dean’s book; the anxiety it inspired, however, told an all-too-common story.” (Nussbaum 2010: 179).

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Back to the Future

[I don't write] recipes for the cook-shops of the future.
(Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*)

*My approach toward gay parades and sexual minorities is very simple.
It is directly linked to my responsibilities. One of the key problems of our
country is the demographic problem.*
(Vladimir Putin)

Unanimously recognized as the founder of antisocial queer theories, Bersani is also the first to attest to their political untenability. Those who would like to more consistently pursue the path he has laid out must thus be willing to risk renouncing politics. Lee Edelman, as I have mentioned, is the one who has expanded on this. In launching a radical attack on the communal sense of LGBTQIA movements, Edelman shields himself by using the criticism against political planning developed by the young Hocquenghem, from whom, in his time, a thankless Foucault also drew.¹ The goal of the following pages is to test the resistance of this defensive tool, or, better yet, to investigate whether or not this defense is more of a boomerang than a shield. It is in fact true that in the seventies, Hocquenghem rejected the “futurist” rhetoric of planning and waiting, but his intention was not to abstain from politics: to the contrary,

Translation by Julia Heim

he expressed the “anal” impatience of an action that needed immediate execution. And while he did reject the bourgeois-capitalist society as well as the proletariat-communist one, he did not repudiate every form of sociality. I predict, therefore, that it is a boomerang that not only returns where it once began, but leads us even further back—not in space: in time.

3.1 THE ANAL STRUGGLE AGAINST CAPITAL

In May of 1968, during the occupation of the Sorbonne, a group of students tried to create a Comité d’Action Pédérastique Révolutionnaire [Committee of Revolutionary Pederastic Action]. Six of the eight political posters that were put up were torn down the next day. After a week, not a single one remained. For the occupation committee, in fact, the mere presence of homosexuals near the university bathrooms represented a threat to the respectability of the movement. The next year, in New York, following the Stonewall Riots, the GLF (Gay Liberation Front²) was born. Following their example, on March 10, 1971, several young lesbian and gay Parisians, along with some activists from the MLF (mouvement de Libération des Femmes [Women’s Liberation Movement]), burst into the Salle Pleyel and interrupted an episode of Menie Grégoire’s radio program. Psychologists, doctors and priests were invited to discuss the “painful problem of homosexuality” with the popular host, but not a single lesbian or gay was invited. Brandishing cold cuts as if they were clubs, the protesters nonviolently and joyously declared their right to voice their opinion.³ This was FHAR’s (Front Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire) constitutive act. They, along with the newly formed FUORI! (Fronte Unitario Omosessuale Rivolutorio Italiano! [Unitary Italian Homosexual Revolutionary Front!]), would then attempt, in Sanremo on April 5 and 6, 1972, to sabotage the first international congress of sexology on the “Deviant behaviors of human sexuality.”⁴ During the years in which psychoanalysis was becoming a pervasive element of everyday sociality, in Europe the growing homosexual liberation movements declared what FHAR called “*Flickiâtres*” (psycho-cops), the keepers of medical and psychological knowledge of homosexuality, to be the strategic objects of their protests. But since the actions carried out during the occupation of the Sorbonne were not exceptional, they decided to go after the leftist “*bétéro-flics*” (hetero-cops) as well. In February 1972, for example, FHAR polemically barged into a French communist party conference that dealt with the “female question” from a familist perspective that the youths of the group considered reactionary.⁵

Instead of being driven by an assertive and proactive attitude, the first French gay liberation movement was motivated by a feeling of radical opposition toward any form of sexual discipline, including the family and the couple. Out of all its founders and main spokespeople, the 25-year-old Guy Hocquenghem distinguished himself in 1972 by publishing *Le Désir homosexuel* [*Homosexual Desire*], a text that was destined to become a point of reference for queer thought. It is most likely deliberate and not accidental that Bersani was one of the few who did not pay him his due respect: the absence of Hocquenghem in *Homos* renders him the stone guest of the text. Both Genet and Proust appeared, in fact, as examples of masochistic homosexuality in *Homosexual Desire* (Hocquenghem 1993: 61, 128, 88–90, 119). Masochism, however, was not understood by Hocquenghem as an expression of an original death drive, but as a characteristic trait of a paranoid personality generated by the persecution and prejudice from which homosexuals would do well to free themselves—today we speak of internalized homophobia. Hocquenghem, above all, referring to Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization* and Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, contested the existence of a specific homosexual ontology, and labeled homosexual desire a paradox. In his opinion (1993: 50–51), in its productive power, desire is simply desire, without qualification, while homosexuality is a “psycho-policing-logical category” that has been recently coined: only in the second half of the 1800s did medical literature introduce a binary partition of desire, and the consequence of this partition, not only in science but in everyday society as well, is the imposition of a normative order that sanctions the moral and biological superiority of heterosexuality over homosexuality.⁶ Hocquenghem preempted the theses that would make Foucault and Butler famous, maintaining that homosexuality is a modern invention produced by bourgeois-capitalistic societies for exclusionary purposes. In his opinion, homosexuality “exists and does not exist”: “its very mode of existence questions again and again the certainty of existence” (53).

Starting from this assertion, the young Hocquenghem would then formulate, as the equally young Mario Mieli would do in Italy five years later in his *Elementi di critica omosessuale* [*Elements of a Gay Critique*] (1977, 2002²), a political project geared toward erasing sexual identities and liberating an original schizophrenic desire.⁷ But he did not do it for at least three reasons. First and foremost, in the seventies, in a France where homosexual acts were punished legally only when they involved a minor under the age of 21, but where the police raids of bars and other

gay establishments and arrests for violations against public decency were the order of the day, he did not have faith in the possibility that rights could be an instrument of defense for sexual minorities, nor that the security apparatuses of the state—liberal or communist—could actually guarantee their protection.⁸ For him, the “constant progress... toward the liberalization of public morals and respect for the individual” was simply a bourgeois “myth” (Hocquenghem 1993: 62). Secondly, he was convinced that—as the overabundance of pejorative epithets used in the spoken language to label male homosexuality shows—something about homosexual desire, in its paradoxical historical existence, was intractable from language, and therefore attempts to draw gays and lesbians back to a “peaceful” and “normal” equality with other human beings were useless, if not at the cost of deeply revising the meaning of the concept of humanity (53). Finally, unlike Mieli, Hocquenghem was not a Freudomarxist, but a Deleuzian: for him, there was no original and universal core of desire beneath the eruption of desire in history, and no future could be represented in which one could dream of the definitive liberation from repressive structures of power.

According to his reconstruction, when Freud theorized the existence of a perverse infantile polymorphism and a bisexuality common to all humans, he had done it with the intention of harnessing them in the double Oedipal ties in which “predestination and sin are coexistent” (87). Thereafter, homosexuality had acquired a double-constitution, since it was interpreted by post-Freudian psychoanalysts as an original perversion that a healthy psychological development would extinguish, as well as the result of a development during which something went wrong.⁹ In its first form, homosexuality is an expression of disorganized and component drives, localized in singular organs (the mouth, the anus and the genitals) and directed at singular organs (the nurturing breasts, the caring hands); in its second form, it is neurotically organized around the illusion that is the ego:

The unification of the practices of homosexual desire under the term ‘homosexuality’ is as imaginary as the unification of the component drives in the ego (148).

Maternal fixation, fear of castration, narcissism and paranoia: these are the attributes that the first psychoanalytic literature occasionally associated with the homosexual personality.¹⁰ According to Hocquenghem, this

insistence on the pathological nature of homosexuality showed just how incapable classical psychoanalysis was of conceiving of desire without regulating its productive force in terms of a reproductive force aimed at perpetuating the symbolic order of Oedipus—the order in which the phallus is the only supplier of sense, and consequently sense develops in the verticality of a familial hierarchy with the heterosexual male at its apex. For him, thus, it was no coincidence that Reich, ushering in Freudomarxism with *Die Sexualität in Kulturkampf* [*The Sexual Revolution*] (1936), had imagined that the sexual revolution, in abolishing the inhibitions of desire and neuroses, would have entailed the extinction of the homosexual pathology and the triumph of a healthy heterosexuality (Hocquenghem 1993: 134–135). Remembering that infant sexuality is polymorphous for Freud (1905) and bisexual for Marcuse (1955), Mieli would later affirm that the result of the sexual revolution would be the liberation of an “original transexuality”¹¹; more drastically, but also more realistically, Hocquenghem concluded instead that, in the symbolic order that classical psychoanalysis perpetuates and helps to understand, between (homo-)sexual desire and the traditional forms of politics, including revolutionary politics, there is always something that doesn’t work:

Something always seems to go wrong somewhere between desire and revolution [...] We must give up the dream of reconciling the official spokesmen of revolution to the expression of desire. We cannot force desire to identify with a revolution which is already so heavy with the last history of the “workers’ movement” (1993: 135).

If *Homosexual Desire* is an ambiguous text that was perhaps not entirely successful, it is because the two objectives attempted by the author were simultaneously gigantic and aporetic. On the one hand, Hocquenghem wanted to assert the possibility of thinking of homosexual desire as an excess of the symbolic order that has produced the modern experience of homosexuality. On the other hand, he meant to propose a revolutionary homosexual practice capable of challenging the meaning that the term “revolution” had assumed in the political movements that were fertile ground for the struggles for homosexual liberation. Thus, for him, as for Deleuze and Guattari before him, it was not about reforming psychoanalysis in an effort to open it up to a different understanding of homosexuality and to widen the horizons of the left. Nor was it about searching for a foundation for the programmatic construction of new knowledge

about humans and new progressivist political practices. It was about using psychoanalysis against psychoanalysis and the revolution against the revolution to show the possibility of another symbolic order (disorder?).

What is true for *Homosexual Desire* could also be said of every book of political philosophy: it cannot be understood by abstracting it from its context. It was in fact in a debate with the movements of the new left and with the increasingly widespread anti-repressive psychoanalytic culture that Hocquenghem went as far as defining the homosexual liberation as the protest of the protest (138). This definition allowed him to enact a distinction between what he called the “homosexual movement” or the “homosexual struggle” and those that he called the “movements for homosexuality” (133), or rather the liberal types of assimilationist movements:

It is no longer a matter of justifying or vindicating, or even attempting a better integration of homosexuality within society. I shall now be discussing the way in which recent gay movements, linked up with left-wing activism, have changed or overturned the commonly acknowledged relation between desire and politics (133).

The adjective should be read in a subjective sense: for Hocquenghem, in the homosexual struggle, homosexuality is not the object of demands. It does not ask to be included in the existing sociopolitical regime, nor is it disposed to subject itself to that revolutionary branch for whom the liberation will follow the appropriation of power.¹² In being a creation of desire, homosexuality is both the subject and the goal of its struggle. While for Freud, social relationships are sublimated homosexual relationships, the scope of the homosexual struggle is the (homo)sexualization of the public sphere in contrast to the privatization of sexuality within the family: in spite of the framework of their conflict which is constituted by the normative ideal of “civilization” shared by both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the struggle seeks to bring sex directly into the social sphere without sublimation.¹³ The homosexual struggle is thus a “savage” struggle that does not call for “a new form of ‘social organisation’” or a “new stage of civilised humanity” but instead condemns the fact that “civilization is the trap into which desire keeps falling” (138). Hocquenghem came to these theses following his partner René Schérer (1972): if Schérer had supported the recovery of Charles Fourier’s “*naïveté*” in contrast to the Marxist thought, Hocquenghem reinterpreted the Fourierist ban

on family through an anti-Oedipal lens thanks to the theoretical tools developed by Deleuze and Guattari. According to the young intellectual, within the advanced capitalist society in which homosexual identity is considered a defective product—familism's waste—two directions are possible for desire: it can mobilize you upward, toward a sublimation that obeys the mandate of the superego and thus toward the sense of guilt and "social anxiety," or downward "towards the abyss of non-personalised and uncoded desire" inhabited by "organs subject to no rule or law" (1993: 95). Hocquenghem maintained that the first path was attempted by Gide, among others, while the second, which he considered the more authentically revolutionary (more revolutionary than the revolution, you could say), should not be confused with the one taken by Genet. For Hocquenghem, turning desire toward that which is forbidden, surrendering pleasure for transgression and making betrayal and the pursuit of evil an ethical imperative were equal to a confirmation of the law (143): if civilization organizes desire around guilt, the pervert is a civilized being, as is he who attempts to redeem homosexuality by justifying it on the basis of nature¹⁴ or a presumed original bisexuality. The movement downward championed by Hocquenghem was not aimed at satisfying a perverse desire or recovering a primordial state, instead it was aimed at the liberation of the creativity of an *undifferentiated* desire, which, in his eyes, did not represent a transgression of the limits between public and private, or between society and the individual linked to Oedipal familism, because it was not even affected by such scissions—by such differences.

Using Freud's axiomatic terms, Hocquenghem maintained that the bursting in of the gay liberation movements into the public sphere both concretely and symbolically implied the recovery of the desiring function of the anus in defiance of the phallic/Oedipal regime of signification. According to the theory of sexual development put forth by Freud in *Three Essays* (1905), in fact, only during the child's anal phase does he or she learn the norms that regulate the spaces of a civilized society, learning that the excremental functions must be relegated to the sphere of intimacy. In a civilized society, unlike what happens to the penis/phallus, no social existence is foreseen for the anus:

The anus is the most private part of the individual. The constitution of the private, individual, "proper" person is "of the anus"; the constitution of the public person is "of the phallus." The anus does not enjoy the same ambivalence as the phallus, i.e. its duality as penis and Phallus. Of course, to

expose one's penis is a shameful act, but it is also a glorious one, inasmuch as it displays some connection with the Great Social Phallus. Every man possesses a phallus which guarantees him a social role; every man has an anus which is truly his own, in the most secret depths of his own person. The anus does not exist in a social relation, since it forms precisely the individual and therefore enables the division between society and the individual to be made. (Hocquenghem 1993: 97)

Despite this insistence on anality, Hocquenghem did not make the mistake—which sometimes Bersani seems, instead, to make—of identifying the totality of homosexuality with a willingness for penetration that would group together male homosexual desire and female desire (according to Freud, in fact, activity and passivity acquire meaning for the human psyche precisely after the surpassing of the anal stage and not earlier). Showing a strong hostility toward the inversion model, which, in his opinion, was guilty of negating homosexual desire by connecting it to heterosexuality, Hocquenghem remembers, instead, that women have an anus as well, and that in a man the anus should in no way be considered a substitute for the vagina (103).¹⁵ For him, claiming a right to anal desire does not simply mean singing the praises of so-called passivity, but it is more ambitiously the valorization of nonreproductive, not exclusively genital, pre-personal sexuality, that Freud associated with the child's immaturity.

Freud called it “partial sexuality,” but his intention was to bring partiality, through Oedipal development, back to the totality of a genitally organized adult ego. For Hocquenghem (1993: 114 et seq., 148 et seq.), publicly laying claim to the partial and pre-personal investment of the homosexual desire for the anus was equivalent to a rejection not only of the privatistic appropriation of sexuality by the family, but also of the active–passive, subjective–objective, signifier–signified, natural–cultural polarizations—all of which, according to the Freudian schema, were the results of the surpassing of the anal phase. Homosexual desire, for him, stood in opposition not only to the spatiality (public–private) of the Oedipal civilization, but also to the specific temporality and identities tied to it. “Oedipus,” Hocquenghem recalls, “is based on the conflict between child and adult,” and in its system “civilization” is synonymous with the “historical continuity” of progress, understood as the hierarchical “succession of generations” (137) in which the children are subservient to the parents and the parents sacrifice their present for the future in which their children will in turn become parents. In an imaginary organized by

this formulation, the nonreproductive sexuality of homosexuals must represent a threat to this end. Because of this, in literature as well as psychoanalysis, homosexuality is degenerate and regressive, and its time is always in the past:

The homosexual can only be a degenerate, for he does not generate—he is only the artistic end to a species. The only acceptable form of homosexual temporality is that which is directed toward the past, to the Greeks or Sodom; as long as homosexuality serves no purpose, it may at least be allowed to contribute that little non-utilitarian “something” toward the upkeep of the artistic spirit. Homosexuality is seen as a regressive neurosis, totally drawn towards the past; the homosexual is incapable of addressing his future as an adult and father which is laid down for every male individual. Since homosexual desire is ignorant of the law of succession—the law of stages—and is thus unable to ascend to genitality, it must therefore be regression, a counter-current to the necessary historical evolution, like an eddy on the surface of a river. Freud undoubtedly establishes a topographical coexistence of drives rather than successive stages; but temporality asserts itself as the absolute need for parents and children to succeed each other, and for full genitality to follow the anal stage, even if the preceding stages reappear throughout the individual’s history as the relics of an ever-threatening past. The counter-current is merely the gratuitous little flourish that responds to the inevitability of the current. (Hocquenghem 1993: 107–108)

Instead of seeking a primary position for homosexuality within the myth of progress, Hocquenghem, following Deleuze and Guattari, preferred to take on the challenge posed by psychoanalysis and turn the unproductive freeness of homosexual desire into a skeleton key with which to break open both the hierarchical articulation of Oedipal temporality and the projected and sacrificial logic of traditional politics.¹⁶ In refuting the destiny of other males, the destiny assumed by the position of the father at the summit of the Oedipal triangle, the homosexual is proof of the possibility of “another social relation which is not vertical but horizontal” that interrupts the reproduction of the hierarchical verticality of filiation and is therefore “unacceptable” (Hocquenghem 1993: 109):

[T]he homosexual points to another possible form of relationship which we hardly dare call “society.” (109).

These words, however, should not be interpreted as a utopian cry for the need for a future revolution: *Homosexual Desire* did not promise a happy future, but exhibited the (collective, not individual) enthusiasm that Hocquenghem himself was experimenting with in virtue of the FHAR's militancy. The portrait that he painted of the gay movement was modeled on the political practices of the French group, on its joyous acts of protest that showcased, in the here and now, the freedom of young gays and lesbians who had no intention of waiting for the success of the proletariat revolution to live out their sexuality. The new homosexual relationality alluded to in the book was thus what the FHAR was already enacting during their gatherings, organizing meetings, public actions and in the private lives of its members. Without taking this experience into account, one would not be able to understand the determination with which Hocquenghem—passing over the role of leader that he and a few others occupied within the group—refused organizational hierarchy and legislative mandates within the homosexual struggle. In his opinion, the gay movement should not aspire to gather the masses under the authority of a few of its representatives, since its fragmentation into smaller groups was more fitting. According to his thinking, the recourse to anality takes on the function of an ex-post justification for that which he considered a given. Hocquenghem maintained that, if one accepts the Freudian thought according to which a subjectivity that was capable of distinguishing signifier from signified could only be created through the anal phase, rediscovering the anus's desiring function would mean eliminating all the consequences that come with this distinction, *in primis* the principle of representation. It is clear, however, that this theoretical construction alluded to a form of political subjectification that he knew well, a generational rebellion that, quite honestly, was not always anti-Oedipal and was rarely anal:

[Y]outh movements, women's movements, gay movements, ecological movements, community movements [...] all start from a particular desiring situation (their relation to sex, to nature, to the environment) and not, as the traditional workers' movement would like, from a strategy based on general political theories. [...] The confusion is total, since the links between these desiring situations do not occur according to the logical model of the signifier-signified but prefer to follow the logic of the event. It is therefore no use trying to work out the relationships between these movements in rational or strategic terms. It is incomprehensible that the gay movement should be closely connected with the ecological movement. Nevertheless, it is so. In terms of desire, the motor car and family heterosexuality are one

and the same enemy, however impossible it may be to express this in political logic. (Hocquenghem 1993: 142)

At first reading, what might appear as a refusal of general politics is in reality a refusal of a set modality of political organization whose instrumental logic negates the value of experiences that are not directed at an aim (non-reproductive sexuality, or the public happiness of meeting in a gay collective, for example). With these words, Hocquenghem echoed the voices of his FHAR comrades, who expressed the urgency of their desire with an unwillingness to sacrifice it or postpone it for the sake of the future, or regulate it within the confines of a couple. Hocquenghem made the anus the symbol of a pre-personal, anonymous desire which was not oriented toward a single object; it was a moving desire, capable of diverting itself from its momentary objectives, open to welcoming the unexpected without defenses, in a sexual act in which “everything is simply communication” (150). He thus inaugurates the strand of gay literature that celebrates the promiscuous sexuality of occasional encounters in parks, saunas or darkrooms without accounting for the fierce competition and subsequent humiliations that, in reality, always play out in those places.¹⁷

In 1972, before the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic, Hocquenghem, unaware of the destiny that awaited him and many other gay men of his generation, promoted a hedonistic liberation of desire, valuing the partial character of anal desire without associating it with masochism in any way. His celebration of casual sex was very different than the one found in Bersani and Dean’s texts: idealized, probably, and naive, but enlivened by the conviction of the possibility of a joyous depersonalization that he conceived of as being “of the group”—not impersonal, and thus, not anti-social. For Hocquenghem, it had been psychoanalysis to associate homosexuality with a masochistic guilt that is in no way ontologically innate.¹⁸ The “anal struggle” had to respond with not a mournful but a joyous excess: its negative power had to take the shape of critical deconstruction, not nihilistic destruction, and in any case act out, not against all forms of sociality, but only against the fetishes of what traditional politics, both on the left and the right, continued to consider “civilization”:

The great fear of homosexuality is translated into a fear that the succession of generations, on which civilisation is based, may stop. Homosexual desire is neither on the side of death nor on the side of life; it is the killer of civilised egos. (150)

There is thus no death drive in Hocquenghem. His Deleuzian rhetoric is instead optimistic and vital. And yet, it is precisely within his thought that Lee Edelman traced the origin of the “antisocial thesis of queer theories”¹⁹ of which Bersani is champion, and that he himself developed in a book symptomatically titled *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (2004), a book which, in the last decade, has sparked an intense debate among gay, lesbian and trans intellectuals in the United States. De Lauretis (2010: 87) spoke of it as “a manifesto for the twenty-first century,”²⁰ Bersani (and Phillips 2008: 45) as the “classic textbook” of the “horror of heterosexual breeding”²¹: both definitions show how the death drive, in Edelman’s text, takes on the character of a call—to which I will now attempt to respond.

3.2 NO PITY FOR TINY TIM

Hocquenghem drew his conceptual psychoanalytic tool-set from Deleuze and Guattari’s Freud; Bersani took his from Laplanche. Edelman’s reference point is mainly the teachings of Lacan, which allow him to maintain that while desire is the consequence of a lack, the death drive, instead, is an excess of the subject. In the extremely dense last few pages of the second book of his seminar which are dedicated to the “ego,” Lacan, in fact, maintains that the price that the human pays for having access to the symbolic order, namely, the language register and the law, is the loss of the real: it can be drawn from the speaking subject only in a mediated form, like the signified alluded to by the signifier (Lacan 1978a; Eng. trans. 1988: 322). The establishment of the speaking subject is not however the only effect of the acquisition of linguistic competencies: generated alongside it is, in fact, its obscene Siamese twin, the subject of the drive. If the first reacts to the loss of the real with the desire to fill this ontological lack on the imaginary plane through creations of meaning, the second does not know symbols and immediately pushes to join the real that it has lost: its mode of existence is *jouissance*,²² and the ego is sucked in with a dizziness that does not leave space for sense. The drive is thus an illogical excrement of the proper subject (the ego created by language, that is forced to mediate between the symbolic order and its imaginary existence—Lacan 1978a; Eng. trans. 1988: 319): since the subject exists in a perennial swerve away from the real, the *jouissance* of the thing is equivalent to its dissolution.²³

To be honest, in the second book of the seminar, Lacan maintains that the symbolic order itself goes beyond the life of the subject and pushes

for its dissolution, and this action coincides with the death drive²⁴: the imaginary survival of the ego is thus the result of a difficult balance in which the human is suspended between different forces that would like his or her abrogation. In Edelman's theoretical construction, however, little space is reserved for the destructive potential of the symbolic, and it is *jouissance* that will carry out the function that Hocquenghem attributed to anal desire: to contrast a regime of signification that subordinates the needs of the immediate, singular existence—"queer and now," you could say, inappropriately citing Kosofsky Sedgwick (1993)—to the planning of a collective future. The substitution of anal desire with *jouissance* carries with it, however, a drastic change of perspective: while Hocquenghem followed Deleuze and Guattari in sustaining that by indulging anal desire the subject would destroy its own ego in the name of group pleasure, Edelman follows Bersani and affirms that *jouissance* has a narcissistic character and thus makes every relationship with the other impossible, starting with the sexual. What Lacan (1975) affirms in relation to heterosexual sex in the 21st book of the seminar is valid *a fortiori* for homosexual and queer sex: the fact that another is implicated and that a new human being can be conceived are secondary, non-intentional effects of sexual *jouissance* (Edelman 2004: 39). Moreover, it is known to all that—except for rare exceptions—people "fuck" for pleasure and not for reproduction:

"A family is created" [...] the phrase strategically elides the agency by which this end is achieved. No fucking could ever effect such creation: all sensory experience, all pleasure of the flesh, must be borne away from this fantasy of futurity secured, eternity's plan fulfilled as "a new generation is carried forward." Paradoxically, the child of the two-parent family thus proves that its parents *don't* fuck and on its tiny shoulders it carries the burden of maintaining the fantasy of a time to come in which meaning, at last made present to itself, no longer depends on the fantasy of its *attainment* in time to come. (41)

In *No Future*, the noun "*queerness*" becomes a synonym for the neologism "*sinthomosexuality*," which Edelman uses to indicate the nonrepresentable singularity of the sexual subject, the irreproducible quality of its keeping together the various orders of the psychic life. If what characterizes the subject by making it equal to itself in time is the singular modality of its position at the crossroads of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real, what condemns the subject to coincide with itself outside time is the

access to *jouissance* that gets created from this particular position, when the drive disturbs the logic of meaning, of fantasy and of desire. As excess that escapes signification as well as imagination, the obstinate repetition compulsion is the symptom that pierces the veil of *Maya*, revealing the illusions of identity and of sociality by opening a chasm onto the absence of the sense of the real.²⁵ Every eruption of the drive reveals that existence is an eternal, tragic present and that the future is the fantasy of a promise that can never be kept. The world of meanings that we believe we share with others is pure illusion, and this illusion will no longer be for us, as we will cease to exist.

In response to an American gay and lesbian movement that is continually more focused on the right to marriage, to parenthood, to adoption and assisted reproduction, Edelman pushes queer subjects to embrace their own sexual symptom and use it as a shield against “futurist” rhetoric that would like to domesticate them and include them in a civilization founded on family and on the perpetuation of future generations. It is precisely for antifamilistic and antifuturist purposes that he involves Hocquenghem in an extremist polemic against “the cult of the Child”²⁶ which honestly only partly belonged to the young French intellectual. FHAR’s polemics against the family did not have the child, read as a disciplinary tool of adult sexuality, as their target, instead FHAR was driven by the viewpoint of the new generations (the present ones, not those of the future). The group’s edited documents called for the liberation of adolescent and infant sexuality from the control of a capitalist society that gives “the child the same image as surplus: a treasure to be protected and on which to base its knowledge and the construction of its power.” Sometimes the child appears to be the only revolutionary subject completely qualified to refuse that future of which a whole world of adults nominated him or her—against his or her will—representative:

The attack on society and its moral order by the youth, is the attack that hits it in its dearest and most vulnerable point. The most vulnerable because we, the dear young ones, are so easily influenced, so uninformed about the matters of life!!! The dearest because we represent the future. BUT WE DON’T GIVE A FUCK ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. We want to enjoy [jouir] immediately. We affirm our right to make use of ourselves, our right to pleasure. Against our will for emancipation there are THE LAW, THE FAMILY, THE ENVIRONMENT. (FHAR 1971; translation Julia Heim)

The FHAR was thus, at the end of the day, on the side of the children.²⁷ For Edelman, to the contrary, queer subjects should put every feeling of empathy toward childhood aside and proudly pronounce “the words for which we’re condemned,” not only making themselves defenders of the right to abortion against the verbal and sometimes physical violence of the US pro-life movements, but even issuing an angry death sentence against “the Child,” symbolically understood as “futurity’s emblem”:

The queerness we propose, in Hocquenghem’s words, “is unaware of the passing of generations as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about ‘sacrifice now for the sake of future generations’... [it] knows that civilisation alone is mortal.” Even more: it delights in that mortality as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as pro-life. It is we who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we’re condemned should we speak them or not: that *we* are the advocates of abortion; that the Child as futurity’s emblem must die; that the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. (Edelman 2004: 31)

The entire message of *No Future* lies in these lines. The rest of the book, in trying to account for the drive—which not only escapes, but completely cancels out signification—follows a figural narration: queer theory once again takes the form of Cultural Studies, in particular that of literary and film criticism,²⁸ and this time to impersonate the queerness, Edelman convokes Ebenezer Scrooge, the misanthropic protagonist of Charles Dickens’s *A Christmas Carol* (1843), the birds of the homonymous film by Alfred Hitchcock (1963) and Leonard, a secondary character in *North by Northwest* (1959), another of the British director’s famous films.

Scrooge, as is known, is an old greedy and miserly bachelor businessman who is left alone after the death of his business partner Jacob Marley. *A Christmas Carol* tells of how he becomes compassionate and generous the night of the 24th of December, 1843, after being visited by four ghosts: his deceased and enchained cohort and the spirits of Christmas past, present and future. Edelman does not choose the easy solution by hypothesizing about Scrooge’s relationship with Marley and making him a gay character; instead he lingers on the edifying intentions of the parable. Scrooge will renounce his infertile solitude to give in to the heterosexual norm that calls for spending Christmas with family: he could therefore be elected a symbol of the pressures that familism exerts on queer existence:

Christmas here stands in the place of the obligatory collective reproduction of the Child, the obligatory investment in the social precisely as the *order* of the Child. (Edelman 2004: 45)

As a bachelor and having dedicated his entire existence to accumulating and saving money, old Scrooge has no children. He will make up for this lack in two different ways: finally accepting his nephew's invitation to spend Christmas lunch with his family, and above all sending a stuffed turkey to his destitute employee Bob Cratchit, so that he, in turn, can celebrate with those he holds dear. What takes Scrooge away from his narcissistic and masochistic *jouissance* of solitude²⁹ is not, in fact, the vision of the miserable conditions Marley—who in life was as stingy as Scrooge—faces in the afterlife, nor is it regret for his youth during which he had tasted the sweetness of feelings and hope. The old miser's redemption will come thanks to a sick child, the lame Tiny Tim (Timothy), Cratchit's son, who is destined to die young because his father, who earns extremely low wages, does not have the resources to care for him. It is the vision of a future Christmas in which Tim's parents grieve for him that convinces Scrooge to invest in the future instead of focusing on saving his riches in the present. The Child must not die, and in fact, he does not: Dickens explicitly declares that Scrooge will become a "second father" to him. This epilogue will thus become a paradigm—in 1861, for example, even George Eliot will tell the tale of a misanthrope's conversion to faith and optimism because of Eppie the orphan in *Silas Marner: The Weaver of Raveloe*—against which Edelman will rebel with all his might:

Make no mistake, then: Tiny Tim survives at our expense in a culture that always sustains itself on the threat that he might die. And we, the *sinthomo*-sexuals who, however often we try to assert that we're "more" than what we do with our genitals, are nonetheless convicted from the outset of stealing his childhood, endangering his welfare, and, ultimately, destroying his life, must respond by insisting that Tiny Tim is always already dead, mortified into a fetish. [...] Because there isn't now, and never has been, much doubt about who killed him, because his death can always be traced to the *sinthomosexual's* *jouissance*, why not acknowledge our kinship at last with the Scrooge who, unregenerate, refuses the social imperative to grasp futurity in the form of the Child, for the sake of whom, as the token of accession to Imaginary wholeness, everything else in the world, by force if needed, must give way? (2004: 49)

Why not align ourselves with the misanthropy and pedophobia of an unredeemed Scrooge?—Edelman asks. And why not, he continues (70), align ourselves with Leonard “the sadistic (and tellingly fashion-conscious) agent of America’s cold war enemies in Alfred Hitchcock’s *North by Northwest*”? What fascinates Edelman about Martin Landau’s character is his ruthlessness. In the famous scene filmed on Mount Rushmore, Leonard first pushes Eve Kendal (Eva Marie Saint) off the monument’s face, and then sadistically steps on Roger Thornhill’s (Cary Grant) left hand that he is using to hold onto the rock as he grabs a suspended Eve with his right. Thornhill’s pleading look and his calls for help are of no use because Leonard is incapable of compassion. For Edelman, Leonard is an incarnation of the negativity of *jouissance*: he throws the subject into the void of the real, dissolving the futurist fantasies that feed couples’ relationships. In the next scene, these fantasies get the upper hand: magically Thornhill lifts Eva from the cliff of Mount Rushmore, takes her to the bed of a train car and, turning to her, calls her “Mrs. Thornhill.” Challenging the logic of the narration, Hitchcock took pity on them. But Edelman has none at all: his sympathy is all for Leonard, “the *sinthomosexual* [that] annuls the temporality of desire, leaving futurity, like the reproductive Couple charged with the responsibility of bearing it” (87).

In *No Future*, there is not even pity reserved for those unfortunate inhabitants of Bodega Bay, the town hit by the violent attacks of killer birds that, for Edelman (2004: 119), represent “the death drive that haunts the Symbolic with its excess of *jouissance* and finds its figural expression in *sinthomosexuality*.” While in the film their assault on humans, with a certain predilection for children, has no explanation—“Why are they doing it? Why are they doing it?” asks the small Cathy Brenner (Veronica Cartwright) to her older brother Mitch (Rod Taylor)—it is because it is a direct attack precisely against the structure of signification:

Their first all-out assault, their first joint action, as it were, takes place at the party thrown in honor of Cathy Brenner’s eleventh birthday, the prospect of which gave Mitch—who subsequently passed it on to Melanie—the idea of presenting his sister with a pair of lovebirds as a gift. Though a single gull had already struck Melanie on the forehead the day before, the choice of the children’s party for this fully choreographed attack suggests the extent to which the birds take aim at the social structures of meaning that observances like the birthday party serve to secure and enact: take aim, that is, not only at children and the sacralization of childhood, but also at the very organization

of meaning around structures of subjectivity that celebrate, along with the day of one's birth, the ideology of reproductive necessity. (121)

Edelman notes that the first scene in which we see the birds fly around threateningly is in San Francisco, and the attacks begin with the arrival of Melanie Daniels (Tippi Hendren) to Bodega Bay; Melanie, the rich and sophisticated student of general semantics who is set on seducing lawyer Mitch Brenner. A sexually ambiguous character, very tied to his oppressive mother, Mitch has already broken the hearts of other women—teacher Annie Hayworth (Suzanne Pleshette), who moved to Bodega Bay for him. When Melanie interrogates her about the nature of her friendship with the handsome lawyer, she responds: “Maybe there’s never been anything between Mitch and *any* girl.” Nevertheless, *No Future* is careful not to suggest an identification between the birds and homosexuality (149); its aim is rather to draw up a recommendation for queer political practice, or should we say, for the appropriate ethical attitude of queer subjectivity from the negativity of the Hitchcockian fowl. Edelman’s provocation for viewers/readers is to not be taken by the rhetorics of heterosexual familism, and not be intimidated by the “fascism of the baby’s face” (75) represented by Cathy as it was previously by Eppie and by Tiny Tim. But rather to become ruthless, and even *inhuman*:

The Birds, like *Psycho*, portrays the revenge (which thereby reinforces the fantasmatic threat) of those conceptualized as “passive” by depicting the activist militancy that attends their coming out—especially when that activism takes the form, as with Leonard in *North by Northwest*, of an “impossible, in-human” act. (131)

Thus, in appearance *No Future* is a manifesto oriented not just against the sacrificial ideology of “futurism,” but also against altruism, beginning with its most elemental and least demanding form: compassion for the vulnerability of another human; the infant being the most immediately recognizable incarnation of such (Cavarero 2007). To this end, Edelman (2004: 102–109), like Bersani before him, harshly polemicizes with Butler, using her conference *Antigone’s Claim* (2000) as an example of “liberal” theorizing. Edelman contrasts Leonard, who fiercely expresses his inhumanity and his cruelty, with the pity Butler reveals when she attempts to save Antigone from the tomb of the death drive in which not only Creonte buried her alive, but Hegel and Lacan as well, making her the symbol

of the struggle of minorities for a livable life and for the recognition of the entirety of humankind.³⁰ In his opinion, Butler's *Antigone* aspires to concede to the logic of intelligibility and thus of meaning, while Leonard represents the illogical existence of the *sinthomosexual* that, despite everything hammering away at it, continues to persist outside every signification. This refusal of the values of humanity and of compassion might make *No Future* unhinging and revolting from a moral perspective: it is worth, however, trying to comprehend its polemic meaning to the fullest before giving in to a superficial expression of disdain. Edelman's provocation (2004: 89, 1 et seqq., 111 et seqq.) is oriented against various objectives that the author very precisely identifies throughout the course of the book—from the most vulgar homophobic tones of some conservative US groups to the so-called respectability of a certain kind of claim to civil rights for lesbians and gays, passing from the condemnation uttered by pope John Paul II in July 2000 for the “moral disorder” of homosexual people, to the aggressive proclamations of the *pro-life* movements in the United States and the paranoid homophobia that hides behind media campaigns against pedophilia. But if Edelman's intention is quite serious, his tone, to the contrary, is exasperatedly and deliberately derisive, beginning with his choice of a punk motto as the title of a refined book of literary and film criticism. *No Future* cannot be understood without keeping in mind the fact that it feeds off the “explosive” (31) or “corrosive” force of irony, which, in a re-elaboration of the theories of Paul de Man,³¹ our author defines as “that queerest of rhetorical devices” (23).

In a polemic discourse, the instrument of irony can be used with varying intentions, for example, to reinforce a meaning by dissembling it within its opposite, or to muffle a tension by causing the interlocutor or the reader to smile. According to de Man, however, the function of irony is principally to disturb comprehension by evoking an infinite questioning of the possibility of communicating (Are you being serious? Are you joking? Are you pretending to joke? Pretending to be serious? Or pretending to pretend? ...). Irony, for him, is essentially negative, a destruction of the coherence of narration, the dissolution of meaning³²—definitions that allow Edelman to turn irony into the stylistic stamp most suited for those who think about the death drive. In fact, you cannot recognize that irony is fairly trendy among advocates of “antisocial queer theory”; but while Bersani uses it to valorize the abjectness of anal passivity, masochism and humiliation, in Edelman, it takes the more active and sadistic form of sarcasm. What clearly emerges from the last citation, for example, is that

No Future is a text of queer *empowerment*, whose intention is to overturn the passivity of a reactive impulse directed indeed toward humiliation, but the humiliation of one's adversaries. Meaning must become impossible for them, for *all* of them indiscriminately, from the worst homophobe, to the "respectable" gay; in the face of them, the queer speaking subject—starting with Edelman himself—is raised on the pedestal of superior indifference toward human sentiments. It is from this position that he can enjoy the desert of the real in total and complete solitude.

Even this positioning can moreover be interpreted as an ironic goal, both serious, and facetious, and thus unstable, non-definitive. Edelman's cruelty is immediately reshaped if one understands that the compassion that he opposes is actually that (hypocritical) compassion evoked by John Paul II *against* queer lives,³³ the (paternalistic) one that gives heterosexual adults the authority to speak in the name of their children and of all minors in order to deprive homosexuals the right to parenthood (75). And still, if one keeps in mind that the Child upon which he wishes death is not a flesh and blood human, but a disincarnated fetish, and that before it (not him or her) our author does not propose the edification of a stabile queer super-subjectivity (the super-gay and super-lesbian as new versions of the super-man) that is designed to endure through time (through the future), but to the contrary the dissolution here and now of every subjectivity by means of that jouissance-seeking and ironic power of the "no" that also runs through Bersani's texts.

Here and now, exactly. And then? And before?

3.3 AFTER THE END (CATULLUS)

In 2011, after 18 years of activity and 48 published titles, Edelman's *No Future* among them, Duke University Press's book series SeriesQ directed by Michèle Aina Barale, Jonathan Goldberg, Michael Moon and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick closed shop. Three years after Kosofsky Sedgwick passed away, her colleagues, noting that queer studies was flourishing in universities across the United States, determined that the goals of the book series had been reached. Some wanted to interpret this decision as a sign, word spread of the end of the queer, which had already lost its subversive potential and would become, on the one hand, an academic product and, on the other, merchandise for the entertainment market (Arfini and Lo Iacono 2012: 35 et seqq.; Penney 2013). I will neither take a position on this nor attempt any predictions, which would be risky

for anyone, but especially for those who find themselves in the marginal observatory that is the Italian university, where, after years of being the of only a handful of scholars of English and Anglo-American literature, queer is only now beginning to spread.³⁴ What I would like to take note of instead is that Edelman's antisocial thesis, if not understood in its original polemic (and thus political) meaning, risks relegating the queer to the ivory tower of a university discussion, a discussion which today would have trouble finding readers outside the restricted elite and dialoguing with contemporary LGBTQIA movements, communities and subjectivities. *No Future* embodies one of the risks that queer theories run when, as frequently happens in the United States, they take the form of Cultural Studies³⁵ which privilege psychoanalysis (Iuli 1996): its insistence on the Lacanian concept of the real risks, in fact, paradoxically causing it to lose contact with reality. Though continually referencing the present, Bersani, in *Homos*, examined the homosexual specificity within the great writers of the previous century's remarks on pederasty and inversion. Not dissimilarly, Edelman elaborates his proposal for the antisocial mission of the queer by analyzing novels from the 1800s and films from the 1950s and 1960s. The solution he offers neither projects itself in the future, nor seems suited to present day. In fact, while the targets of his polemic sarcasm are largely reactionary forces that hope for a return to the past (the so-called bourgeois respectability of some familist fringes of the lesbian and gay movement, the traditionalism of the American right, even the medievalism of the catholic chains of command), the result of his research risks seeming conservative, and in line with some contemporary tendencies.

In the beginning of the seventies, when Hocquenghem promoted the anal struggle against capital and the liberation of adolescents' sexuality from parental control, he was facing both a modern society that was still holding on to some traditional, Oedipal and repressive traits, and a workers' movement that, while calling itself revolutionary, did not question the conditioning of sexuality within the confines of family life. Foucault and Deleuze should have waited for the arrival of the eighties to intuit that postmodern societies were assuming post-disciplinary traits (Bernini 2008: 169 et seqq.); but Lacan—precisely the author that Edelman deemed his tutelary deity—was already recognizing that advanced-capitalistic societies would not be sexually repressive. In 1969–1970, in the 17th seminar, Lacan (1991), in fact, contrasts the psychoanalytic discourse with what he calls “the master discourse.” Shortly thereafter, however, in

a famous conference in Milan 1972, he establishes that in the West the master discourse was being substituted with the “capitalist discourse.”³⁶ According to Lacan’s analysis, in traditional societies, the “master” intimated the prohibition of pleasure and imposed rigid norms that defined an Oedipal and hierarchical relationality; in the false democracy of the limitless circulation of goods typical of consumerist societies, instead, capitalism pushes for the *jouissance* of the thing, for the reification of the self as an object of exchange, for the dissolution of familial and social ties using a logic of dispersal. Both discourses undermine the desire of the individual and the fantasies with which this individual, in dialogue with others like him or her, can make sense of the “lack of being” that constitutes human existence: for these reasons, according to Lacan, psychoanalytic discourse must focus on the symptom, understood as the patient’s expression of desire. Thirty years later, many believe that Lacan’s intuitions have been largely confirmed. The Italian psychoanalyst Massimo Recalcati (2010, 2011, 2012a, b, 2013), for example, has repeatedly maintained that the most characteristic psychic symptoms of contemporary unease (hyperactivity and depression, anorexia-bulimia, panic attacks, pathological dependence on alcohol, drugs, gambling...) are signs of a progressive abrogation of the subconscious—not manifestations of the suffering of a frustrated subject whose desire is repressed by the superego, but to the contrary, the consequences of the excessive power of the id, of the injunction to *jouissance* that imprisons the subject in his own narcissism, prohibiting it from relating to others and to itself.³⁷ Recalcati, however, does not seem to pay enough attention to the current phase of capitalism—characterized by post-Fordism, globalization, job flexibility, marked by the global financial and economic crisis that Edelman, in 2004, could not yet foretell. In Europe, for instance, the imperative of *jouissance* established a perverse double-bind with its superego’s reverse, which is the imperative of austerity—a new variation on the master’s discourse—and was reinforced by a structural impossibility of constructing sense, formulating life projects and planning for the future.³⁸ In the current crisis, in fact, on the one hand, the new incitement to sacrifice and to save makes wastefulness even more transgressive; on the other hand, the “flexibility” of work is reflected in an existential precariousness that brings with it a precariousness of feelings. In European and US societies, but not limited to them, the most recent generations have for some time lived in pursuit of “*no future*,” without, to be honest, doing very well—these are heterosexual men and women, and queer subjects. Those who occupy prestigious positions at the university

level can perhaps struggle to realize it, but in reality, Bersani's community of narcissism has already largely come to fruition (the gay scene that is fashionable in large metropolises is the prime example), and Edelman's anti-planning asociality has, for many, become simply a necessity. Other logical-conceptual considerations can be added to these sociological ones, considerations that keep in mind the risks of the conservatism that is present in the antisocial thesis of queer theory. As the possible double-bind between dissipation and austerity shows, the injunction to enjoy, whether it comes from Lacan's capitalist discourse or Edelman's book, does not carry with it any transformative action on the public ethic of our societies: ordering the *jouissance* of the transgression of traditional moral codes, in fact, confirms it. As Hocquenghem already intuited with regard to Genet, if the queer chooses to permanently occupy the position of the death drive, he or she risks becoming that which a conservative society expects him or her to be: the obscene double of the heterosexual, the waste that confirms the normative.

Bersani has the undisputed merit of reallocating an unreserved and "politically incorrect" reflection on the sexual to the center of queer theory, while a certain Foucault and Butler inspired constructivism, losing contact with the material experience of sex, risks transforming sexuality into a mere epiphenomenon of culture or power. Moreover, insisting on the drive, Bersani brings to light how sex crushes the logic of hedonism and utilitarianism: both because the sexual subject does not have sovereignty over itself and because something in it contradicts the pleasure principle. Referencing Hocquenghem as well as Bersani, Edelman adds that when the sexual erupts onto the public sphere, it must assume a certain urgency: its needs can be neither representative, nor represented, nor deferred, because the time of the drive is a "now" that is always the same and always unexpected, and the future conceived of as the linear Oedipal development of the past and the present can never contain it. What Beatriz Preciado affirms of Hocquenghem can be said of Bersani and Edelman as well, namely that the three authors put into action the argumentative strategy that Roland Barthes defined as "textual terrorism," meant to provoke a shock in the reader, to violently separate him or her from the reassuring certainties of common sense.³⁹ Feeding off the sterility of *jouissance* instead of the productivity of desire, the explosion produced by *No Future* nevertheless risks closing the political horizon that the explosion of *Homosexual Desire*, despite everything, opened. Insisting on the identification between the sex drive and the death drive that he learned from

Bersani, Edelman condemns the queer to a solitary existence, rendering it a concept that—may he excuse my adjective—is more *fertile* for psychoanalytic theory and cinematographic criticism, than for political thought. Even Hitchcock’s birds fly in a flock, and Leonard takes orders from a criminal organization: for Edelman, instead, *queerness* should be a purely negative force, compulsively geared toward fracturing ties with the other, indiscriminately, without judgment, without imagination. In this, he is more coherent than Hocquenghem and Bersani, who at various times declare their desire for the creation of new forms of community between subjects who are no longer enslaved by the heterosexual norm. But are we sure that coherence is a virtue when we are dealing with drives?

From Freud to Laplanche by way of Lacan, the job of the psychoanalyst has always been to account for the ambivalence of the subject, for the coexistence of opposing forces that do not contrast but rather mutually support one another.⁴⁰ The real scandal of the theory of the death drive does not derive in fact from the realization that human beings are as capable of cruelty against others as they are of self-destruction (which, in itself would not be such a grand discovery), but from the affirmation that their negativity is necessary for relationality, and even for love—as Catullus had sung 20 centuries before the birth of psychoanalysis.⁴¹ Freud’s same behavior with respect to war, the trauma that, in 1920, would lead to his reflection *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, was moreover ambivalent: the condemnation matured following an initial enthusiastic acceptance, inexplicable for a Jewish intellectual who had nothing to gain from German nationalism (Jones 1955). In his writings from 1915 (Eng. trans. 1918), he—while accounting for the “disappointment” of the European public over a war that burst out between “the great ruling nations of the white race, the leaders of mankind [...] and to whom we owe the technical progress in the control of nature as well as the creation of artistic and scientific cultural standards” (sic)—still defended the “civil” Germany. Then he launched into that anthropological reflection that, after five years, would mature into his death drive hypothesis:

Except in a few instances, even the tenderest and closest love relations also contain a bit of hostility which can rouse an unconscious death wish. [...] Doctors who practice psychoanalysis have frequently had to deal with the symptom of over tender care for the welfare of relatives or with wholly unfounded self reproaches after the death of a beloved person. The study of these cases has left them in no doubt as to the significance of unconscious

death wishes. The layman feels an extraordinary horror at the possibility of such an emotion and takes his aversion to it as a legitimate ground for disbelief in the assertions of psychoanalysis. I think he is wrong there. No debasing of our love life is intended and none such has resulted. It is indeed foreign to our comprehension as well as to our feelings to unite love and hate in this manner, but in so far as nature employs these contrasts she brings it about that love is always kept alive and fresh in order to safeguard it against the hate that is lurking behind it. *It may be said that we owe the most beautiful unfolding of our love life to the reaction against this hostile impulse which we feel in our hearts.* (Freud 1915; Eng. trans. 1918, italics mine)

Thus, for Freud, every human relationship feeds off the necessary effort of involved subjects to resist the hostility that the relationship necessarily produces: we love the other to the fullest when we know how to refrain from the unavoidable impulse to harm him or her. Naturally, the opposite is also valid: our hate is most fully turned toward our objects of love or admiration when they shirk away from our desire and thus delude us. Even Edelman's sarcasm betrays, perhaps, a great, disappointed love for a humanity that in the name of the reproductive familist ideal continues to exclude queer existences—there is no lack of emotional and infuriated references in his book to the victims of homophobia.⁴² But this is not—or not yet⁴³—the point. As Freud already brought to light in 1915 (Eng. trans. 1918), the “question” is:

[W]hether we shall be the ones to yield [...] [to] admit that in our civilized attitude towards death we have again lived psychologically beyond our means. Shall we not turn around and avow the truth? Were it not better to give death the place to which it is entitled both in reality and in our thoughts and to reveal a little more of our unconscious attitude towards death which up to now we have so carefully suppressed? This may not appear a very high achievement and in some respects rather a step backwards, a kind of regression, but at least it has the advantage of taking the truth into account a little more and of making life more bearable again. To bear life remains, after all, the first duty of the living. The illusion becomes worthless if it disturbs us in this. We remember the old saying: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. If you wish for peace, prepare for war. The times call for a paraphrase: *Si vis vitam, para mortem*. If you wish life, prepare for death.

While for Freud the goal of psychoanalysis is to create an awareness of the ambivalent role of human feelings in making existence more tolerable, Edelman radicalizes the theoretical move made by Bersani and uses

Freudian metapsychology, reinterpreted by Lacan, to solve this ambivalence in the unambiguousness of an unbearable “truth” that unloads everything on the shoulders of queer subjects. He invites them, in fact, to free themselves of what Freud calls the “illusions” of civilization, not promising any gain but rather the solitude of a subject that unravels before the absence of sense within the real. And yet, if his ironic style had not resulted in sarcasm, it would soon have lent itself to express a queer version of human ambivalence, since—without offending de Man—in addition to dissolving meaning, irony can be knowingly used to simultaneously convey opposing meanings. Even when they chose the most radical forms of fighting, the sexual liberation movements have always been motivated by the aspiration for a more tolerable life, to use Freud’s words, more pleasurable, to use Foucault’s, or more livable, to use Butler’s: why should they instead now limit themselves to breaking social ties, remaining blind before the evidence that every break offers the possibility of a recomposition, and every destruction a creation? Why, aside from the death drive, should the queer be the representative of the end of history, and end which, after September 11, 2001, no one believes anymore?

The real problem of the future, that Edelman, and Hocquenghem before him, brought to light, is that when it is thought of as a linear and coherent development of the past and present (the succession of generations wherein those who are born take the place of those who die), it monopolizes the political imagination and closes it to any possibility of the new—preventing it, for example, from creatively giving new meaning to concepts like “community,” “civilization” and “kinship.” But this doesn’t seem like a good reason to quit exercising this precious faculty, all the more so because both these authors make wide use of it to establish a horizon of subversive meaning starting with the valorization of the dark side of the sexual. Edelman declares—contradicting himself this time—that he wants to put imagination out of commission to leave space only for the drive, thought of as the eternal return of the same (of the *jouissance* of the real). It seems like, for him, turning one’s back on the future means renouncing not only the planning of better collective lifestyles, but the imagining of them now as well. There is no obligation, moreover, to completely agree with him: queer subjects could instead take advantage of their ability to be ironic and ambiguous in order to follow and also betray his teaching (and the example of Genet, who was the first to turn the solipsism into a moral imperative). Turning their gazes toward the past and not the future as Bersani and Edelman choose to do, but simultaneously maintaining an

anchor in contemporary politics, the queers, for example, could institute imaginary communities with those who came before, gathering dissonant voices like those of Proust, Gide, Genet, Foucault and Hocquenghem in their collective choir, voices who in different ways continue to sing out experiences of homosexuality that challenge the shared feeling of gays today, and allude to the possibility of other symbolic orders. From their outdatedness—thus from their failures more than their successes (Muñoz 2009; Halberstam 2011)—the queers could thus learn that the present is in fact not written in the past, that it could have been different from what it is and that, consequently, the contemporary world could assume configurations different from the monotonous succession of Oedipal families prescribed by the master's discourse and from the constantly equal jouissance of the real that the capitalist discourse encourages. Always looking at the past and the present, queer subjects could recuperate from their predecessors the suspicion toward every discursive strategy that limits their existence to one particular truth: both Foucault and Hocquenghem teach that psychoanalysis has always been dangerous for sexual minorities, when it is dragged into a dogmatic ontology, or used in a normative way.

Finally, the queers could remember that children have existed and still exist that are different from the virtual ones in the name of whom a widespread “futurist” rhetoric asks for the sacrifice of the present, *children* plural with a lowercase “c,” in flesh and blood like the ones they themselves were, like anyone and everyone was and in a way still is.⁴⁴ Both Lacan and Laplanche agree with one point in Freud's teachings: even our drives are ontologically indebted to those who cared for us when, defenseless, we were completely exposed to a world that we could not understand that both hurt and excited us, but that, in its ambivalence ultimately protected us, making us become what we are now. The queer has always belonged to this communal world with the destructive force of its “no” that has always also demanded recognition. And it is this world that Edelman addresses in his work: even his provocative narcissism needs an audience. At heart, his polemic against the fetish of infancy could be read as a condemnation of the inability of “civilization” to give heed to children as children, without instrumentalizing them to govern adults and without taking paternalistic care of them, that is, without disciplining them in order to turn them into adults that are dominated by the future (Mieli (2002) used, in this regard, the illuminating concept of “educastration”). Edelman, more coherently than Hocquenghem, illuminates the impossibility of politics to position itself within the time of the trauma in which infants live, ignorant of the

future that others are planning for them. Even the activists of the FHAR were, in the end, young adults who claimed to speak for children, and Hocquenghem mythologized the return to an anal phase that he had long surpassed: Edelman does not limit himself, however, to inviting queers not to repeat these mistakes, at times *No Future* risks suggesting that they should renounce politics.⁴⁵

Perhaps the age of the queer has ended, and perhaps it was the logic of “*no future*” that declared its end, when the punk motto became a neoliberal capitalist injunction and it trapped queer existences in its deadly spiral. But nothing prevents one from thinking beyond the end, jumping beyond the death drive. Because another imaginary is possible other than the one in which the burden of the mortgaging of the future weighs upon the present. And another present is possible, a present that, through the double disobedience toward the imperatives of jouissance and austerity to which our precarious lives are subject, has new access to the nonlinear, punctual time of singular and collective action (Arendt 1958; Bloch 1959). In this time those who choose to refuse this civilization and enter into a “tribe” of queers can trace back the “prophetic voices” of the past that prepare them to think and to practice the new. For this to occur, there is no need for the arrival of a Child Messiah, because every human has already been a child. In addition to the future, infants do not even know the past, but as Beatriz Preciado demonstrated on the occasion of the January 13, 2013, protest against the *mariage pour tous* [marriage for all] bill, queer subjects only need their memory to free themselves of the “reproductive futurism” rhetoric.⁴⁶ Listening to his teachers Deleuze and Guattari, Hocquenghem forced himself to think about desire outside the logic of the lack. This is perhaps the moment to endeavor to rethink of the drive, not by forgetting death, but by recasting it, in its ambivalence, with life.

Perhaps the queer’s present is the apocalyptic time of the zombies.

NOTES

1. For more on this, refer to the last pages of paragraph 1.1 “From the Pleasure Principle...” and to note 13, *supra*.
2. The name referred to the Algerian liberation front. In 1951, the Mattachine Society was founded in Los Angeles, and in 1955, the group the Daughters of Bilitis began: they were two assimilationist and integrationist organizations, the first was made up of homosexual men and the second of homosexual women. The GLF instead had a radical and revolutionary character,

in the spirit of the Stonewall riots in which the disreputable patrons of the establishment had taken part—"transvestites," drag queens, prostitutes, among others.

3. The episode is discussed by Beatriz Preciado in the afterward of the Spanish edition of Guy Hocquenghem's *Lé désir homosexuel* (*El deseo homosexual*, Melusina, Barcelona 2009): "In France, on March 5th 1971, the leftist activist writer and member of MLF Françoise d'Eaubonne and a group of lesbians armed with cold cuts, attacked professor Lejeung during an anti-abortion conference he was giving at the Théâtre de la Mutualité in Paris. Thus the 'Commando Saucisson' (Sausage Commando) was born, a movement that the Front Homosexuel d'Action Révolutionnaire (FHAR) would later merge with. The Sausage Commando invents anal terrorism. By making the penises and police clubs used as instruments of traditional politics seem ridiculous, the sausage summons anality: made with the skin of lamb and pig intestines, its shape is necessarily reminiscent of human or animal excrement. Shortly thereafter, the Sausage Commando rushed the radio studio that transmitted Ménie Gregoire's program dedicated to *Homosexuality, this painful problem*" [translation Julia Heim].
4. "In April 1972 a medical congress was held in San Remo, Italy, in order to discuss cures for homosexuality such as conditioned reflexes, electric shock therapy, drugs and even surgical operations. [...] The repressive mechanism of desire is so effective that homosexuals agree to submit to this kind of treatment, and even ask for it" (Hocquenghem 1993: 67).
5. "The French Communist Party has often played the role of a kind of bourgeois superego: it stands for the moral principles which it accuses the ruling class of respecting in theory, only to betray them in fact. It has supported the law of family heterosexuality" (Hocquenghem 1993: 71).
6. Hocquenghem, as Foucault would do in *The Will to Knowledge* (1976), used Havelock Ellis' statement in *Sexual Inversion* (1889) as the source of the origins of the concept of homosexuality. Foucault would later identify Karl Friedrich Westphal as the one who introduced the concept of inversion (and not the term "homosexual") into medical literature with an article published in 1870 (cf. note 6 from the first chapter, *supra*), while Hocquenghem, without distinguishing between the term and the concept, generically named a "German doctor" and dated it 1869. In actuality, according to Havelock Ellis' statement, it was "Hungarian doctor" Karl-Maria Kertbeny who coined the term "homosexual" in 1869, in a letter/paper he anonymously sent to the Prussian government to protest the introduction of a law against sodomy. Ellis' statement is also inexact, however, because Kertbeny was a scholar and not a doctor.
7. Cf. note 5 in Chap. 1, *supra*. The two met in 1973 because of a FUORI! delegation visit to Paris. In particular, the "theoretical arrogance" of

Hocquenghem, that “well-known theorist and brilliant star of FHAR” struck Mieli (Mieli 1973: 16, translation Julia Heim; the episode was reconstructed by Massimo Prearo 2012: 105). Despite this, Hocquenghem remains a constant source of reference in *Elements of a Gay Critique*.

8. Among other things, in April 1971, Sartre was charged with defending homosexuality for having published some of FHAR’s articles in number 12 of the magazine *Tout*, which was confiscated.
9. Here Hocquenghem picks up the theses developed by Deleuze and Guattari (1972; eng. trans. 89) in their analysis of *Sodom and Gomorrah*: “We are statistically or molarly heterosexual, but personally homosexual, without knowing it or being fully aware of it, and finally we are transsexual in an elemental, molecular sense. That is why Proust, the first to deny all Oedipalizing interpretations of his own interpretations, contrasts two kinds of homosexuality, or rather two regions only one of which is Oedipal, exclusive, and depressive, the other being an Oedipal schizoid, included and inclusive.”
10. Sándor Ferenczi in particular is Hocquenghem’s polemic target. Ferenczi’s interpretation of male homosexuality is a particular variation of the inversion theory, which, at the same time, leads homosexual desire back to heterosexual desire and introduces a “third sex.” While for Freud homosexuality is principally an “error” of sexual object choice, for Ferenczi, there exists instead an essential difference between “objective homoeroticism” and “subjective homoeroticism.” The former is applicable to active homosexuals, neurotic men that can be cured by redirecting their desire toward women. The latter is applicable to the passives or inverts, men who, because of a developmental error have acquired a feminine identity, are incurable and as such constitute a real and true “third sex” (see Ferenczi 2002).
11. “The discovery and progressive liberation of the transsexuality of the subject lead to the negation of the polarity between the sexes and to the utopic attainment (in the revolutionary sense of utopia-eutopia) of the new man-woman or, more probably, the woman-man” (Mieli 2002: 242, translation Julia Heim).
12. To this end, Hocquenghem (147) furthers Guattari’s opinion (1972). According to Guattari, a revolutionary group would remain subjugated even if it was able to gain power, because power cannot help but oppress the power of desire.
13. “The gay movement is thus not seeking recognition as a new political power on par with others; its own existence contradicts the system of political thought, because it relates to a different problematic. The bourgeoisie generates the proletarian revolution, but defines the framework within which the struggle takes place; this we could call the framework of civilisation, from whose historical continuity every social force benefits” (Hocquenghem 1993: 137).

14. On the normative use of the concept of “nature,” Hocquenghem (1993: 62) engaged in polemics with the operation attempted by Gide in *Corydon*: “When Gide in *Corydon* attempts to construct a homosexuality which is biologically based, by means of a comparison with other species, he is simply walking foolishly into the trap, which consists of a need to base the form of desire on nature.”
15. Mieli, instead, seems to have forgotten: “Homosexuality is a relation between persons of the same sex. Between women, it proclaims the autonomous existence of female sexuality, independent of the phallus. Between men, even though historically marked by phallocracy, homosexuality multiplies the sexual ‘uniqueness’ of the phallus, thus in a certain respect negating it, and discloses the availability of the ass for intercourse and erotic pleasure” (Eng. trans. 1980: 26).
16. “The gay movement [...] is unaware of the passing of generations as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about ‘sacrifice now for the sake of future generations,’ the cornerstone of socialist enlightenment” (Hocquenghem 1993: 147).
17. One recent example of this literature, aside from *Unlimited Intimacy* by Tim Dean (2009, and particularly the chapter “Cruising as a Way of Life”), is José Esteban Muñoz’s *Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity* (2009; particularly the chapter “Ghost of Public Sex: Utopian Longings, Queer memories”). Foucault (1982a; eng. trans. 2011: 399–400) was already seduced by this rhetoric, and the debate continued throughout the eighties, culminating in Bersani’s critique of Altman in *Is the Rectum a Grave*: “In short, to put the matter polemically and even rather brutally, we have been telling a few lies—lies whose strategic value I fully understand, but which the AIDS crisis has rendered obsolescent. I do not, for example, find it helpful to suggest, as Dennis Altman has suggested, that gay baths created ‘a sort of Whitmanesque democracy, a desire to know and trust other men in a type of brotherhood far removed from the male bondage of rank, hierarchy, and competition that characterize much of the outside world.’ Anyone who has ever spent one night in a gay bathhouse knows that it is (or was) one of the most ruthlessly ranked, hierarchized, and competitive environments imaginable. Your looks, muscles, hair distribution, size of cock, and shape of ass determined exactly how happy you were going to be during those few hours, ad rejection, generally accompanied by two or three words at most, could be swift and brutal, with none of the civilizing hypocrisies with which we get rid of undesirables in the outside world” (2010: 12).
18. “[E]verything related to anality is guilty. The buggard person is a masochist, even in spite of himself. He may enjoy himself—but, according to the book, not only has he no right to do so, he *cannot*” (Hocquenghem 1993: 129).

19. *The Antisocial Thesis in Queer Theory* is the title of the panel held in Washington DC on December 27, 2005, as part of the annual Modern Language Association conference. Excerpts of the papers by Robert L. Caserio, Tim Dean, Lee Edelman, Judith “Jack” Halberstam and José Esteban Muñoz were published, under the same title, in the magazine *PMLA*, 3, 2006.
20. “Lee Edelman’s *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive*, a manifesto for the twenty-first century, takes queerness as the figure for an ethical position against the ‘democratic literality that marks the futurism of the left’ as well as any other reproductive futurism. [...] The coincidence of Edelman’s and my critical projects, quite unrelated and unaware of one another, is remarkable: both read visual, literary and cultural texts with psychoanalytic theory (Lacan in Edelman, Freud and Laplanche in mine) and focus on figurality. As much as they converge on the linked trope of queerness and the future, perhaps not surprisingly, our readings diverge on the issue of the death drive. Edelman urges queers to embrace a figural identification with the death drive as *jouissance*, a figure for the undoing of identity and the heteronormative order of meaning. My reading of Freud’s drive offers no programme, no ethical position, no polemic, only queer figures of passing in the uninhabited space between mind and matter.”
21. “The barebacker’s rectum is a grave. And this is where the reproductive fantasy becomes at once more sinister and more creative. Sinister because it’s difficult not to see this as a rageful perversion of the reproductive process. A horror of heterosexual breeding (Lee Edelman’s recent book, *No Future*, is already the classic textbook of this horror) becomes the sexual excitement of transmitting or conceiving death instead of life.”
22. Translator’s Note: the term “jouissance” (enjoyment) has been left in the original French to reinforce its connection to Lacanian thought.
23. For these reasons, according to Lacan, the psychoanalyst’s job is not to reveal the subject’s reality but the subject’s signification to himself: Lacan 1978a; eng. trans. 1988: 326.
24. “The symbolic order [...] isn’t the libidinal order in which the ego is inscribed, along with all the drives. It tends beyond the pleasure principle, beyond the limits of life, and that is why Freud identifies it with the death drive. [...] And the death drive is only the mask of the symbolic order, in so far—this is what Freud writes—as it is dumb, that is to say in so far as it hasn’t been realized” (Lacan 1978a; eng. trans. 1988: 326).
25. “The *sinthome*—a term, as Lacan explains in Seminar 23, that he takes from an ‘old way of writing what was written later as ‘symptom’—speaks to the singularity of the subject’s existence, to the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. But by calling attention to the status of the word as an

- archaic form of writing—thus inflecting it in the direction of the letter rather than of the signifier as bearer of meaning—Lacan, who will subsequently describe the sinthome as ‘not ceasing to write itself,’ implies from the outset its relation to the primary inscription of subjectivity and thus to the constitutive fixation of the subject’s access to jouissance” (Edelman 2004: 35).
26. “[T]he only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive we’re called on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and the political order it enforces, that we, as Guy Hocquenghem made clear, are ‘not the signifier of what might become a new form of ‘social organization’,’ that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future. We choose, instead, *not* to choose the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of projective identification with an always impossible future” (Edelman 2004: 30–31).
 27. Kathryn Bond Stockton is also decidedly on the side of the children; in *The Queer Child, or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth Century* (2009), she analyzes how in the literature and film of the twenty-first century, the child often appears as a sexually ambiguous figure, as the personification of the queer.
 28. Edelman already elaborated his research method in *Homographesis* (1994).
 29. “What might seem to bespeak narcissistic isolation from everyone around him—his self-delighting stinginess, his solipsistic rejection of comforts, no less for others than for himself—instantiates, then a death drive opposed to the ego and the world of desire. It expresses, that is, the will-to-enjoyment perversely obedient to the superego’s insatiable and masochistic demands” (Edelman 2004: 46). A short while later (51), Edelman picks up Bersani’s thesis according to which sexuality can be thought of as a tautology of masochism.
 30. For the interpretations that Butler and Cavarero give of the Sophocles tragedy, see the first chapter, “Corpi di nemici,” of the book *Comunità e vulnerabilità: per una critica politica della violenza* [Community and Vulnerability: for a political critique of violence] by Olivia Guaraldo (2012).
 31. Edelman references, above all, the posthumous collection *Aesthetic Ideology* (1997) and particularly “The Concept of Irony” conference of 1977 contained in the collection, the title of which traces back to that of Kierkegaard’s senior thesis (1841); in addition to *The Resistance to Theory* (1982).
 32. “The way to stop irony is by understanding, by the understanding of irony, by the understanding of the ironic process. Understanding would also allow us to control irony. But what if irony is always of understanding, if

- irony is always the irony of understanding, if what is at stake in irony is always the question of whether it is possible to understand or not to understand?” (de Mann 1997: 166).
33. “Consider, for example, Pope John Paul II’s unambiguous affirmation in July 2000 that those of us outside the heterosexual norm deserve, as he put it, to be treated ‘with respect, compassion, and sensitivity.’ No sooner had the Pontiff spoken these words than he felt it important to let us know that ‘homosexual persons who assert their homosexuality,’ who do not, that is, repress or deny their sexual orientation, suffer an ‘objective disorder.’ They possess what he called an ‘inclination... toward an intrinsic moral evil’” (Edelman 2004: 89).
 34. I must, in this regard, recognize the merits of Liana Borghi (Borghi and Barbarulli 2003, 2004, 2006, 2010) and Marco Pustianaz (Pustianaz et al. 2000; Pustianaz and Villa 2004; Pustianaz 2011), directors of the book series *altera* (intercultura di genere) of Edizioni ETS who published the Italian version of this book.
 35. Even Teresa de Lauretis, in the previously cited conference in Bologna in March 1996 “Freud’s Nemesis” (1996b: 84), interprets queer theory as a subset of Cultural Studies.
 36. “The crisis not of the master discourse, but of capitalist discourse, which is its substitute, is overt (*ouverte*). I am not at all saying to you that capitalist discourse is rotten, on the contrary, it is something wildly clever, eh? Wildly clever, but headed for a blowout. After all it is the cleverest discourse that we have made. It is no less headed for a blowout. This is because it is untenable” (Lacan 1978b: 10–11).
 37. “Instead of liberating desire from its material and moral constraints, and from its social inhibitions—basically from its neuroses—, the capitalist discourse has killed it, crushed it under the steamroller of a desperate run-up to a jouissance as necessary as it is devoid of satisfaction. It is the paradox of the hyper-hedonism of our time: the drive appears equipped with infinite potential, it affirms itself as finally free, unfettered by the limits of the law, but this freedom is not capable of generating any satisfaction. It is an empty, sad, unhappy, apathetically frivolous freedom” (Recalcati 2012a: 15–16, translation Julia Heim).
 38. For example, in Italy, on November 16, 2011, the mutual perverse support of jouissance and austerity was proven when, without a vote, the Monti government replaced that of Berlusconi; and April 28, 2012, by the support given both by the Berlusconi front and equally by his historic opponents to the Letta government (which, among other things, quickly clarified that neither legal recognition of gay and lesbian couples, nor the organization of *ius soli* for children of migrants born in Italy were among its priorities). For an interpretation of “Berlusconism” as a result of neoliberalist contemporary jouissance, see Bernini 2011a.

39. "They are terrorists, Barthes affirms [1972: 14] [...], those texts that are capable of 'socially intervening', not thanks to their popularity or success, but rather thanks to the 'violence which allows the text to transgress the laws that a society, ideology, or philosophy retains in order to be identified as a nice, historically intelligible movement'. Hocquenghem's *Homosexual Desire* is not just a book on homosexuality. It is the first terrorist text to deal directly with heterosexual hegemonic language. It is the first critical-diagnostic text on the relationship between capitalism and heterosexuality created by a fag that does not hide his status as 'social scum' and 'abnormal' before speaking" (Preciado 2009, translation Julia Heim).
40. "The formation of these reactions is favored by the fact that many impulses appear almost from the beginning in contrasting pairs; this is a remarkable state of affairs called the ambivalence of feeling and is quite unknown to the layman. This feeling is best observed and grasped through the fact that intense love and intense hate occur so frequently in the same person. Psychoanalysis goes further and states that the two contrasting feelings not infrequently take the same person as their object." (Freud 1915; eng. trans. 1918).
41. The reference here is, naturally, to the very famous carme [poem] 85, one of the numerous poems Catullus dedicated to Lesbia (literary pseudonym behind which is the poet Clodia, sister of Clodius the tribune): "Odi et amo. Quare id faciam fortasse requiris. Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excucior."
42. See, for example, Edelman's reference to the public reactions to the news of the brutal homicide of Matthew Shepard (2004: 115–116).
43. I will consider this argument more fully in paragraph 6.2 "Celine's hens, or on prophetic voices," *infra*.
44. Psychic evolution, in fact, is not at all linear, but follows a temporality that we may define as "queer." In this regard, Freud's words seem illuminating (1915; eng. trans. 1918): "For psychic evolution shows a peculiarity which is not found in any other process of development. When a town becomes a city or a child grows into a man, town and child disappear in the city and in the man. Only memory can sketch in the old features in the new picture; in reality the old materials and forms have been replaced by new ones. It is different in the case of psychic evolution. One can describe this unique state of affairs only by saying that every previous stage of development is preserved next to the following one from which it has evolved; the succession stipulates a co-existence although the material in which the whole series of changes has taken place remains the same."
45. In Edelman's brief piece "Antagonism, Negativity, and the Subject of Queer Theory" (2006: 822), he lays claim to his refusal for political action aimed at renewal, affirming that "no future" was more radical than that of

the Sex Pistols: “‘God Save the Queen’ does not, in fact, dissent from reproductive futurism. It conventionally calls for England to awake from the ‘dream’ that *allows for* ‘no future’ while implying that the disenfranchised, those ‘flowers in the dustbin’ for whom the song speaks, hold the seeds of potential renewal. ‘We’re the future,’ it tells us, against its refrain, ‘No future *for you*’.”

46. Following the French protest on January 13, 2013, against the bill that proposes full access to marriage and adoption to lesbian and gay couples, Preciado wrote an article in *Libération* entitled “Qui défend l’enfant queer?” [“Who Defends the Queer Child?”], inspired by the reflections of Hocquenghem and Edelman. In the article, among other things, Preciado says “I have been the child that Frigide Barjot [the sponsor and spokesperson of the protest] is so proud of protecting. [...] I was born in Franco’s Spain where I was raised in a straight, Catholic, right-wing family. [...] I recognize my father’s ideas and arguments in the discourses that can be heard today in France against marriage and medically assisted procreation for all. In the intimacy of the nuclear family, my father expressed a syllogism that invoked nature and moral law to justify exclusion. It would always begin like this: ‘a man must be a man and a woman must be a woman, as God intended,’ it continued with ‘what is natural is a union between a man and a woman, that’s why homosexuals are sterile’, and went on until the relentless ending: ‘if my son or my daughter was homosexual, I would prefer to kill them’. I was the daughter” (translation Julia Heim).

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PART II

Queer Apocalypses

Resurrections

Once upon a time, in the not too distant future, there unlied a zombie named Otto.

It was a time, not much different from today, when zombies had become, if not commonplace, then certainly unextraordinary. Zombies had evolved over time and become somewhat more refined. They had developed a limited ability to speak, and more importantly, to reason. Some say it was primarily owing to the fact that the practice of embalming had fallen out of favour. In the old days it was the embalming fluid that drove the zombies to their frenzied, deranged and sometimes retarded behaviour. Others say it was simply a natural process of evolution. Each new wave of zombies was beaten down and killed by the living, who found them to be an irritating and irksome reminder of their own incapable mortality, not to mention an echo of their own somnambulistic, conformist behaviour. But the few zombies who survived annihilation managed to pass on the intelligence they had acquired to subsequent generations, perhaps through some strange telepathy only shared by the dead... or perhaps by a kind of clandestine guerrilla activity born out of resistance against the violent and unceasing hostilities of the living. Still others say it was, and always had been, just a metaphor.

(Medea Yarn, in Otto; or, Up with Dead People)

Translation by Julia Heim

Several of Edelman's illustrious interlocutors have had some criticism for him that is similar to mine. De Lauretis (2010: 87), for example, took her distance from the prescriptive meaning of the death drive in *No Future*. While Dean has maintained that Edelman is conditioned by a restricted and static vision of the symbolic, which impedes him from imagining the kinds of relationality that challenge the Oedipal law of reproductive futurism. In his opinion, Hocquenghem and Bersani have instead shown themselves capable of a larger imaginative force¹ and a greater contact with reality. In fact, in the concreteness of gay existences, the breaking of the Oedipal social tie generally follows the construction of a new relationality, of which *barebacking* is only one example:

Everyone knows that homosexuals throw fabulous parties. Far from antisocial, we are in fact adept at practicing sociability in its myriad forms. (Dean 2006: 826)

Finally, Jack Halberstam (2006: 823–824), who perhaps more than any other has sought to link his own thought to “antisocial queer theory,”² has contested Edelman and Bersani's recourse to an elite “gay male archive,” limited to “a select group of antisocial queer aesthetes and camp icons and texts” that are far from the pop tastes of the queer community—not to mention his personal punk sensibility. Recalling that “Bersani's work... has also been useful for the theorization of femme receptivities (Cvetkovich) and butch abjection and lesbian loneliness (Love),” Halberstam contrasts “Tennessee Williams, Virginia Woolf, Bette Midler, Andy Warhol, Henry James, Jean Genet, Broadway musicals, Marcel Proust, Alfred Hitchcock, Oscar Wilde, Jack Smith, Judy Garland and Kiki and Herb” with “antisocial writers, artists, and texts, like Valerie Solanas, Jamaica Kincaid, Patricia Highsmith, Wallace and Gromit, Johnny Rotten, Nicole Eiseman, Eileen Myles, June Jordan, Linda Besemer, Hothead Paisan, *Finding Nemo*, Lesbians on Ecstasy, Deborah Cass, SpongeBob, Shulamith Firestone, Marga Gomez, Toni Morrison and Patti Smith.” The intentions of the two different archives correspond not only to two different levels of culture—the first to “high” culture and the second to popular culture—but also to different affective choices: Halberstam prefers “dyke anger, anticolonial despair, racial rage, counterhegemonic violence, punk pugilism” to the boredom, indifference and irony that permeate the “comfort zone” of gay references. In Halberstam's opinion, the former have more to do with “the undisciplined kinds of responses that Bersani at least seems to associate with sex and queer culture.”³

While in the previous chapter I formulated criticisms that had been put forth differently by de Lauretis and Dean, in this chapter I will draw on

Halberstam's polemic. It raises important questions, which, in addition to style, taste and emotional tone, interrogate the possible consequences of antisocial theories in queer life practices, and their ability to echo beyond what I have called the ivory tower of the university. I will not surreptitiously assume positions to which I do not belong, and I will remain within the archive that Edelman and Bersani seem to share more than Halberstam seems to recognize—which, furthermore, as Jose Esteban Muñoz notes, is not just gay, academic and snobbish, but also “white.”⁴ I will thus attempt to contaminate this archive with “less cultured” references that bring it closer to the contemporary gay community and to the new hybrid (mixed race) and postcolonial generations, in an effort to suggest that the present can, for them, be a time of political queer action. The choice could seem surprising, if not bizarre, but there is one figure in particular that seems capable of both joining this archive and reopening the horizon: the zombie, a creature that in the recent past more than any other time has represented, and not by chance, the nexus between death and jouissance, and to which, in the last few years, gay cinema has given a vital new ironic meaning.

4.1 THE JOUISSANCE OF THE LIVING DEAD

The zombie is the most abject of the contemporary “monsters” of horror, not only because the zombie's natural habitat is comprised of not-so-prestigious movies geared toward younger audiences—B-movies and low-budget productions of the splatter or gore subgenres⁵—but also because of its modest origins. Vampires, Frankenstein and werewolves can boast their noble genealogies, that date back to the gothic novels of the 1800, and even ancient Greece or ancient Egypt⁶; “zombie” instead is the Anglo-Saxon transliteration of the Creole-Haitian term “zonbi,” which derives from the Bantu “nzumbe” and designates a voodoo character easily read as a symbol of slavery. The Haitian zonbi is, in fact, a newly dead human that a wizard (or to be more precise, a *bokor* priest) exhumed and brought back to life, stealing parts of his soul, annihilating his will, increasing his physical resistance, and reducing him to blind obedience so as to essentially transform him into a docile and enhanced workforce for the plantations. This is the version of the myth that was initially cannibalized by popular US culture after making landfall there in 1929 through the travel stories of occultist journalist William Seabrook (who was actually a cannibal⁷). This version would shortly thereafter become a cinematic attraction: in 1932, in Victor Halperin's *White Zombie*, which takes place in Haiti, Bela Lugosi—who played Tod Browning's *Dracula* just one year earlier—impersonates Murder Legendre, the colonialist wizard who, with

the help of mysterious extracts and voodoo dolls, zombifies not only black slaves, but white settlers as well, to procure manual labor for his criminal undertakings, or simply for his mill.

For the US public, in addition to representing a fear of the *metisage* of the Creole culture (Moreman and Rushton 2011a; Phillips 2011), the metaphor lends itself to an initial slippage, from slavery in the fields to work in the factories.⁸ And that is only the beginning: a few years later, with the Second World War and then with the cold war, the figure of the zombie begins to reveal its extraordinary versatility.⁹ Other films that insert new fears are added to those that stem from the Caribbean tradition¹⁰: at times the role of the wizard is played by mad scientists or even Nazis,¹¹ or ex-Nazis that bring the dead back to life with the help of nuclear radiation.¹² At times in the place of zombies, there are alien-controlled human bodies¹³ which are easily read as a caricature of Soviet totalitarianism. But symptomatically, it was not until 1968—the year Martin Luther King was assassinated by a shot to the head, and youth protests popped up all over the West while the United States was busy with the war in Vietnam—that a very low-budget film with nearly unknown actors definitively revolutionized the zombie look, turning them into the partially decomposed, devoid of any intelligence, hungry for human flesh and, luckily, very slow moving cadavers that we all know. I am talking about *The Night of the Living Dead*, created by George Andrew Romero, a director born and raised in New York by a Cuban father (descendent of Spaniards) and an American mother of Lithuanian origin. Just like his genealogical makeup, Romero's living dead are the product of a complex syncretism. They inherit very little from the zombies of the Hispaniola island, initially not even their name (they aren't called zombies in the film), while they seem to draw from the folklore of the Arab world, where numerous myths tell of shape-shifting demons, known as ghouls, that wander through cemeteries in search of human flesh.¹⁴ Furthermore, the director declared that his inspiration was Richard Matheson's novel *I Am a Legend* (1954), which was actually about a vampire epidemic, and his terrifying creatures gesticulate much like Frankenstein.¹⁵ Finally, there is no lack of science fiction references: a space probe returning from Venus reanimates cadavers and turns them into cannibals as it spreads mysterious radiation throughout America. The theme remains however only the background, giving the film the possibility of developing the *topoi* that will later mark the genre and make *The Night of the Living Dead* a film classic (of which at least two remakes were later produced, one official and one unauthorized,¹⁶ but of which many

other films with different titles could also be considered remakes): a group of unknown people finds itself facing an invasion of living dead cannibals that can only be neutralized by a blow to the head, and who, for the duration of the film, enact disgusting performances, voluntarily displaying the signs of their decomposition as well as the insides of their victims to the camera. In this case, the protagonists barricade themselves in a farmhouse near the cemetery, and after having displayed the more noble and altruistic sides as well as the more wretched and selfish sides of their personalities, they all die. The last one, Duane Jones in the role of the heroic Ben, who, in the history of cinema, is the first “nonethnic” character played by a black actor, survives the nocturnal assault of the zombies only to be killed the next morning by a bullet to the head, fired by a policeman on the hunt for the living dead. Ben thus dies just like Martin Luther King, in a finale that makes the zombies’ fury the apocalyptic symbol of the uprising of the poor.

The global success of *The Night of the Living Dead* gives way to a great number of productions, in which horror is inserted in romantic, erotic or screwball stories, which at times replay the “hot themes” of timely political debates: from the war in Vietnam to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, from black people’s claim to rights, to ecological threats, to the condemnation of the unequal distribution of wealth that are still present in advanced societies.¹⁷ Over the years, zombies not only infest B-movies (a large number of which, filmed in the eighties, are Italian¹⁸) and mainstream ones,¹⁹ they also infest videos by pop stars²⁰ like Michael Jackson’s *Thriller*²¹ and Lady Gaga’s *Born This Way*,²² extremely popular video games, successful television series, and finally, they become the object of a vast array of literature: Their suspended lives inspire authors of novels and comics, and are the subject of serious philosophical analysis. Within this uncontrollable proliferation, some fundamental mutations make the voracious walking cadavers very fitting for a discourse on queerness, the death drive and pleasure.

The first, which is perhaps more of an evolution than a mutation, was enacted by Romero, who in 1978—always with a low budget and fairly unknown actors—filmed the sequel of his saga: *Dawn of the Dead*.²³ This time, with the United States reduced to total collapse, four survivors, who escaped toward Canada in a helicopter, are forced because of lack of fuel, to land on the roof of a zombie-infested mall in Philadelphia. They manage to rid it of the living dead—two of them, Peter (David Emge) and Rover (Scott Reiniger), are members of a SWAT team, and know their way with weapons—and block all the entrances. They thus find themselves sheltered

amidst the toys, and surrounded by life's comforts. While the world is being devoured by chaos, they live out a lush existence, surrounded by fine wines and foods, elegant clothing, ice-skating and video games. After a while, it is a motorcycle gang wishing to ransack the mall, along with the protagonists' efforts to protect what they now considered their property, that will reopen the doors to those terrible creatures for the final slaughter.

What links the living dead of *Night of the Living Dead* to those of *Dawn of the Dead* (and the many other films inspired by them), and separates them from the Haitian zombies, is that they are not subjected to anyone else's will. In the former, the dead are awakened by a radiation that came from outer space, in the latter, the cause of their resurrection remains unknown, but there are no voodoo wizards, Nazi scientists or artificial intelligences to control them: Romero's zombies don't take orders from any authority. This does not mean they are endowed with free will (to the contrary, it is their almost total lack of consciousness that make them so interesting to philosophers of the mind²⁴): rather, they are confined to their dulling spasmodic predatory activity of insatiable and meaningless hunger, and this is the only thing that keeps them united in a horde (in the recent television series *The Walking Dead*²⁵ the term "herd" is used) though they lack any relational or social competency almost completely. Their "impersonal intimacy" could perhaps appeal to Bersani, but what seems most noteworthy to me, keeping the aims of this discourse in mind, is that from night to dawn, from the cemetery to the mall, the metaphor undergoes a meaningful contortion. In the first film, the cannibalistic drive that pressures the living dead reignites the death drive that nests in all of the unfortunate ones barricaded in the farmhouse, leaving no salvation for any of their relationships or any of their lives: Barbara (Judith O'Dea) enters a catatonic state after losing her brother Johnny (Russell Streiner), and when she finds him, having become a zombie, he wastes no time attacking her; Tom (Keith Wayne) causes his and his girlfriend Judy's (Judith Ridley) death by accidentally setting fire to the pickup truck with which they, and the others, were supposed to flee; Ben, the protagonist, ends up being really skilled at finishing off zombies, even when they are his ex-comrades, but not skilled enough to prevent Karen (Kyra Schon) from devouring her parents (Karl Hardman and Marilyn Eastman) before he can break all three of their skulls.

The antisocial and antirelational function embodied by the zombies does not fade in *Dawn of the Dead*: not only because the struggle between the protagonists and motorcyclists clearly alludes to the end of civilization,

but also because, more subtly, Romero turns his living dead into a threat to Oedipal planning time. In fact, when Stephen (David Emge), believing he is safe in the mall, gives his pregnant girlfriend Francine (Gayle Ross) a ring, she refuses him, maintaining that the presence of the living dead makes the promise poorly timed (“No, Stephen, not now...”). In retrospect, can you really say she’s wrong? In the last scene, Francine will escape in the low-fueled helicopter with Peter, far from Stephen, who has become one of the zombies, as she carries her unborn child toward an unknown future. What constitutes a significant innovation is that the setting of *Dawn of the Dead* makes the hungry zombies’ jouissance of human flesh seem like a warped reflection of the protagonists’ jouissance of merchandise: all of them, the living and the dead, claim the mall as their own. This correlation evokes a question: what do the zombies do with all that bounty? As Peter observes in a line that hardly masks Romero’s disapproval of consumerist society, if they return to the mall it’s because “this was an important place in their lives”—an expert on TV explains in fact that the living dead preserve vague reminiscences of their past existence.²⁶ Romero’s zombies do not, therefore, free themselves from the voodoo wizard to gain their freedom, but to subject themselves to the drive and to jouissance. To cite Lacan, they pass from the slavery of the master’s discourse to the slavery of the capitalist discourse, that is to say, “from the frying pan into the fire.”

It does not end there; the AIDS crisis arrives, and then September 11th, the anthrax threat, the fear of biological weapons being used by terrorists, and, as if that wasn’t enough, the ever-growing intensity of transportation and exchange that brings with it the risk of new pandemics: SARS, the bird flu and the swine flu. The zombie is there, the sponge of the imaginary, ready to absorb the new anxieties of an increasingly globalized world, ready to acquire a viral nature after having already infected all the cinematic genres and all areas of cultural production. But let us proceed in an orderly fashion. In the first two films of Romero’s saga, whatever the cause of the return of the dead on Earth, every deceased person will shortly come to life hungry for human flesh. Both Karen in *The Night of the Living Dead* and Roger in *Dawn of the Dead* die because of an infection caused by a zombie bite, but do not become zombies because of it: they die because of the infection, and then, like all the other dead people, they transform into cannibalistic monsters. In a long series of other films, however, the zombie is produced by a virus that turns only the infected humans into cannibals: In some cases the zombie still remains

a living dead, in others the zombie becomes an infected and infectious living being. Already, in *Apocalypse domani* [*Cannibal Apocalypse*] directed by Anthony M. Dawson, aka Antonio Margheriti, in 1980—following the success of Francis Ford Coppola’s *Apocalypse Now* (1979) and Ruggero Deodato’s *Cannibal Holocaust* (1980)—we see an epidemic of cannibalizing rabies transmitted through bites. A few Vietnam veterans initially start the epidemic, rendering it a symbol of posttraumatic stress, or even the war itself (or the death drive that Freud links to the origin of every war, reflecting on the symptoms of the veterans of the First World War), but in a short time the viral metaphor will be charged with additional meanings.

The next year, the first case of what would later be called “AIDS” is diagnosed in the United States: before 1982, the American press referred to it using the homophobic acronym “GRID” (*Gay-related immune deficiency*), while the CDC (*Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*), more pluralistic in distributing the stigma, preferred the wording “the 4H disease” based on the initial letter common to the four communities that were predominantly struck with the disease: not just homosexuals, but heroin users, hemophiliacs and... Haitians. HIV is identified in 1983, and in the following years its history is reconstructed: a mutation of an African monkey virus, which would reach the United States by first passing through the island of Hispaniola. Thus, it is perhaps not by chance that in what is considered the most successful example of a film about viral zombies,²⁷ namely, in Danny Boyle’s *28 Days Later* (2002), chimpanzees are the ones to start the epidemic: Used as test subjects in an English laboratory, infected with modified rabies, the primates spread the virus to a group of animalists that rush to free them in the night. The first to be bitten is a girl who immediately begins to vomit blood and show signs of a deranged aggressiveness; one of her companions tries to help her, but a squirt of blood she spits out hits him in the eye and immediately triggers the monsterification process in him. The extremely aggressive virus that is probably contained in all the bodily fluids, but definitely in blood and saliva, has an incubation period of just 15 seconds, and in the span of a mere 28 days will throw England into total chaos.²⁸

Another mutation finally occurs when the zombies begin to regain self-awareness. The process is activated once again by Romero—who, furthermore, has always given his creatures traces of the memory of who they once were. Already in *Day of the Dead* (1985), medical doctor Matthew Logan (Richard Liberty), called Dr. Frankenstein because of the truculent nature of his experiments on the living dead, has a certain amount

of success domesticating and returning zombie Bub (Howard Sherman), who was a soldier in life, to humanity. Bub will in fact be able to utter the word “hallo,” and will remember the uses of a few objects (a razor, a book, a telephone, a cassette player... and a gun), and above all, at the end of the film, he will kill Logan’s assassin by shooting him with the precision of the well-trained soldier he once was—and not by chewing him up with the fury typical of the living dead creature he is now. Later, in *Land of the Dead* (2005), the zombies even organize a revolt against the survivors of the city of Pittsburg, who live barricaded in a militarized community governed by the corrupt and rapacious Paul Kaufman (Dennis Hopper) and occasionally go on expeditions in the city in search of food and medicine and to hunt the living dead. Leading them is the zombie Big Daddy, played by the African American actor Eugene Clark, who we see at the beginning of the film loitering around a pump of what perhaps used to be his gas station, and throughout the film, aside from his memory, he develops the personality of a leader.²⁹

Like many of Romero’s intuitions, even the “conscious zombie” theme will have its success, making a fundamental change in narrative perspective possible: From anonymous and undifferentiated catastrophes, the living dead will acquire not just the dignity of their own names, but even the role of protagonist in a few films. For example in Jonathan Levine’s *Warm Bodies* (2013), the narrating voice belongs to the young R. (Nicholas Hoult), whose name reflects his living name only in the first letter. The film, based on the homonymous novel by Isaac Marion and produced by the same produces of the *Twilight* saga, is a romantic comedy for teenagers that draws significantly from *Land of the Dead* (2005), while reversing its meaning. Instead of turning against the survivors, here the living dead join forces with them to fight the “boneys”; fleshless, voracious and super-fast zombies in their last stages. What will make them recuperate their sense of belonging to humanity, literally making their hearts beat, will be the love that blossoms between R. and Julie (Teresa Palmer), the daughter of the military leader General Grigio (John Malkovich). The new Romeo and Juliet meet when he eats her boyfriend’s brains, but, as we know, the young quickly forget, and in the end the two will live happily ever after³⁰. Once the boneys are exterminated, the young couple looks at the horizon of a new future while the wall that protected the human community from the zombies is torn down.

When compared to the bleak ending of *Dawn of the Dead* in which a pregnant Francine, after refusing the engagement ring, flees from her

zombie companion on a fuel-less and destination-less helicopter, *Warm Bodies* seems like an attempt to close the cinematic trajectory of the living dead with the triumph of Oedipal civilization: The zombies pass the death drive onto the boney, contribute to their extermination and are definitively reintegrated into humanity through a love pact which is also a social pact. Even after returning human, the protagonist does not remember his original name and refuses to choose a new one: He decides to continue calling himself R., preserving for himself and for the others the memory of his zombie existence. But his difference is accepted by the human community not only following the neutralization of the threat that he represents (one can presume that R. and his companions will change their feeding habits), but also at the price of his normalization, aesthetically set forth by the acquisition of a decidedly more pleasing appearance, and symbolically by the “benediction” that the patriarch, General Grigio, gives the heterosexual couple, a price that not all zombies can afford to pay.

4.2 BRUCE LABRUCE’S ZOMBIES

Recent gay cinema has used the new *topos* of impossible love between a conscious living dead being and a human in the opposite way, to denounce the excessive cost that current gay communities ask of their members.³¹ Poor zombie Miles (Brad Bilanin), the protagonist of Michael Simon’s *Gay Zombie* (2007), gets dejected by his psychotherapist (Robin MacDonald)—who at the beginning of the film encouraged him to live out his homosexuality by going to gay locales—just as, after various vicissitudes, his friendship with Todd (Ryan Carlberg) begins to take an amorous turn.³² The film seems to want to indicate that only by concealing the upsetting aspects of homosexuality (embodied by Miles, who, in one scene terrorizes Todd by flaunting his cannibalistic instinct against the homophobe Scorpio, aka Andrew Miller), and therefore renouncing what, in keeping with Bersani and Edelman, is his gay specificity, is it possible for a homosexual to be accepted into a gay community in a world dominated by hetero values, or better yet, by their redefinition as enacted by contemporary consumerism. In addition to showing clear signs of decomposition, Miles is in fact visibly “unfashionable” and must make himself presentable to go out with Todd: his promisingly large package and a thorough application of makeup are not enough, he must also dress like a metropolitan gay—taking on a style that the others choose for him after a fashion show in which we see him experiment with different looks (from the drag

queen, to leather slave, to cowboy, to a seducer in a smoking jacket, to fashion victim, to good boy). This attempt at uniformity proves useless: Todd displays a momentary willingness to question his own system of values for the sake of the feeling he develops for this new arrival, but when the object of his love is irreparably taken from him, he immediately comes to terms with it, accepting what happened as a necessary sacrifice in order to return to his future as a young ambitious gay.³³

In its lightness, as Alessandro Grilli has shown, *Gay Zombie* can be read as a shrewd critique of the homonormativity of metropolitan gay sociality, and more generally “as a very general and very relevant paradigmatic representation of aporia born from the contrast between the individual and society as they each fight to safeguard their own needs” (2009: 172).³⁴ The operation carried out by Bruce LaBruce (aka Justin Stewart) seems even more interesting to me. Bruce LaBruce used the zombie not only as a symbol of the negativity of homosexuality, of the parts within it that escape every hetero-homogenizing and homo-normativizing effort, but also as a figure representing the possibilities of its surprising resignification—a queer resignification that, far from passing through abstract symbolisms, remains anchored in the materiality of the sexual, without trying to enoble it through amorous feeling or sublimate it in language. Both Simon’s *Gay Zombie* and LaBruce’s *L.A. Zombie* (2010) are aimed at gay audiences, but while the first can be considered a coming-out comedy, the second is a porno,³⁵ or better yet, a post-porno almost entirely devoid of dialogue.³⁶

The association between the zombie and the queer, while initially surprising, is justifiable on multiple argumentative levels. First and foremost, from a formal point of view, we are dealing with two “floating signifiers.”³⁷ The former, as I have tried to show, evolving over the span of several decades from the Haitian legends to the latest cinematic productions, has at times symbolized a multitude of social fears, and the rebellion against different forms of oppression and homogenization. While the latter, as I illustrate in the first chapter of this book, was originally used as a qualitative adjective like “strange” to refer as much to people as to things, and then became a pejorative epithet to be used against sexual minorities, and was finally used as a political tool by these minorities themselves both in theory and in political practice. It is important to keep in mind that, since the early nineties, those who choose to use the word “queer” instead of “gay,” “lesbian” and “trans,” do it to enact a sort of dislocation of the categories with which modernity defines and regulates sexuality—and not to substitute them with a new concept endowed with semantic stability:

from de Lauretis to Butler, Bersani to Edelman, queer has been redefined nearly each time it has been used theoretically, to then be further reinterpreted by different movements, groups, collectives and individuals who, following Queer Nation's example, have defined themselves as queer. The semantic mobility is thus a constitutive characteristic of zombies as well as of queers, and as such both can easily be used with irony, where irony is meant in the way I have previously attempted to define it, not à la de Man and à la Edelman, as a dissolution of signification, but as the possibility to plurivocally and even ambiguously signify and thus to fluidize signification.³⁸

I have already discussed the ironic ambiguity of the queer. Now, instead, I would like to highlight how the zombie is a dual and paradoxical monster. First and foremost, in the zombie's suspended condition in which life and death are co-present, instead of the usual reciprocal exclusion, structurally the living dead represents an oxymoron (Grilli 2009: 178, 175). This ambiguous position derives, furthermore, from the position that the zombie occupies in relation to mankind: liminal but potentially central, particular and yet universalizable. Like vampires, zombies are in fact originally human, but unlike vampires their monsterification process does not entail being a part of a restricted circle of noble *élites*: anyone can become a zombie, just like anyone can "discover" they are lesbian, gay, or trans, or can be suspected of being so by others—acquiring in this way not a superhuman status but a minority one; existing as both human and "less-than-human." The zombie can therefore easily lend itself to substantialize the queer in a figural representation that emphasizes the ambiguous ontological status recognized by Hocquenghem and Kosofsky Sedgwick³⁹ and that, however, emerges from the juxtaposition of Bersani and de Lauretis to Foucault and Butler. Their existence "questions again and again the certainty of existence" (Hocquenghem 1993: 53), not unlike what happens with the identities of gays, lesbians and trans people, at once both concrete in the urgency of sexual drives that characterize them and abstract because of their nature as constructed sociocultural products of the modern sexuality apparatus.

Indeterminacy is not the only characteristic common to the two categories in discussion. Other traits become evident if we move from the analysis of the form of signification to the analysis of the denotation and connotation of the contents. Like the queer theorized by Edelman, the zombie is also a creature of the real. Every step, every grunt, every bite of the living dead rips open the veil of Maya of our projections into

the future, showcasing the cadaver that we will all soon become: if the zombie's hunger for human flesh threatens our lives, his/her almost-life threatens our imaginary.⁴⁰ In its evolution through time, however, the zombie has learned to do more: when the zombie develops fragments of consciousness after having been at the mercy of the death drive and pleasure, he/she shows that it is possible for the subject to rise up from dissolution and for meaning to reemerge from deconstruction. The conscious zombie, the "metamonster" to use Grilli's term (2009: 154–155), squares the paradox; reacquiring speech and becoming gay addresses a question to antisocial queer theories that is at once both simple and radical: "I gained awareness of the negativity that I represent, of the drive that operates in me, of the death that awaits me: now what do I do with these tragic truths?" The queer zombie essentially leads Cultural Studies to the limit where ontological psychoanalytic discourse gives over to ethical–political discourse, until theory gives way to practice. Consequently, the zombie can personify the dilemma of the LGBTQIA movements, perennially split between assimilation and contestation, between requesting social recognition and a refusal to recognize the values of sociality.

LaBruce exploits the rich aporetic potential of the conscious zombie to the maximum, leading our monster toward further paradoxical mutations: The protagonist of *L.A. Zombie* is starved not for human flesh (in one scene he drinks milk), but for gay sex, he does not belong to a herd, but is solitary—so much so that no one in the film utters his name and in the director's notes he is simply referred to as "Zombie"—he doesn't bring death, but reanimates people. He is played by François Sagat, one of the most popular gay porn actors, who can easily be considered the symbol of the commercialization of the body in advanced capitalist societies: In addition to having made more than 30 hardcore films,⁴¹ and never hiding his use of anabolic steroids to sculpt his hypertrophic muscles, Sagat has modeled for both a realistic dildo and a Ur3 ass equipped with a penetrable anus sold by TitanMen on the Internet and in sex shops all over the world. It would therefore be easy to "use him" to spread a moralistic condemnation of the commercialization of the body in the porn industry, but his function in LaBruce's film is much more complex: to show the possibility of an artistic and liberating use of pornography and resurrect subjectivity in societies of jouissance. In Sagat's professional life, sex was an instrument to obtain fame and money⁴²; the character he plays with his porn star body, meanwhile, offers his sexual partners as well as his spectators an opportunity to reawaken their dormant singularity. As

LaBruce himself has declared, *Zombie* is a salvific figure, in a technical “Messianic” sense. And like the Jesus of the Christian tradition, and if possible even more so, he is an extremely ambivalent being. The Christians know for certain that Jesus mysteriously participates in the human and the divine; little, however, is understood about the nature of *Zombie*: Perhaps he is both human and zombie (and thus still human but alive and dead at the same time), or he is a mutant alien come from who knows where, or perhaps he is simply a misfit gay, a schizophrenic inventing it all.⁴³

At the beginning of the film he emerges from the Pacific Ocean completely nude,⁴⁴ in some scenes he appears as a defenseless homeless guy wandering with others through the streets of Los Angeles—pushing a shopping cart full of objects he has pulled out of the trash, bathing where he can, stealing clothes that are hung out to dry—in other scenes his skin is bruised, at times fangs poke out of his mouth, other times they poke right out of his face, disfiguring his features (makeup and special effects were done by Joe Castro). When he is a zombie/alien the most interesting, disturbing, macabre and off-color things happen. At the beginning of the film, the surfer who gives him a ride (Rocco Giovanni) dies in a serious car accident. We see him lying in the middle of the street with his thoracic cavity open, and his exposed heart slowly stops beating. *Zombie* then inserts his large hooked phallus in the wound: the spurts of his black sperm reactivate the surfer’s heart, bringing him back to life. Analogous scenes then follow in which *Zombie* stumbles upon the bodies of attractive recently dead gay men and brings them back to life by penetrating their wounds or by spraying them with his black sperm. His partners are different kinds of humans who, in their complexity, paint a portrait of a gay community dominated by hedonism, *lookism*, money and the pleasure industry: a yuppie killed by a shot to the back because he was involved in a scam (Wolf Hudson), a black man with a crushed skull who is thrown to the street from a van after having perhaps participated in an orgy (Eddie Diaz), an older homeless guy who died of an overdose in his cardboard shelter (Andrew James), four bondage S/M porno stars (Erik Rhodes, Matthew Rush, Francesco D’Macho and Adam Killian) massacred by their dealers. In the last sequence we see *Zombie* in a cemetery. He is moved as he is reminded of the victims he has saved and the disadvantages of his reject-life: his eyes, both human and monstrous, shed tears of blood. He begins to dig a hole in the dark ground. On the tombstone an enigmatic “LAW” is engraved.

The metaphor of gay-zombie sex in *L.A. Zombie* lends itself to multiple readings. First and foremost is the attempt to dismantle, but not destroy the association between homosexual sex, disease and death.⁴⁵ In *Unlimited Intimacy* Dean (2009: 50, 55–56) shows how the bareback community produces a meaningful reversal of values, according to which being infected with HIV becomes desirable in that it is a mark, not of vulnerability but of strength, and anal passivity is associated with hyper-virility and not femininity. But LaBruce's imagination in this film goes much further: Here the monster, who in cinema has represented the death drive and infection more than any other, radically reinvents itself, while remaining the same—a zombie, as its name indicates. Some kind of virus is evidently present in his black sperm: But it is a virus that resuscitates.⁴⁶ What's even more interesting is that he does not infect. What is striking about the characters of the film is that they meet but remain alone: *Zombie* does not make his partners like him, and after each sexual act he distances himself. And his partners, once resurrected, greet him with astonished, surprised and grateful expressions, as if that unusual sex had ripped them away from their previous existence—which is most certainly zombie existence à la Romero, hypnotized by the capitalist discourse—and elevated it to a more authentic existential state, that even in the awareness of death, makes them feel alive, each one unique among other unique subjects. Because if it is true that, as Lacan said time and again, “there is no such thing as a sexual relationship,” then experimenting with the impossibility of the encounter with the other in sexual jouissance can, paradoxically, provide the occasion to recognize having come up against the otherness of the other and one's otherness to the other, other people's and one's own miraculous living singularity.⁴⁷ As LaBruce has also declared in his way, *L.A. Zombie* enacts the critical, creative and relational potential (which he still calls “revolutionary”) of sex (to which antisocial queer theorists remain largely blind):

AIDS has very effectively changed the course of the revolution. Now we are experimenting with a conservative resurgence in which extreme sexual behaviors and hedonism are not very well accepted by the gay community. Pornography is truly the last bastion of gay sexual radicalism. Having lived my formative years during the heart of the homosexual revolution, I am still in sync with that kind of sexual energy and militant style that really gives strength to more revolutionary movements. I continue to use pornography in my films precisely for this reason. But the specter of AIDS, that I fear has been used in some way—both literally and metaphorically—to kill the gay

revolution, still torments my films. Anonymous gay sex, for example, has always excited me, but from a certain point of view it could seem, looking at it from the outside, a zombie world. I have seen many “gay zombies” wander the parks and saunas at night, and I have become like that at times. There is always a dark side to every revolution. (2011a, Translation Julia Heim)

The metaphor of gay-zombie sex basically allows all the contradictory elements of the sexual, and thus even antisocial queer theories and Foucault’s thought, to be kept together; and at the same time it allows the imaginary to be freed from that obsession with anality that a certain psychoanalysis and a certain gay thought share with the most reactionary homophobia, without, however, releasing gay sex from the abjection that it assumes in a heteronormative context. Because if it is true that sex is the death drive that dissolves the subject, it is also true that it is an activity within which, to the contrary, the subject could prove his or her own consistency, creativity, and relational ability: first and foremost by demanding awareness of their own desires and tastes, and then by inventing new forms of pleasure (and pain) for themselves and for others, eventually “inventing new possibilities of pleasure with strange parts of their body—through the eroticization of the body” as Foucault writes about sadomasochism (1984c; Eng. trans. 1994: 165). LaBruce has also proven himself well aware of this when he declared: “Zombie porn is practical: you can create your own orifice” (2010: 3).

While Bersani and Edelman, in unidirectionally and dogmatically interpreting some fundamental psychoanalytic texts, remind us that the sexual is the tomb of subjectivity and relationality, the anarchic imagination of *L.A. Zombie*, which is irreverent toward any kind of truth about the sexual, reminds us that this tomb is also a cradle from which the renewed subject can be reborn, escaping from the forces that push for the subject’s narcissistic implosion, whether these forces come from drives or the imperatives of consumerism. Their encounter with *Zombie* returns his lost partners to the responsibility of their existence, to the search for a personal “law” that accounts for their antisocial needs in addition to their need for sociality.

The dialectic between solitude and relationality also dominates LaBruce’s previous film, which marks his entrance into the gay-zombie-hardcore genre. The film makes explicit the ideological perspective that orients his poetic and simultaneously allows one to look beyond this viewpoint.⁴⁸ While *L.A. Zombie* (2010) is a guerilla film, produced very quickly, and with modest means, *Otto; or, Up with Dead People* (2008) instead

enjoyed the benefits of greater financing, and consequently the film was conceived of, planned and filmed with relative ease. While in the former many scenes were improvised and the film almost totally lacks dialogue, the latter followed a detailed storyboard with words taking a leading role, often in the form of bulky political rhetoric that borders on didacticism.⁴⁹ In the first scene, in black and white, we see Otto, played by Jey Crisfar, just 18 at the time, come out of a tomb; immediately afterward we see him in color, he wanders through a bright field of yellow flowers, reaches a German state highway, feeds off the carcass of a hare that has been hit by a car, and then hitchhikes.⁵⁰ It will be revealed later in the film that Otto is afflicted by mental disorders. He left, perhaps fled, a psychiatric clinic, but does not remember it: Instead he believes that he is a zombie, and following the smell of human flesh he heads where the scent is most intense. He tries to get to Berlin (the city where the wall fell in 1989). When he reaches his destination, his scruffy appearance and the musky stench emanating from his body makes him an easy target for insults and harassment: In one sequence some children throw rocks at him, in another he escapes from a band of lowlives. He is then picked up by a synthetic drug-loving skinhead (in the credits the actors only appears with the pseudonym “Mo”) in front of the club *Flesh*, where a zombie-themed costume party is taking place—the boy, to dissuade Otto from entering the club and to invite him to his house, describes the party by saying “It’s dead.” The young clubber ends up partially gutted, his bedroom stained with blood like a slaughterhouse, but he doesn’t mind any of it (“That was amazing. Can I see you again sometime?”).

After this experience, Otto decides to abandon the dangerous and disturbing street life. To try to make some money, he answers an ad⁵¹ and does an audition with Medea Yarn (Katharina Klewinghaus), a feminist, anticapitalist lesbian director who—with the “immoral support” of her girlfriend Hella Bent (Susanne Sachsse) and the physical help of her cinematographer brother Adolf (Guido Sommer)—has been perpetually filming “the politico-porno-zombie movie” *Up with Dead People*,⁵² in which a band of conscious gay zombies,⁵³ led by actor Fritz Fritze (Marcel Schlutt), who plays the “gay Che Guevara of the undead,” plot a revolt against the packs of zombie exterminators.⁵⁴ Medea is so enthused by Otto’s mental discomfort that, instead of casting him as an extra in *Up with Dead People*, she decides to shoot a film with him as the lead and sole actor (we find out later that the initial black and white scene in which Otto emerges from a tomb, is the first scene in Medea’s film). Considering him so valuable, but

intuiting that he may be untrustworthy, Medea puts Otto in the care of Fritz who, despite fearing for his safety, agrees to watch out for and host him throughout the filming.

A certain anxiety, however, distracts Otto from his new job: Slowly memories of his past life surface, until he finds the phone number of his ex Rudolf (artist and singer Gio Black Peter) in his wallet and calls him and asks to meet. The two of them meet on the bench where they had met three years before, while Otto was reading Nikolai Gogol's *Dead Souls*, a book that he then lent to Rudolf who now returns it ("I didn't get a chance to read it. Little too depressing for me"). With great superficiality, without (wanting to) realize his stupefied, amnesiac state, Rudolf reminds Otto that he left him right when Otto was beginning to feel bad, right before his admittance to the clinic for eating disorders, depression, schizophrenia and "disorders of the soul," and he justifies himself with these words:

RUDOLF: Look, I know it was wrong of me to dump you like that, but I'm just no good in those types of situations. When you told me you were sick, I didn't know what else to do. I figured you'd be better off without me.

OTTO: Better off without you.

RUDOLF: Come on, Otto. Don't make me feel worse than I already do. I've never been good with sick people. You seem to be doing okay now, though, right? I mean, you look good. I like the new Goth thing. It suits you. Although you might want to think about taking a bath every once in a while. You're a little gamey. You smell like a dead mouse. No offense. Anyway, I really have to get going. It was nice seeing you again.

OTTO: Nice seeing you again.

After this conversation, in a sequence whose dramatic tone is heightened by the warm and hypnotic voice of Anohni Hegarty of *Antony and the Johnsons* as she sings *The Atrocities*,⁵⁵ Otto wanders through the streets of Berlin hugging his book, with more of a lostness about him than ever. Again he meets a band of thugs, but he does not escape from them this time. He lets himself get beaten up without putting up a fight, until they leave him bloody on the asphalt. He goes back to Fritz who greets him with affection and care. They make love with sweetness, but the next morning he wakes up alone. Otto—who, as a zombie, never sleeps—sneaks out of the bed to go film the last scene of Medea's movie: we see him, in black and white, dose himself with gasoline and set fire to himself, though he actually sets fire to a mannequin dressed in his clothing. We then see him

in the last scene of LaBruce's film, hitchhiking on a state highway—just like in the beginning, but this time he is leaving Berlin and headed north.

Even more so than *L.A. Zombie, Otto; or Up with Dead People* lends itself to a multilayered reading. In *Dead and Live Life: Zombies, Queers, and Online Society* (2011: 184–186), keeping the theoretics of Edelman's *No Future* and Bersani's *Intimacies* in mind, Shaka McGlotten interprets the film as a metaphor for the virtual intimacy of gay men on chat lines and their dependence not only on sex but on the Internet. In the essay, which takes an ethnographic approach, the author reports that many of the young gay men he contacted via chat have said they feel “dead” and that the predominant feeling in chat rooms is boredom, accompanied by hints of foolishness and uselessness. In McGlotten's opinion, Otto, who has the appearance of a “chemically zoned out hipster,”⁵⁶ represents “queer emptiness,” and LaBruce's intention is to enact a “polyvalent critique” of “boredom and the boring”:

The new gay is boring, already zombified and getting deadier.

LaBruce's generational critique of new metropolitan gay communities seems to me, in reality, to have a much farther-reaching range. Otto can easily represent a young man in an existential crisis—the director himself defines him as “a very sensitive, vulnerable and authentic gay teenager.”⁵⁷ Coming from a small town he is attracted to the gay life of a big city like Berlin, but it ends up deluding and hurting him. He is caught up in the whirlwind of gay nightlife pleasure, in wild, drugged sex (represented by the skinhead clubber), he is deluded by a love that turns out to be superficial (Rudolf), and not even the comfort of a group of alternative youngsters (Medea & Co.) is able to keep him in the city. A narrative element that should not be overlooked is that through the course of his experiences in the city, this sensitive young gay discovers that he is *ill*, and that his illness in the story functions as a reagent that reveals the pathologies of the world around him. Medea's first film, in fact, contains a double condemnation: not only of the homophobia within heteronormative civilization, but also of the serophobia⁵⁸ and the homonormativity of the gay community. In *Up with Dead People*, their viral nature and the stigma of their illness differentiate the gay zombies from the living gays. Rudolf more than any other character, in his inability to take care of Otto's unease, the candor with which he admits to having never “been good with sick people,” and in his utter disinterest for the great works of literature, becomes a symbol of

the emptiness of the new generations of metropolitan gays. Following the introduction of HAART (highly active antiretroviral therapy), fortunately AIDS, while remaining a deadly syndrome, lost its primal identification with immediate death in the imaginary of advanced countries. This misled the mainstream gay community—certainly not the bareback one—which was busy affirming its own respectability and working to claim marital and parental rights, into thinking that it could definitively sever the association between AIDS and male homosexuality. In the late eighties and early nineties it was nearly impossible for a HIV-negative gay man not to feel an instinctive solidarity for those like him who had contracted the infection and would soon die from it; today, instead, associations working to fight AIDS and create solidarity with HIV-positive people have trouble finding volunteers, and gay associations no longer consider prevention campaigns a priority. The dramatic consequence is an increase in HIV infection among gay metropolitan populations.⁵⁹ Thanks to advances in medicine, HIV-positive gays, who once carried clear marks of the relentless virus on their bodies, today have acquired a sacrosanct right to anonymity, but this brings with it a sentence of invisibility and an alienating isolation. In post-repressive, post-patriarchal societies where the uninhibited gay nightlife represents none other than the obscene double of the acquisition of gay respectability in Oedipal civilization, the HIV-positive people do not find support for their unease within the gay community, just as Otto does not find it in Rudolf, and only a few queer activists and theorists prefer to stay on their side instead of pursuing their own social affirmation.

This interpretation, however, does not exhaust the richness of the film. Otto's illness has, in fact, a multifunctional character. We must not forget that, while it can legitimately be considered an AIDS metaphor—as the evolution of the theme in *L.A. Zombie* shows—there is a clear literal interpretation of this mental illness produced by the film. In two different scenes, Herbert Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* (1964) appears: The zombie Maximilian reads it as he has breakfast with his partner Fritz, who is also a zombie,⁶⁰ and Hella reads it during her birthday party picnic in the cemetery—a paradoxical scene that Edelman would enjoy, in which the repetition that most symbolizes “futurism” is neutralized by the awareness of mortality.⁶¹ As if that wasn't enough, Medea makes no mystery of the anti-psychiatric ideology of Marcusian-Freudomarxist inspiration that motivates the film she is making about Otto:

In an industrialized society which has reached a point of abundance that is characterized by the production of “unproductive goods”—tech gadgets, excess waste, planned obsolescence, luxury items, excessive military build-up, etc.—a certain repression over and above the one necessary to advance culture is forced on its citizens in order to exert a particular notion of “normalcy” that is more aligned with conformist social and institutional attitudes rather than ideas of individual fulfillment. The redundant, unnecessary work upon which advanced capitalism is predicated, characterized by a deadening or stupefying effect—a kind of zombie state when performed by the working or middle class subject, or, in the case of the white collar workers, by a moral indifference and callous aggressiveness—results in a distraction from their own personal and sexual needs. A person who functions normally in a sick society is himself sick, while it is only the “nonadjusted” individual who can achieve a healthy acting out against the overly strict restraints and demands of the dominant culture. The idea of a “common sense” notion of “reality” or “sanity” under such a noxious system is absurd. Considering that all dominant discourses are defined and controlled by the ruling class, the first step to becoming a revolutionary is to act out against any consensual reality. Clearly, as a homeless person who believed he was dead, Otto was conducting his own, one-man revolution against reality.

Medea’s film about Otto is a critique of consumerist society, represented by its alienating, repressive and anti-ecological aspects: One scene, which Edelman would also appreciate, is filmed in a supermarket (as Otto steals and gnaws on raw meat, a little girl (Laura Berger), interferes with the scene and Medea shoves her⁶²), one scene in a slaughterhouse where a team of workers debones an enormous quantity of chicken, and one scene in a garbage dump.⁶³ After all, LaBruce (2011a) has never made a mystery of the fact that he considers himself an anticapitalist and “Marxist sympathizer.” He furthermore declared that even *his* film about Otto, like Medea’s, is inspired by Marcusean theory, which states that “the individual who functions healthily as a citizen of a sick society is sick himself,” and that the young “great” director must be considered his mouthpiece. The ironic tone of LaBruce’s interview, of his cinematic works in general, and of *Otto; or Up with Dead People* in particular, nevertheless legitimizes a reading that forces the filmmaker’s declared Freudomarxism to take a markedly queer direction.

There are, in fact, other markers of the distance that LaBruce takes from his “mouthpiece.” First and foremost, the narrative device of the film within the film creates various levels of reality and multiplies the possible

points of view, fragmenting the identity of the director (does Medea's point of view really coincide with LaBruce's? And is it the same in the two movies that she films within LaBruce's film?). Secondly, the young director's very identity hides an alias: In the scene of the macabre picnic, while Hella reads Marcuse, Medea leafs through a book with the evocative title, *Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti*. It is an ethnographic piece, considered a classic in Haitian voodoo studies, published in 1953 by Vanguard Press. Its author, who is of Russian origin, is called Eleanora Derenkowskaia (1917–1961), but assumed the nom de plume “Maya Deren,” which is an anagram of “Medea Yarn.” Like Medea, Maya was a versatile intellectual, an author but also a dancer, choreographer, photographer and avant-garde director: *Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti* is also the title of her documentary film—in black and white, just like Medea's works—about dance and possession in voodoo rituals, filmed in Haiti between 1947 and 1954, as always with the help of her camerawomen whose last name was Heyman, and first name was... Hella. McGlotten suggests that Maya Deren can be considered the symbol of intellectual and boring cinema, without however emphasizing how this would make the cohesion between LaBruce and the contents of Medea's films ambiguous. It also seems meaningful that Eleanora Derenkowskaia was born in Ukraine to Jewish parents the year of the Russian Revolution; that five years later fleeing the anti-Semitic pogroms they moved to the United States, where they abbreviated their last name to distance themselves from their origins; that once she became an adult Eleanora, chose a name that means illusion in Sanskrit (the veil of Maya, that has been evoked more than once in these pages) and became a radical socialist, even if her experimental style, heavily imbued with psychoanalysis and often surreal, would have been labeled “degenerate bourgeois art” in her homeland. LaBruce's name choice for his alter ego is essentially a symbol that is rich with ambiguity and offers the public a variety of interpretations. It is not chance then if at a certain point in the film, in a game of Chinese boxes, Fritz plays the role of narrator for Medea and recounts his meeting with Otto in these words:

Otto intrigued me from the very beginning. I considered his particular form of mental illness a healthy response to a materialistic world that had become soulless and deadening. I knew immediately that Otto was, for this reason, the perfect subject for Medea. He was the hollow man, the empty signifier upon which she could project her political agenda.

Thus, like the zombie and like the queer, for LaBruce, Otto occupies the position of the empty or floating signifier. And like “Medea,” his name reveals his narrative function. Its palindromic nature allows us to read it from left to right or right to left, looking at the future along with the past. It thus evokes a very particular temporality. Unlike what happens for Medea, in this case it isn’t the name “Otto” that carries out the function of floating signifier, it is Otto himself, in (foul-smelling) flesh and bones: in a subjective sense he is a signifier, a signifier entrusted with the responsibility of renegotiating his signified with the context, in an ever-open and never definitive process. For too long, as Foucault and Butler teach us, queer existences have been categorized by others, but this does not stop them—after rebelling against the psycho-police that defined them, and after crossing the desert of the absence of meaning to which they were condemned by the capitalist discourse’s imperative of *jouissance*—from taking up speech in order to construct new narratives of themselves: as Italian trans men and women did when they united at Castiglione degli Ubertini in May of 2008, not to hide the “stubborn” nature of their drives (de Lauretis 2010), but to joyously celebrate it by singing together beneath the moon. If, as Lacan teaches (1978a), the symbolic order and the drive coincide, it is because the sexual is the psychic and bodily area where the social and the singular meet, what can most dispossess the subject and that which characterizes him as unique.⁶⁴ Queer is thus that event that bursts into the Oedipal temporality in which the future is already written in the past and present, giving the subject back the responsibility of himself or herself even in the multiple determinations to which he or she is... subject. And, still, queer is the subject that straddles this event, that upsets its molds, that challenges the principle of non-contradiction, affirming itself as “an excrescence of logic” to use Butler’s words in *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997: 17). Queer, for example, is the opening here and now of the apocalyptic zombie temporality, in which death and life, *Thanatos* and *Eros*, are mysteriously kept together.

After becoming aware, through the violence of the thugs and Rudolf’s careless words, of the irreducible negativity that he embodies, Otto could give himself up to solitude and despair by setting fire to himself as his alter ego does in Medea’s film. Or he could try to neutralize his negativity by coupling himself with Fritz, who, unlike Rudolf seems willing to accept him for what he is, but who perhaps—not unlike the skinhead of the casual encounter—is attracted to him because of the transgression he represents. The queer, however, refuses to stabilize itself within a meaning (in this

sense, Edelman's thought is not queer enough), and resumes its trip, its floating. Otto prefers not to run the risk that Miles does in *Gay Zombie*. Once the shooting of the last scene is done, the following conversation occurs between him and Medea:

Medea: Now that the movie is finished, what will you do?

Otto: I'm not sure. All I know is, I can't un-live in the city anymore.

Medea: Why not?

Otto: Because the living have no respect for the dead.

Medea: So you still think that you're dead?

Otto: I am dead. I mean, I don't think I'm dead. I'm dead.

We then see Otto again, just as in the beginning, along the highway. Thumb raised. A rainbow behind him. We hear his last words conclude the film:

I really didn't know what my destination was, but something told me to head north. The cold doesn't bother me. In fact, I find it comforting. It preserves my flesh. Maybe I'd find more of my kind up there, and learn to enjoy their company. Maybe I'd discover a whole new way of death. Most of the chances were against it, but not, I thought quite all. At one point I did consider ending it all, like at the end of Medea's movie. But how do you kill yourself if you're already dead?

The finale does not exclude a communal solution that starts with the creation of new ways of life à la Foucault, but doesn't coincide with a call for only the positive nature of pleasure either. Paradoxically, it is the cohesion of one's negativity, the reaffirmed awareness of being dead, of occupying the position of the death drive within the social, that saves Otto from suicide. Like Lacan in *Seminar XX*, Otto seems aware that sexual jouissance does not need to coincide with deadly jouissance, nor with obedience to the injunctions of the capitalist discourse (injunctions to the jouissance of the thing, which is another name for deadly jouissance).⁶⁵ The last word has not yet been said about jouissance, and it is thus possible here and now for us to enjoy ourselves for who we are, subjects that are continually renewed by the dissolution of drives which opens up the possibility for unplanned encounters. Perhaps the rainbow alludes to this cheerful awareness. Perhaps if Andrea, the 15-year-old from Rome who was made fun of by his classmates for wearing pink pants, had shared it, he wouldn't have felt so overwhelmed by their insults; perhaps he wouldn't have given those around him the right to judge his right to exist. Perhaps

on the 22nd of November 2012, he wouldn't have hung himself.⁶⁶ And if Marco, the 16-year-old in Rome, had shared it, perhaps he wouldn't have defenestrated himself.⁶⁷

The conscious gay zombie reemerges from the society of jouissance and from the apnea of the drive by himself, capable of tolerating the marginalization and even of enjoying it, yet not resigned to a desperate isolation. After the slender Crisfar, it will be the hypertrophic Sagat to impersonate the messianic queer that translates himself into experimental casual encounters.⁶⁸ And if a porn star can sit on Christ's throne, if it is possible to use the porno industry to attempt to revolutionize the sexual-political imaginary of the gays, then it is also possible to continue making queer theory after Edelman likened the queer to the imperative of jouissance and the death drive, and after the consumerist society turned queer into a marketing product.

After the close of SeriesQ in the United States, new book series have been created,⁶⁹ even in Italy, which trails Europe in terms of rights for sexual minorities, where the recent blossoming of queer initiatives seems to attest that there is a certain desire for "resurrection." It is not, after all, about a cultural colonization, if anything it is an interesting return that is full of potential: around the mid-seventies, thanks to Bersani's invitation, Foucault's philosophy made its way from the old continent to the French Literature Department of California universities, beginning, among other things, that passionate debate about the foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge in Cultural Studies, which I briefly summarized earlier. In a rebound move, antisocial queer theories have crossed into Europe, and in France and Italy as well, mainly by Anglo-American Literature and Film professors, awakening interest in the subject among scholars of psychoanalysis, to then find a place within the philosophical debate from which they originally arose. Thus far, this study has sketched out a brief survey of these theories and attempted to respond to them on their terms through the examination a body of "popular" genre films in an effort to follow Halberstam's directions. Now it will abandon psychoanalytic metapsychology and turn to the instruments of political philosophy.

NOTES

1. "What I find crucial here is that the shattering of the civilized ego betokens not the end of sociality but rather its inception. This point has been missed by many of Bersani's readers too. The movement of coming together only

to be plunged into an experience of the nonrelational represents but the first step in Bersani's account of relationality. The second, correlative step is to trace new forms of sociability, new ways of being together, that are not grounded in imaginary identity or the struggle for intersubjective recognition" (Dean 2006: 827).

2. A belonging that Edelman (2006: 822) criticizes: "Affirming, however, as a positive good 'punk pugilism' and its gestural repertoire, Halberstam strikes the *pose* of negativity while evacuating its force ... For violence, shock, assassination, and rage aren't negative or radical in themselves; most often they perform the fundamentalist faith that always inspirits the Futurch: the affirmative attachment to 'sense, mastery, and meaning,' in Halberstam's words. *No Future*, by contrast, approaches negativity as society's constitutive antagonism."
3. The reference is particularly to the essays that were collected in Halberstam 2011 and 2012, but also to Halberstam's previous works from 1998 and 2005.
4. "[T]he antirelational in queer studies was the gay white man's last stand" (Muñoz 2006: 825).
5. The term "splatter cinema" was coined by director George Romero in reference to his film *Dawn of the Dead* (1978). The zombie filmography is uncontrollable; there are, however, optimal guides, each of which promises to be the most "complete" or "the latest": Dendle 2001; Russell 2005; Kay 2008.
6. Just think of the etymology of the word "lycanthrope," of the myth of Lycaon and the depictions of the god Anubis.
7. Seabrook himself narrates that in Paris, before visiting Haiti and after a trip to Africa, he was able to procure a piece of meat from a healthy human who had recently died in an accident. Motivated by curiosity, he cooked and ate it, declaring that human flesh has a taste similar to that of veal (Seabrook 1930).
8. In recent times, following the changes of the labor market, there is no lack of people who have made zombies the symbol of the exploitation of the cognitariat (cognitive-proletariat) in cultural production: Bang Larsen 2010.
9. Zombie studies have already produced a vast literature. Among the more recent, see, at least: Moreman and Rushton 2011a, 2011b; Boluk and Lenz 2011; Smith? 2011.
10. In addition to Jacques Tourneur's classic *I Walked with a Zombie*, 1943, other examples are *Voodoo Island* by Reginald Le Borg, 1957; *I Eat Your Skin* by Del Tenney, 1964; *The Plague of the Zombies* by John Gilling, 1966.
11. For example in: *Revenge of the Zombies* by Steve Sekely, 1943; *The Frozen Dead* by Herbert J. Leder, 1966.
12. For example in *Creature with the Atom Brain* by Edward L. Cahn, 1955.

13. For example in: *Quatermass 2* by Val Guest, 1957; *Invisible Invaders* by Edward L. Cahn, 1959; *Plan 9 from Outer Space* by Edward D. Wood Jr., 1959; *The Earth Dies Screaming* by Terence Fisher, 1965.
14. The similarities stop here: ghouls in fact, like hyenas, whose shape they often take, feed mostly off the flesh of the dead (rarely defenseless children), and are not dead themselves.
15. Like what happened in previous films. One oddity: in 1936, to impersonate the living dead in *The Walking Dead*, Michael Curtis wanted Boris Karloff, who, in 1931, had played *Frankenstein* for James Whale (and in 1932 had played a mummy in the homonymous film by Karl Freund).
16. *The Night of the Living Dead* by Tom Savini (1990) and *The Night of the Living Dead 3D* by Jeff Broadstreet (2006), respectively.
17. Within this vast production, naturally there is no lack of Hitchcockian references: *Killing Birds* is one example, also known as *Zombi 5*, filmed by Italian director Claudio Lattanzi in 1987, in which the theme of zombies is mixed with that of killer birds.
18. Dario Argento never engages personally in the genre, but convinces his brother, producer Claudio Argento, to co-finance Romero's *Dawn of the Dead* (in exchange for distribution rights for languages other than English), which was screened in Italy with the title *Zombi*, after undergoing a few edits. It is a great success, and a source of inspiration for directors like Lucio Fulci (whose *Zombi 2* from 1979 is worth remembering, as it returns to Haitian origins of the zombies, together with *Paura nella città dei morti viventi* [*Fear in the City of the Living Dead*] from 1980), Umberto Lenzi, Bruno Mattei and Claudio Fragasso, Joe D'Amato aka Aristide Massaccesi (Slater 2001).
19. Like Danny Boyle's *28 Days Later* (2002), *Dawn of the Dead* (2004) by Zack Snyder, *Zombieland* by Roben Fleisher (2009), *Warm Bodies* by Jonathan Levine (2013), Marc Forster's *World War Z*, starred in and produced by Brad Pitt (2013).
20. The theme becomes very popular in heavy metal culture (just think of Eddie, the zombie that appears on numerous Iron Maiden LP covers, among which the cover of *Live After Death* (1985) in which we see him rising from a tomb) and even the American alternative metal band *White Zombie*, which was active from 1985 to 1998. After the group's separation, lead singer Rob Zombie, aka Robert Bartleh Cummings, has a solo career and directs of two horror films: *House of 1000 Corpses* (2003) and *The Devil's Rejects* (2005). The dark wave musician (and dark cabaret artist and professor at the School of Visual Arts in New York) Voltaire, aka Aurelio Voltaire Hernandez, takes inspiration from the living dead in singles like *BRAINS!* (2003), *Day of the Dead*, *Cannibal Buffet* and *Zombie Prostitute* (2006).

21. 1984, directed by John Landis. It is the first music video in the current sense, equipped with a narrative and choreography.
22. 2011, directed by Nick Knight, is a very complex video. In one of the scenes Lady Gaga appears with Rick Genest, the Canadian artist and model known as Zombie boy. Her makeup mirrors the tattoos he has all over his body; she is made to look like a decomposing cadaver—with the addition of an unwieldy pink horse's tail.
23. Zack Snyder will film the remake in 2004. The third, filmed in 1985, is entitled *Day of the Dead* (*Day of the Dead* is also the title of a 2008 film by Steve Miner, inspired by the environments and situations of Romero's film, who, however, uses it as a background for a different plot, cf. *infra*). But Romero is not able to give up his creatures and will return to them 20 years later with *Land of the Dead* (2005), *Diary of the Dead* (2007) and *Survival of the Dead* (2009).
24. To be more precise, the zombies that philosophers of the mind, starting with two articles by Robert Kirk (1974a, b, see also 2005), brood over are the hypothetical beings that are by all accounts similar to humans and endowed with their same cognitive system but devoid of "phenomenal consciousness": thus they would respond to a stimulus (for example, a hand's contact with a red-hot iron) the same way humans do (by pulling back the hand), but without feeling it and without any awareness of what had happened. The so-called zombie argument is used in polemics with the hypothesis of physicalism (a philosophical branch according to which every mental activity is explainable starting with neurobiological cognitive processes), by those who maintain, to the contrary, that consciousness is not a simple epiphenomenon of the cognitive system, but something that is added to it: demonstrating that beings can exist that possess our same cognitive system but are devoid of consciousness, is equivalent, in fact, to excluding the possibility that consciousness comes from the cognitive system. The argument has been laid out more systematically by David Chalmers (1996), but is also present in the works of Thomas Nagel, Daniel Dennett, Kyla M. Flanagan and many others. No one has been able, to be honest, to definitively demonstrate that zombies could exist; what the entire debate seems to prove, instead, is that today neurobiology and the cognitive sciences are quite far from being able to explain the complexity of human consciousness, but are able to give an account only of a few simple functions of the zombie mind.
25. Created by director Frank Darabont and produced starting in 2010, the television series is reaching its third season as I write this, and is inspired by the homonymous comic series written by Robert Kirkman and illustrated by Tony Moore and Charlie Adlard.

26. The interpretation of *Dawn of the Dead* as a critique of consumerist society has become canonical by now. Already present in Hardy 1984, today it can be found in all the zombie filmography guides and encyclopedias (Dendle 2001; Russell 2005; Kay 2008).
27. Paul W.S. Anderson's *Resident Evil* (2002) is another example, inspired by Capcom's homonymous serial video game for Playstation, that has had four sequels (inspired in turn by the sequels to the video games): *Resident Evil: Apocalypse* by Alexander Witt (2004), *Resident Evil: Extinction* by Russell Mulcahy (2007), *Resident Evil: Afterlife* by Paul W.S. Anderson (2010) and *Resident Evil: Retribution* by Paul W.S. Anderson (2012).
28. The film changes the zombies in another way: the infection, in fact, instead of slowing their reflexes and movements, enhances them. The idea of super-fast infectious cannibals was already present in *Nightmare City* (1980) by Umberto Lenzi, in which the virus was caused by a nuclear accident, but the fact remains that this characteristic will be particularly successful only after Boyle: it will return, for example, in the remake of *Dawn of the Dead* directed by Zack Snyder in 2004 and naturally in the sequel to *28 Days Later*, *28 Weeks Later* directed by Juan Carlos Frensadillo in 2007.
29. In 1985, the same year *Day of the Dead* was released, *The Return of the Living Dead* was also distributed, and the director, Dan O'Bannon, was one of Romero's collaborators at the time of *Night of the Living Dead*. O'Bannon's film, aimed at a teenage market, chooses an ironic and light register, and to make the film even more attractive to audiences, contains a woman's striptease. Here, the zombies are even able to talk: they mostly shout out "Braaaaaaiins!" as they attack the preferred organs of their victims, but they also use the radio of an ambulance to call others, so as to procure fresh nurses in order to eat them, and converse with the young punk protagonists to explain to them that only the brains of the living can alleviate the pain of the dead.
30. Even the lesser-known *Deadheads* by Brett Pierce and Drew T. Pierce (2011) develops a romantic plot, but in this case the atypical zombie protagonist, Mike (Michael McKiddy)—who not only maintained his consciousness, but has no appetite for human flesh—does not make new conquests, but goes in search of his lost love.
31. Remember that, according to the now classic anthropological theory developed by Ernesto de Martino (1958), collective mourning rituals serve the cultural function of preventing an excessive attachment toward the dead that could produce the antisocial effect of subtracting the individual from the life of the collective.
32. Both the living and the zombie protagonists are also gay in the film *At Twilight Come the Flesh-Eaters* by Vidkid Timo (a pseudonym of Timothy

Paul Ritchie, 1998), *Zombies* by Alex Dove (2003) and *Creatures from the Pink Lagoon* by Chris Diani (2007), but the three films, the first being pornographic, the second a thriller and the third a comedy, do not develop the theme of the conscious zombie (as an aside: *Zombies* in fact takes up the “Haitian” theme of the zombie controlled by an evil magician, and the protagonist Christian, aka Jonathan Williams, is torn between the duty to obey, which he cannot resist, and remorse for the homicides—the homicides—that he is forced to commit). What is very interesting, however, is the use of this figure in the BBC television series *In the Flesh*, written by Dominic Mitchell and directed by Jonny Campbell (which has broadcast two seasons—2013 and 2014). The protagonist is the gay teen Kieren Walker (Luke Newberry), who died of a suicide, came back as a zombie, and “reinserted” himself into the family: In the series, in fact, “partial death syndrome” can in part be cured with the help of a pharmaceutical just as HAART allows HIV-positive people to live a “normal” life. There are many amateur productions about gay zombies that can be found by doing a quick YouTube search (Fürst 2012). A separate chapter is designated for the relationships between lesbians and zombies. A lesbian character, Tomboy (Athena Karkanis), is present in Romero’s *Survival of the Dead* (2010), and lesbian sex scenes are present in Mario Siciliano’s *Orgasmo esotico* [*Exotic Orgasm*] (1982), but above all it is literature that has developed the theme in romantic and softcore plots. There is even a series of *eBooks* from the publisher Noble Romance entitled *Lesbian vs. Zombie*.

33. Miles is killed right as he tries to kiss Todd for the first time, and Todd’s initial reaction is to accuse the psychotherapist of being a monster. But she quickly reminds him: “There was no future there. You’re ready to move on now.” He thinks for a moment and responds: “You’re right. Thank you.” She responds: “No, thank you.” After which, caressing Todd’s chin, the psychotherapist uncovers her arm exposing a rotting lesion, and thus—she, the representative of the principles of reality and homonormativity—reveals her true zombie self.
34. The article was reworked in both German and English translations: Grilli 2012a, b.
35. The syncretism of pornography and horror is not new, Claude Pierson’s pioneering film *La fille à la fourrure* (1977, in which aliens possess the bodies of newly dead young women to have human sexual experiences) was a start, and *gornography* and *zombie-hardcore* can be considered real subgenres. Already in 1980 the Italian filmmaker Joe D’Amato—a pseudonym of Aristide Massaccesi, the director of the first Italian porn movie, *Sesso nero* [*Black Sex*] (1978), and the cult horror film *Antropophagus* (1980, in which even a fetus gets devoured)—makes *Le notti erotiche dei*

morti viventi [*The Erotic Nights of the Living Dead*] and *Porno Holocaust*, both set on the island of Hispaniola: in the first film, the actor Mark Shanon is bitten up by a kind of sorceress zombie leader (Laura Gesmer), in the second the zombies rape and eventually kill several women. Another Italian director, Mario Siciliano, inserts lesbian sex scenes in his *Orgasmo esotico* (1982), in which once again it is a sorceress who transforms the unlucky protagonists into porno-zombies. Other non-Italian examples of zombie-hardcore are *La revanche des mortes vivantes* [*Revenge of the Living Dead Girls*] by Pierre B. Reinhard (1987), the previously mentioned gay film *At Twilight Come the Flesh-Eaters* by Vidkid Timo (1998), that pokes fun at *Night of the Living Dead*, and *La Cage Aux Zombies* by Kelly Hughes (1995), a zombie-trans and gender-bending parody of Jean Poirer's theatrical production *La cage aux folles* (that Edoard Molinaro drew from in his 1978 comedy *Il vizierto*). There are many softcore productions that associate the figure of the zombie with the prostitute or the stripper, from *Night of the Living Babes* by Jon Valentine (1987) and *Gore Whore* by Hugh Gallager (1994), to *Planet Terror* (2007) by Robert Rodriguez, *Zombie Strippers!* by Jay Lee (2008) and *Zombies! Zombies! Zombies!* (2008) by Jason M. Murphy. "The link between pornography and horror isn't as odd as it might at first seem. Both genres deal in the forbidden and the fleshy and both are 'body genres' that try to produce a physical reaction in their audiences (pleasurable arousal and/or pleasurable fear). What's more, both genres also deal with extreme images of the body, the kind of images that are usually kept hidden behind the locked doors of the bedroom or the morgue" (Russell 2005: 135; see also Jones 2011).

36. In reality, there are two versions, a hardcore one and a softcore one, but even the first is post-pornographic if by "post-pornographic" you mean the use of hard scenes for ends other than the mere sexual excitement of the spectator, in particular with the aim of experimenting with creative subversions of the erotic imaginary. In the director's notes for *L.A. Zombie*, LaBruce (2010: 3), who furthermore is the author of an autobiography which is symptomatically entitled *The Reluctant Pornographer* (1997), declares: "Against all professional advice, I've been making porn movies ever since, albeit reluctantly (I'm not a particularly avid consumer of porn, and I don't follow the industry; not unpretentiously, I consider myself not so much a pornographer as an artist who works in porn)."
37. The term "significant flottant" was first used by Claude Levi-Strauss in his *Introduction à l'oeuvre de Marcel Mauss* [*Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss*] (1950) to qualify the Polynesian term "mana" that vaguely references the realm of magic but lacks a precise referent and a shared meaning, and is thus at times redefined by its use. From anthropological lexicon "floating signifier" then entered into the realm of semiotics along with its

- synonym “empty signifier” to indicate words that in virtue of their vagueness makes symbolic thought possible because of their innate ambiguities and contradictions.
38. As evidenced on the one hand by queer theory and on the other by a fast production of cinematic and literary works on zombies in which the horror register blends with the parodistic or grotesque.
 39. See paragraph 2.1 *Homos/Thanatos*, *supra*: in *Epistemology of the Closet* (1990, 2008²) Kosofsky Sedgwick shows how since the late 1800s, in medical and psychological knowledge and cultural representations, the concept of homosexuality was marked by a threefold contradiction (essentialism vs. constructivism, particularism vs. universalism, inversion vs. separatism) which, it seems to me, no theoretical position, not even Bersani’s or Edelman’s, has been able to rectify.
 40. In addition to *Dawn of the Dead* and *Gay Zombie* (cf. note 33, *supra*), the reference to the future is also present in many other zombie films. For example in *28 Days Later*, the leader of the military troops that live barricaded in a villa—Major Henry West played by Christopher Eccleston—promises that he will bring them some women, “because women mean a future,” and snidely remarks that comrade turned zombie is “futureless” as he keeps him chained up in a courtyard so that he may find out how long the living dead can survive without eating. In *Zombie Strippers*, when Jeannie the stripper (Shamron Moore) decides to become infected by the zombies who are closed in the basement of the club where she works, she responds to the question “Aren’t you afraid of looking like that in the future?” with another meaningful question: “What future?” Finally, in *Zombieland*, the most that Columbus, the young protagonist (Jesse Eisenberg) learns from the catastrophe is to “enjoy little things” and it isn’t hard to translate that into “enjoy *now*, don’t worry about what will happen later.”
 41. And not only: he also had a small part in Kevin Greutert’s horror film *Saw VI* (2009) and the role of protagonist, alongside Chiara Mastroianni, in *Homme au bain* [*Man at Bath*] (2010) by Christophe Honoré.
 42. As you can read in the previously cited director’s notes for *L.A. Zombie* (LaBruce 2010: 3): “After studying fashion for two years in Paris and working briefly as, what he called a ‘slave assistant’ in various fashion houses, Sagat left the profession. He felt that he had not been given the opportunities he deserved, and has claimed that it actually cost him money to work in the fashion industry, since he was often not paid for his work. Around age twenty-one, Sagat looked into working in the adult film industry. He did photographic work for several French companies, but felt he was poorly treated and put his career in front of the camera on hold. At the age of twenty-five, he was contacted by a French pornographic studio

called Citebeur while chatting on a gay chat line. He accepted the offer and, a few weeks later, performed in his first movie. It became an instant success, and Sagat decided to seek a fulltime job in the porn industry. Six months later, he was invited to move to the USA and, there, shot his first scene in a porn movie.” In 2011, Sagat was also a director and producer as well as an actor for Titan Media: the film is entitled *François Sagat’s Incubus* and was distributed in two parts, in December 2011 and in March 2012. In May 2013, at 33 years of age, he published a 16-second video on YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ujyb2rxiYfE), filmed in Magic Kingdom, in front of Sleeping Beauty’s castle, in which he announces his decision to give up red-light films to launch a line of T-shirts and perhaps underwear. While he never made declarations in this regard, his choice has been connected to the heart attack and death (probably caused by steroid abuse) of Erik Rhodes, who acted alongside him in *L.A. Zombie*, and to the chain of suicides in the last few years that include other gay pornography stars: Roman Ragazzi, Wilfried Knight and Arpad Miklos.

43. “It’s about a zombie alien, a kind of chameleon that dresses like a homeless person and takes on a variety of forms. Furthermore he brings the dead back to life instead of transforming them into zombies, and that makes him a sort of Messianic figure. He could also be interpreted as a ‘Martian on Earth’, a creature who came to our planet to observe the behavior of humans and to try to help them. His observations operate as a critique of our culture” (LaBruce 2011a, translation Julia Heim; see also 2008; and Brinkema 2006 on LaBruce’s previous work).
44. The scene has its predecessors. In some of the advertisements of Fulci’s film *Zombi 2* (1979), there is a photo of an obese zombie that emerges from the water in front of Manhattan, though there is no trace of this image in the film. Most likely it was a shot that depicted the actor Captain Haggerty as he returned to shore: he had just filmed the scene in which his zombie character is shot down by a spray of gunfire and falls into the ocean. The film was supposed to contain a scene in which a herd of zombies comes out of the water, but this was cut as well. A very similar sequence appears, instead, in Romero’s *Land of the Dead*, where, to surprise-attack the survivors of Pittsburgh, the zombies, led by Big Daddy, cross a river by walking along its bottom and reemerge on the other shore—from which we can deduce that the zombies do not need to breathe.
45. “The black sperm that is ejaculated from the zombie’s alien penis ‘infects’ the dead people that come in contact with it, bringing them, for all intents and purposes, back to life. It is a reverse metaphor for AIDS, with the monster who gives life instead of death through gay sex” (LaBruce 2011a, Translation Julia Heim).

46. LaBruce (2011b) has explained that the idea of a gay-zombie-alien that brings the dead back to life by having sex with them derived both from personal intuition and was the product of a re-elaboration of preexistent horror themes. Listing his references, he paid particular homage to the Italian director Mario Bava: “I had a kind of dreamlike vision of a creature that emerged from the ocean around Los Angeles and had a sort of connection with dead bodies that had just been found [...]. I had begun to think of a film by Kiyoshi Kurosawa called *Cure*. I had seen it when it came out in 1997 and I wanted to conjure it. I remembered the scenes in which people in trances murdered and this reminded me of somnambulism and death. Plus, shortly before I had seen the film by the Canadian director Daniel Petrie called *Resurrection* [1980], with Ellen Burstyn, that tells the story of a woman who is able to heal people after they have had terrible car accidents. This gave me the idea for the zombie that fucked dead people in order to bring them back to life. Then, finally, I rewatched the sci-fi horror film *Planet of the Vampires* [1965] by Mario Bava, which left me practically dead with fear when I was young. The creatures in that film are a kind of alien species capable of colonizing other people’s bodies whether they are dead or alive. The production design was fantastic. This is the same film that the creators of *Alien* borrowed a lot from in terms of their production design” [Translation Julia Heim].
47. That sex can provide an occasion for “anchoring oneself” through the encounter with the other has been confirmed by specialists as well. Referring to Herry Sullivan (1962) and Jose Bleger (1967), Italian psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Cristina Faccincani (2010: 52) has shown, for example, the “perspective importance” that “sexual acts” can have for subjects affected by psychoses, maintaining that they can represent attempts to “control the confusion and the psychotic fragmentation” (Translation Julia Heim).
48. In addition to having done these two films, LaBruce also developed this theme in photography and the plastic arts. The show *Hardcore Zombie Project* began with a performance by François Sagat and Tony Ward (model and Madonna’s “boy toy” briefly) on May 23, 2009, at the Peres Projects Gallery of Los Angeles. The director (2010: 3) declared that his previous production in a certain sense already touched on the gay-zombie-hardcore genre: “After making three sexually explicit feature films (NSOMA, Super 8½, and Hustler White), in 1999 I wrote and directed my first ‘legitimate’ porno film, *Skin Flick*, made under the auspices of the German porn company Cazzo Films. The subjects were neo-Nazi skinheads, characters that, one could argue, have a certain zombie-like quality. The hardcore version, released under the title *Skin Gang*, was a full-on pornographic product, shot in a relatively conventional porn style, and packaged and promoted

with an adult entertainment industry audience in mind. [...] My following film, *The Raspberry Reich* (2004), about a gang of extreme left wing would-be-terrorists—another zombie-esque bunch—was conceived as a porn product [...] (The hardcore version, entitled *The Revolution Is My Boyfriend*, was released by the porn company Wurstfilm.) In 2008 I finally stopped pussyfooting around the living dead theme and made an actual zombie flick called *Otto; or, Up with Dead People*.” LaBruce’s latest film deals with the connection between sex and death from a different perspective: it’s entitled *Gerontophilia* (2013) and is about a young man’s attraction to old people, and in particular to an old man at the nursing home where he works.

49. “*Otto* had a storyboard, *L.A. Zombie* was filmed like a guerilla movie. *Otto* had a screenplay filled with dialogue, *L.A. Zombie* was filmed based on three pages about the theme and without dialogue. *Otto* has strong lesbians among its characters, *L.A. Zombie* doesn’t have any female characters. [...] *Otto* had a consistently larger budget, and because of this I could work on its aesthetic with accurately arranged scenes and a precise lighting plan. *L.A. Zombie* had a micro-budget and was filmed in a guerilla-style with a lot of documentary sensibility. The two filming experiences couldn’t have been more different” (LaBruce 2011a, Translation Julia Heim).
50. The theme of feeding develops through the film. Though he feels the desire, Otto is not able to eat human flesh and feeds off small animals that he finds already dead or that he kills (aside from the run-over hare, a pigeon, raw chicken meat he steals from the supermarket, and a cat that purrs at him): there is only one scene in which he bites a gay skinhead. It will come out later that Otto was a vegetarian, his father is a butcher, and eating disorders are among the reasons for which he was hospitalized.
51. The ad reads: “Calling all zombies. Open call. Low budget zombie film. Call Medea Yarn 69555555.”
52. Before filming a gay-zombie orgy, which is the last scene of her film, Medea turns to the actors and utters these words: “All right, boys. Listen up. I’ve gathered you here to participate in something historical. Today we film the final scene of *Up with Dead People*, the politico-porno-zombie movie that I’ve been working on for too many years to count owing to the fact that no one would give me the funding. My brother Adolf, whose dedication to the project has been unwavering, will be behind the camera, as usual, and my long-suffering girlfriend, Hella Bent, is here to provide immoral support.”
53. LaBruce naturally has an excellent mastery of the cinematic evolution of zombies and the multiple meanings they have assumed, and he explicitly presents his zombies as the product of these continual mutations. The film that Medea shoots about Otto, in fact, opens with the narrative voice of the director reciting the words that are the epigraph of this chapter.

54. Medea sums up the plot of the film with these words: "Fritz, our anti-hero, returns home after a long day of forced labour in the fashion mines, ever vigilant of the marauding gangs of youth who hunt down and annihilate anyone they suspect of being undead or homosexual, having become indifferent to the distinction between the two. Entering his apartment, Fritz finds his longtime companion, Maximilian, dead of a self-inflicted gunshot wound on the kitchen floor. He could no longer live in an environment of persecution and paranoia, a topsy-turvy world in which the living, deadened by an increasingly materialistic, corporatized world, exterminate the undead, who have become more humane and sensitive than their living counterparts. The bullet to his brain, however, does not prove enough to prevent Maximilian from being reanimated. After recruiting his lover, Fritz, into the homosexual army of the undead by making sweet zombie love to him, the necromantic duo begins to plan an uprising against living civilization. While writing graffiti to spread the word, they are interrupted by a gang of thugs brandishing baseball bats. Maximilian is shot in the head again and, this time, permanently exterminated. FRITZ escapes and, inspired by the martyrdom of Maximilian, begins his rise to infamy as the guerrilla leader of the homosexual zombies, the gay Che Guevara of the undead. In the beginning he recruits his followers one by one, luring homosexuals into dark alleys and fucking them into immortality. Soon he has recruited enough members to form a gang of his own, a small army of gay zombies who recruit members by fucking, killing, and partially devouring vigorous young men, not necessarily in that order. In the final scene, FRITZ has gathered together his insurgent sissies from beyond the grave, his macabre Mujahideen, to prepare them for their last stand against the overwhelming forces of the deadened living. He has brought them together for a final orgy of the dead."
55. The song lyrics are a condemnation of civilization: God visits the "lost souls" and cries for the atrocities committed by the human race throughout history.
56. Throughout the film, Otto wears a white shirt with a black tie, a light v-neck sweater with black-and-white horizontal stripes, a black hooded sweatshirt and tight black jeans. The edges of his clothing are all dirty and frayed.
57. "Jey Crisfar, who played *Otto*, was not a professional actor, he was a student I found on the Internet. I wanted to entrust the part to someone who was very similar to the character he had to play—a very sensitive, vulnerable and authentic gay teenager" (LaBruce 2011a, Translation Julia Heim).
58. This term refers not to the fear of HIV but the discrimination against HIV-positive people, and in particular against HIV-positive gay people. There is a blatant association between the zombie epidemic and AIDS in *Up with*

Dead People. In the first scene Fritz, who is still human, worriedly checks his appearance in a window and then swallows a large dose of pills, which makes one think of him as a young gay man who needs to take tranquilizers to deal with the mounting social homophobia, as a young gay man with AIDS, or as a young gay man with AIDS who also needs to take tranquilizers to deal with mounting social homophobia and serophobia. Later on, Medea's narrative voice says: "In a superstitious age, many believed that the return of the dead signified a punishment of mankind by God. A theological explanation such as this gained even more popularity when it became apparent that the latest cycle of zombies was homosexual. A gay plague had descended on humanity."

59. To give a European example, see the *Bulletin de Santé* published by the Observatoire régional de santé Île-de-France in December 2012: "The Prevagay inquiry data conducted by the InVS in Paris in 2009 in gay conviviality locations allow for the estimation of the incidence of HIV in the men who frequent them at 3800 every 100,000, which is double what can be observed on average among men in the region that have homo-bisexual relations. [...] The epidemic is only modestly shrinking in the last few years (see the Bulletin de Santé 2011). Among men who have homo-bisexual relations, it even seems to be growing" (1). Remember that Île-de-France is the region of Paris, a city where, in January 2013, lesbians and gays celebrated the approval of gay marriage with much enthusiasm (Translation Julia Heim).
60. Cf. note 54, *supra*.
61. LaBruce's intention is clear, as evidenced by Medea's joke: "I love birthdays. Each year they bring you closer to death."
62. Medea indignantly addresses her with these words: "Get out of here, you little brat. You're ruining my shot." LaBruce, however, is well aware of the difference between the Child-fetish of futurist rhetoric and flesh and blood children and young people and shows them respect. In fact, though *Otto*, like *L.A. Zombie*, contains sexually explicit scenes (in *Up with Dead People*, for the first time in LaBruce's work, a zombie, Maximilian, penetrates a wound—the one caused by his biting Fritz's stomach), Crisfar never appears entirely nude. During the filming LaBruce, in fact, gave the young actor the choice of being the protagonist of the "hard" sequences, and in the end he wasn't up for it.
63. "Garbage, garbage everywhere. Garbage as far as the eye can see. Garbage piled to the heavens and buried to the depths of hell. Garbage cluttering the environment and demeaning nature. Spent nuclear fuel rods containing radioactive isotopes with half-lives of a thousand years or more seeping into the earth. Plastics with irreversibly linked molecules effortlessly achieving the kind of immortality that men can only dream of. Garbage dumps are the great mass graveyards of advanced capitalism, repositories of all the

unrestrained consuming and unnecessary waste of a soulless, materialist world. Did you know that Waste Management, Inc., the largest rubbish handling corporation on the planet, has a landfill site—a glorified garbage dump—just outside of Morrisville, Pennsylvania, that covers 6000 acres of land? Did you know that on average one American consumes as much energy as 370 Ethiopians, and that Americans throw out 200,000 tons of edible food every day? That the United States produces approximately 220 million tons of garbage each year, enough to bury more than 82,000 football fields six feet deep in compacted garbage? And although I can't think of a better use for football fields, we must be aware that it's the gluttonous, mindless consumers of the developed industrial countries who are burying the third world in an avalanche of putrescence and decay [...] my dead darling, this is your kingdom! This is the earth that you and your kind will inherit. Some day all this will be yours!"

64. With a different vocabulary and different nuanced meaning, Grilli (2009: 178) also stresses the paradoxical foundations of identity with these words: "The zombie becomes, by virtue of its structurally contradictory nature, the most appropriate signifier for this pluralistic and open identity, an identity capable of adopting the other as an integral part of the self."
65. In Lacan the concept of "jouissance" has many meanings, which evolve through the course of his teaching, and which are systematized and clarified in Recalcati 2012b: 495 et seqq. In *Seminar XX* (1975), Lacan distinguishes first and foremost between sexual jouissance that implies the other though not in terms of "relationship," and deadly jouissance, that cancels the subject within the thing. He then distinguishes between the jouissance of being, inaccessible to the human, phallic jouissance (male sex), jouissance of the other (psychotic or paranoic) and other jouissance (female sexual jouissance).
66. It is not at all important to establish whether Andrea was gay or not: he was a victim of homophobia all the same. As are his relatives, not only because they lost him so tragically, but because in the face of such unbearable grief, their first reaction was to deny the talk of his homosexuality, as if wanting to ease their memory by freeing him from such dishonorable accusations. Like Andrea, Otto too is recognized as queer by homophobic thugs regardless of whether he is aware of being queer or not. Suffering from amnesia, not remembering his failed love story with Rudolf, initially Otto just feels like a zombie, an unreal character who exists only in films like Medea's. As much zombie, as homosexual, Otto is thus both real and unreal, defined by an instinctiveness over which he has no control and by a meaning that others attribute to him. At the beginning of the film the spectators are inspired to ask themselves: "is he a zombie or a human?" just as often it is asked of people "but is he gay or straight?" A good question would instead be: but in what way is "gay" something that you are?

67. Luckily the boy survived, though he suffered fractures in his lower limbs. Before throwing himself out the school window, Marco (a made-up name chosen by the newspapers) left a goodbye message on his Facebook wall in which he declared his homosexuality, he affectionately bids farewell to his mother and saves very harsh words not only for his classmates, but for his father as well.
68. Medea explicitly references Jesus Christ, when she provocatively asks Fritz, a participant in Otto's partial memory recovery: "What are you trying to do? Resurrect him? Lazarus was the first one and Jesus Christ the second. Are you planning to complete the Holy Zombie Trinity?"
69. Edelman himself, along with Lauren Berlant, edits the series "Theory Q" for Duke University Press.

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Apocalypse Here and Now

*Oh God, I could be bounded in a nutshell
and count myself a king of infinite space,
were it not that I have bad dreams.
(William Shakespeare, Hamlet)*

The apocalyptic references included in the zombie filmography, and the messianic and Christological references present in LaBruce's latest films, simultaneously evoke an "end of times" and a new beginning, a fracture in the present that is not a projection of the future but a busting of subjectivity into modernity. Thus they invite a turning toward the past, so as to retrace the origin of those cultural apparatuses that curb the imaginary and render the thought of this temporality exceptional. There are many possible paths that can be taken, but the one that I would particularly like to focus on leads to an investigation into the political ontology upon which the Oedipal "futurist" ideology is founded, the ideology that constitutes the polemic objective of antisocial queer theories. Edelman, as well as Bersani and de Lauretis, contrasts the subject of the drive with a not-well-delineated liberal subject who is devoted to the attainment of social recognition, usefulness and pleasure. Despite the fact that in the United States the adjective "liberal" has an undertone of meaning that distinguishes it from the Italian "liberale,"¹ it is undeniable that the subject against whom the three thinkers

Translation by Julia Heim

argue is none other than the current and politically correct version of the *modern individual* who is at once a citizen and a subject of the modern state (and of that which is left of it in the postmodern world of globalization). Suspending judgment about what the reality of the human is, I will attempt now to explore that theoretical smithy of the political modern imaginary in which both the individual and the state are shaped: the thought that Thomas Hobbes developed in *Elements of Law Natural and Politic* (1640),² in *De cive* (1642) and above all in *Leviathan* (1651). I will investigate the temporality in which Hobbes positions individuals, and the one which, instead, he renders inaccessible to them. Finally, I will show how within the temporality of the state, beneath or above it, the opening of another temporal dimension has always been possible. To this end, moving continually in reverse on this journey, I will invite readers to glance at two traditions of thought that historically precede the break enacted by Western modernity in Christianity, but that linger in it like specters: the Hebrew and the classic Greek. After the zombie, before it, we will meet other monstrous figures of the end of times, and other metaphors of the bestiality of the human.

5.1 HOBBS'S BIOPOLITICAL CRYSTAL

Leviathan and Behemoth, for starters: two terrible biblical animals. The first is a sea creature that in medieval iconography was represented either as a giant crocodile or as an enormous serpent, like a dragon or a whale³; the second is a terrestrial creature portrayed as a bull, a hippopotamus or an elephant of colossal proportions.⁴ Hobbes makes Leviathan the symbol of the state's sovereignty, because in the book of Job, he is described as the most powerful being on the earth,⁵ while the less glorious task of representing civil war is reserved for the weaker Behemoth.⁶ In fact, it is before the Leviathan and not the Behemoth that God humiliates Job. Initially, he sarcastically asks him if, alone, he would ever be capable of catching him "with a fish-hook or run a line round his tongue?" (Job, 41: 25). And shortly thereafter, to show the immeasurable power of the sea monster compared to human beings—even if they all united together with all their might—he asks provokingly if "the fishing guild" would ever know how to capture him, cut him up and sell his meat (Job 40: 30). The message is clear: Leviathan's excessive strength is at once a sign of the omnipotence of his creator and of the fragility of humans in comparison. No one, in fact, on this earth can compete with the sea monster, because only the power of God is greater than his.

According to the prophecy in the book of Isaiah, the Lord will face his terrible creature only on the day of the apocalypse:

That day Yahweh will punish with his hard sword, massive and strong, Leviathan the fleeing serpent, Leviathan the twisting serpent: he will kill the sea-dragon. (Isaiah, 27: 1)

The medieval cabalistic tradition has provided many interpretations of these verses, which, the German national-socialist jurist Carl Schmitt (Galli 1996, 2008), boasting of his anti-Semitism, recounts in the 1938 essay *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes*.

According to such Jewish-cabbalistic interpretations, the leviathan represents “the cattle upon a thousand hills” (Psalms 50: 10), namely, the heathens. World history appears as a battle among heathens. The Leviathan, symbolizing sea powers, fighting the Behemoth, representing land powers. The latter tries to tear the Leviathan apart with his horns, while the Leviathan covers the Behemoth’s mouth and nostrils with his fins and kills him in that way. This is, incidentally, a fine depiction of the mastery of a country by a blockade. But the Jews stand by and watch how the people of the world kill one another. This mutual “ritual slaughter and massacre” is for them lawful and “kosher,” and they therefore eat the flesh of the slaughtered peoples and are sustained by it. In other such teachings God plays for a few hours daily with Leviathan. Still others say that to save the world from the fierceness of this beast God has cut up the male Leviathan and salted the flesh of the female Leviathan in order to provide a feast for the righteous in paradise. (Eng. trans. 2008: 8–9)

For that matter, calling for the king to profess that “Jesus is the Christ” and to impose the cult of Christianity on his subjects, Hobbes de facto negates the right of citizenship to the Hebrew people: the agreement that founds the state in his contractualist doctrine erases the messianic waiting time and thus the religious hope in a new phase of the history of humanity.⁷ The aim of the second and third parts of *Leviathan*, dedicated to *The Christian Commonwealth* and *The Kingdom of Darkness*, is, in fact, to affirm that the story of salvation is done, because Jesus, the son of God, is the Savior announced by the Hebrew prophets.⁸ The time of the state is thus *eschatological time*, the perennial present in which the only “hope” granted to the subjects is that they obtain “by their industry” “such things as are necessary for commodious living” and they earn, through faith in

Christ and unconditional obedience to the sovereign, the privilege of eternity (Hobbes 1994, XIII: 78).

In the imaginary that accompanies the birth of the modern state, therefore, the search for usefulness and holiness understood as personal salvation are not in contradiction: they are, instead, two faces of the same coin, the coin of individualism. As Bersani rightly notes in *Intimacies* (2008: 67–68),⁹ there is no space for an ego who craves dissolution instead of preservation, and thus for those personifications of the drive that are the living dead, whose return from the netherworld would strongly question the role of Jesus in human history. The fact that the syncretism between African magic and Catholicism known as voodoo constitutes a form of symbolic resistance by Creole culture to the Christianity of the colonizing powers is, after all, a noteworthy thing. Romero also reminds us of this in *Dawn of the Dead* when he makes Peter repeat the words of his grandfather who was a voodoo priest in Trinidad: “When there is no more room in hell, the dead will walk the earth”—implying that the return of the dead to life is, for him, a symbol of the subversion of an unjust world order. It was LaBruce, however, who exponentially raised the stakes of this challenge; his zombies launch an attack on the heart of modern political theory by explicitly advancing the messianic claims, and practicing the miracle of resurrection. Hobbes, as if with some foresight of this, attempted to immunize the organism that is the state-Leviathan from this virus of the imaginary: in all his texts, he never tires of repeating his polemic against the belief in the existence of spirits, ghosts and messengers from the netherworld, and above all against the instrumental use that religious authorities make of these “superstitions” in order “to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men.” For example, in Chap. II of *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1994, II: 10–11), dedicated precisely to *Imagination*, Hobbes attributes the vision of “spirits and dead men’s ghosts walking in churchyards” to dreams or illusions caused by fear or “the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they would not be known to haunt.”

Hobbes’s political philosophy has, after all, a double, contradictory foundation: it relies not only on an unscrupulous reading of the Scriptures, but also on a rigidly mechanist metaphysics, which, with the excuse of guarding against superstitions, he uses to ban the use of creativity and imagination in politics. For him, as for many of his European philosopher contemporaries, everything that exists must be explained using only the

principles of matter and movement, and thus the imagination is nothing but the lingering in the body of external impressions received by the senses.¹⁰ In his opinion, even God is corporeal, and the soul is none other than the principle of living movement and therefore life itself is mortal in the individual. In Chap. XXXVIII, he maintains that human beings lost their immortality after Adam and Eve were banished, and only those who believed in the Son of God will regain it. Though not immediately, however, for the miracle of the resurrection of bodies, which came about when Jesus died on the cross (Matthew 27: 52), will only repeat itself at the end of time. In Chap. XLI, Hobbes (1994: 327) reaffirms that Christ freed humanity from sin with his sacrifice, initially with his preaching and later through the mediation of his ministers (also and above all those ministers who are the Christian sovereigns) he converted “such as God hath elected to salvation” and only “after his coming again shall begin that his glorious reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.” On the day of judgment, the blessed—and only the blessed—will rise in spirit and body, and to celebrate, at least according to one of the medieval Hebrew readings that deeply struck Schmitt, the Leviathan will be butchered by God himself and offered to these blessed ones as a meal. For Hobbes, a hell in which the dead could return to walk the earth doesn’t exist, nor does purgatory: they are nothing but superstitions that churches and sects use to persuade believers to rebel against the authority of the state. Instead, as the end of history, the apocalypse lies outside of history; like the messianic wait, it does not belong to the state’s time. Consequently, the subjects of a Christian sovereign would do well to obey, and not get distracted by fanatic preachers and liars or abandon themselves to the subversive fantasies of different forms of life.

Long before Romero and LaBruce’s sacrilegious cinema, the predecessor *mutatis mutandis* of Edelman’s attempt to limit the political imagination failed. In spite of the Bible and the cabalistic tradition, and even more so, in spite of Hobbes’s theological materialism, human beings, not God, have begun the hunting season on *Leviathan* since its publication in 1651,¹¹ and they immediately employed that ancient art of butchery, known as philosophical criticism, on its flesh.¹² In particular, since the state revealed all of its thanatopolitical potential in the 1900s, in many places and many directions, different thinkers have tried to open up the horizon of hope that Hobbes had aimed to close within such narrow confines and thus to comply once more to the time of historical transformation. In the course “*Society Must be Defended*” at the Collège de France in 1976, even

Foucault presents his philosophical activity as a challenge to Hobbesian theory, which he describes as a “cycle” that goes from the individual as a natural bearer of rights to the individual who, ceding such rights, subordinates himself to the will of the sovereign that represents him (Foucault 1997; Eng. trans. 2003: 28). And he contrasts such a theory with his constructivist research agenda, aimed at showing that, to the contrary, the individual is a product of the combined action of different modalities of power.¹³ To sketch them out, Foucault coins some innovative concepts that many authors, not just queer theorists, have drawn from in order to thematize forms of subjectivity and actions that escape the imaginary of sovereignty.¹⁴ In his lexicon, the term “discipline” points to those powers that, through education and training, act on individual human beings to turn them into docile bodies.¹⁵ “Biopolitics,” instead, is the name of those control procedures and of the management of the vital processes that transform the human species from a disorganized multitude into a governable population.¹⁶ In *The Will to Knowledge*, the “sexuality apparatus” is a connecting element between the microphysical rule over individual behaviors and the macrophysical rule of the population. In his opinion, this apparatus produces—as I have recalled in the first chapter of this book—both the confession of the Catholic Church and Freudomarxism. The identity of that particular individual who is the homosexual is none other than one of the multitude of consequences of such an apparatus.¹⁷

According to Foucault’s analyses, within the actual functioning of the power of the state, the philosophical–juridical logic of the right-representation-obedience cycle, which characterizes the sovereignty, there lies another form of political rationality, that exerts itself, not through the application of juridical norms, but through the imposition of normalizing criteria supplied by the human sciences—by psychiatry for example, but also by psychoanalysis when used in an epistemic way.¹⁸ This rationality, which Foucault calls “governmentality,” requires adhesion to the “world of things”: “scientific” knowledge of human nature, knowledge of its biological needs and psychic functionings, of the medical techniques and economic laws that allow for development and prosperity, of the territory in which that segment of humanity that is the population of a state lives, and of the dangers that threaten it.¹⁹ While the theory of sovereignty formally legitimizes the political order that coincides with the compliance of the people to the will of the sovereign, in the materiality of political practice, this will proves to be dependent on the fulfillment of the biological well-being of the human race. Foucault’s critique of Hobbes carries

out a strategic role in the elaboration of these theses: for him, the concept of biopolitics should in fact account for those organizing methods of the modern political power that the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty, the matrix of modern political thought, would have concealed. However, it must be noted that Foucault's interpretation of *Leviathan* in *Discipline and Punish*, "*Society Must be Defended*" and *The Will to Knowledge* is rather reductive: in fact, he attributes to Hobbes the same repressive conception of power that in his opinion would characterize Freudomarxism, describing the action of the Hobbesian sovereign toward his subjects as if it were limited solely to the functions of "collection" (statute labor, the collection of taxes and tolls, military service), of "prohibition" (sanctioned by laws, expressions of the will of the sovereign) and of "violence" (penalties for transgressing the laws, whose most extreme form consists in the elimination of the human life). In considering the Hobbesian anthropological theory, the obligations of the sovereign listed in Chap. XXX of *Leviathan* and the interpretation that Schmitt gave of them, it is possible, to the contrary, to observe that the productive functions of the state power that Foucault will concentrate his attention on were already thematized in Hobbes's text, even if only *in nuce*.²⁰

It is necessary, first and foremost, to remember that even Hobbes's theory of the sovereign—like the political philosophy of Foucault and the majority of political philosophies—has a *pars destruens*. Hobbes develops his individualist anthropology in polemic against the Aristotelian theory that was taught in English universities in the 1600s. For Aristotle, "man" by nature is "more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animal"²¹: he is born into a heterosexual family already characterized by relations of power and subordination (of the son to the parents, the wife to the husband, the slaves to the master), and his family together with other families combine to form villages and cities. To the contrary, Hobbes (1994, Dedicatory Letter: 1) thinks of the political subject as an isolated man,²² who is, by nature, a "wolf" for other men, and only by artificially instituting the irresistible power of the sovereign can he learn to live in peace with others like him²³ and become a "god" for them.²⁴ Long before the subject of Freud's psychoanalysis is born, the Hobbesian individual is thus split between contrasting principles: a whole set of antisocial passions (acquisitive passions, geared toward the possession of things, and the passions of the ego, aimed at the desire to triumph over others; Pulcini 2001; Marcucci 2010) would lead him to make war with all those like him if social, compassionate and rational rules did not prevail over him. As I have

already noted, in the Hobbesian theory of passions, there is no death drive: self-preservation is, instead, the irresistible force that, more than any other, pushes the individual to follow reason in order to exit the state of nature and construct the civil state. Nevertheless, Hobbes already foresaw a constitutive *discontent of civilization*: to stipulate the social pact means that each individual cedes the right to all that he enjoyed in the state of nature to the sovereign, and thus renounces a considerable part of his liberty.

As Leo Strauss illustrated quite well (1932, 1968), in Hobbesian anthropology the passion that most determines human choices is the fear of violent death. After all, the fearful Hobbes—who wrote in his autobiography that he was born prematurely to a mother who was frightened by the arrival of the Spanish Armada: “my mother gave birth to twins: myself and fear”²⁵—had the poor luck of living in a turbulent era, and all of his political works can be understood as an attempt to rhetorically neutralize the religious wars: the Thirty Years’ War that devastated Europe, and the civil war that stained his beloved England with blood. Drawing from the bestiary of political philosophy, by his own admission, Hobbes understood his role as philosopher to be that of a “goose of the Capitol”: he reacted to the religious wars, seen as imminent threats to the unity of power, by putting together an array of concepts the state could use to rationally justify its authority based on evidence about human nature and on the Scriptures, doing without other interpreters of religious revelation.²⁶ This use of Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty was highlighted by Schmitt more than any other. In a note (number 53) added in 1963 to his famous essay *Der Begriff des Politischen* [*The Concept of the Political*] (1927, 1932²), he represented the theory by drawing a curious crystal (Fig. 5.1):




Fig. 5.1 The Hobbes’s crystal, by Carl Schmitt

The “closure” at the base of the crystal represents the part of human nature that is always equal to itself. The need for life (the fear of death) leads the individual to agree both to his unconditional obedience to the sovereign, and to make the sovereign’s will the only positive source of justice. Once the social contract is stipulated, within the state, only “laws are the rules of just and unjust, nothing being reputed unjust that is not contrary to some law” (Hobbes 1994, XXVI: 173)²⁷. This does not exclude, however, that it is the *duty* of the sovereign to consider the expressed truths of which, by virtue of the social pact, he is the sole interpreter. In this sense, the superior part of Hobbes’s crystal is “open to transcendence”: it is the sovereign’s decision, and not the truth, that determines the law which is the criterion of justice, and however, the decision of the sovereign must be an interpretation of the truth, of divine justice. In 1936, the Jewish political philosopher Strauss (1963:75) spoke of Hobbes as an “unbeliever” who “for political reasons hid his true opinions.” In this note, to the contrary, the Catholic Schmitt presents Hobbes as an authentic Christian²⁸ and notes that in his theory, the transcendent order onto which the sovereignty opens is comprised of faith in Christ (common to Catholics and Protestants of every denomination) because Hobbes lived during the religious wars of the 1600s. While the structure remained unchanged, sovereignty would occasionally open up to other truths that were necessary to the political community and required a last word before being imposed—among which those relating to human nature, to the definition of its well-being and its happiness, all of which are the objectives attributed today to the politics from neoliberal thought.²⁹

By performing my own personal butchery of *Leviathan*, in which I will use Schmitt against Schmitt and Foucault against Foucault, I will demonstrate that Hobbes only appears to close the political question of human nature at the base of the crystal. The caesura that his thought represents with respect to Aristotelianism, specifically with regard to the anthropological question, is not limited in fact to the affirmation of the lupine character of the human. In a passage from Chap. XVII of *De cive*, for example, Hobbes considers the human not only an object of study for political philosophy, but an object about which the political power may make decisions as well:

Furthermore, all these things, to build castles, houses, temples; to move, carry, take away mighty weights; to send securely over seas; to contrive engines, serving for all manner of uses; to be well acquainted with the face

of the whole world, the courses of the stars, the seasons of the year, the accounts of the times, and the nature of all things; to understand perfectly all natural and civil rights; and all manner of sciences, which, comprehended under the title of philosophy, are necessary partly to live, partly to live well; I saw, the understanding of these (because Christ hath not delivered it) is to be learnt from reasoning, that is to say by making necessary consequences, having first taken the beginning from experience. But men's reasonings are sometimes right, sometimes wrong, and consequently that which is concluded, and held for a truth, is sometimes truth, sometimes error. [...] It is needful therefore, as oft as any controversy ariseth in these matters contrary to public good, and common Peace, that there be some body to judge of the reasoning, that is to say, whether that which is inferred, be rightly inferred or not, that so the controversy may be ended. [...] But the decision of the question whether a man do reason rightly, belongs to the city. For example, if a woman bring forth a child of an unwonted shape, and the law forbid to kill a man, the question is, whether the child be a man. It is demanded therefore what a man is. No man doubts, but the city shall judge it, and that without taking an account of Aristotle's definition, that man is a rational creature. And these things, namely, *right*, *politic*, and *natural sciences*, and subjects concerning which Christ denies that it belongs to his office to give any precepts, or teach any thing, beside this only, that in all controversies about them, every single subject should obey the laws, and determinations of his city. Yet must we remember this, that the same Christ as God could not only have taught, but also commanded what he would. (1991: XVII, 345)

In being open to the transcendent truth that Jesus Christ is the son of God—the only one it is necessary to believe “for our entrance into the kingdom of heaven” (Hobbes 1651, XVIII; 1994, XLIII)—the sovereign power is called by God himself to establish the form that the cult of this truth must assume for his subjects. Christ chose to remain silent on other truths, trusting men with the task of these investigations. To govern well, the sovereign needs a knowledge of the nature of the world and of human nature, and it is up to the natural sciences and the human sciences, those areas of knowledge that Hobbes includes under the heading “philosophy,” to investigate them with reason. But when philosophical controversies emerge and turn into political controversies that are so intense they undermine the peace of the state, it is up to the sovereign, and only the sovereign, to resolve them. It is up to the sovereign, for example, to decide who is completely human and who is not. It is surely no small decision since it involves the ontology of the state. As Derrida recalls in his seminar

La bête et le souverain [*The Beast and the Sovereign*] (2008), Hobbes, in fact, excludes both God—whose alliance with the Jewish population was renewed once and for all and extended to the gentiles as well through the first coming of Christ, until he returns and the bodies of the blessed rise up—and the “brute beasts” from the possible parties of the founding pact of the political community.³⁰ In *De cive*, those excluded from the human assembly by the decision of the sovereign will be assimilated into the latter category, stripped of every judiciary guarantee and rendered killable. The unsettling example is that of the “child with an unwanted shape”: Hobbes asks the question “is it murder to kill a newborn with a disability”? Others after him have faced (and resolved through a sovereign judgment) different decisions as well. For example: “is it murder to kill an individual who belongs to an allegedly inferior race?” or an individual considered “abnormal,” like those who belong to sexual minorities³¹?

Still today, in seven countries,³² people who perform sexual acts that are “against nature” are considered guilty of a crime that reduces them to a bestial state that warrants capital punishment. In 78 others, those who break the norms of obligatory heterosexuality are punished with jail time, and in many others—Italy included—gays and lesbians are not considered worthy of enjoying the full rights reserved for other citizens. After all, in the modern state, those who are not considered truly human can be killed and it isn’t considered homicide, and it is the duty of the sovereign to decide which of his subjects should be considered fully human, which are enemies to the health of the people, and which are second-class citizens: Hobbes clearly implied this in *De cive*, long before Foucault’s reflections on the racism of the state that were later developed by Giorgio Agamben (1995) and Judith Butler (2004a, 2009).³³ Foucault made it explicit that, in exercising its disciplinary and biopolitical functions, the power of the state is not limited to making decisions about people with a simple yes or no (or a “*ni*”³⁴ given, for instance, to homosexual people in Italy), which in extreme cases means its right to “take life”: regulation and biopolitics “give life” to the population, they get the people’s lives in shape following the criteria of normalcy supplied by the human sciences (biomedical, economic and psychological), but about which the sovereign always has the last word.³⁵ One could create another figure to represent modern political power, namely, Hobbes’s biopolitical crystal: no longer a two-dimensional figure, but a three-dimensional system folded onto itself, in which the base—no longer closed, but broken by Foucault’s

corrosive critique—comes to coincide with the opening at the top. In a secularized landscape, the salvation of the political community (the faith in Jesus Christ) coincides with the health of the biological species, namely, in that cult of well-being that implicates the collaborative and competitive sociality of the market, and that expunges thus the asociality of the death drive from the human (which, however, reemerges under the guise of transgressive enjoyment). In modernity, it is thus the duty of the sovereign to fulfill the natural aims of the population he represents, but before this it is his duty to interpret such aims, to make decisions about them and shape individuals and the population in a way that will lead to the realization of these aims (Foucault 2004a; Eng. trans. 101). In Chap. VIII of *De cive*, Hobbes admits—showing great irony and a full mastery of his philosophic expression (205)—that the individual presented by him is a fiction produced when we “consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like Mushrooms, come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other.” Since in Chap. IX of *De cive*, Chap. XX of *Leviathan*, and Chap. IV of *De corpore politico*,³⁶ Hobbes shows that he is well aware of where human beings come from, defenseless children at the complete mercy of mothers, as Aristotle described them, and not independent adults, we may perceive an action plan in these words. It is not, in fact, the will of God, nor the laws of nature that cause the human to behave like a docile subject; the family must be made into an instrument and used to transform every newborn into a mushroom with wolf instincts—namely, into an individual that will be submissive to the authority of the sovereign—for the goodness of the state and the good functioning of the market economy. Regulating hope and fear, the two passions that propel the human into the future, is essential for carrying out this agenda. In Chap. VI of *Leviathan*, Hobbes defines these two passions as two complementary convictions (1994: 27–30), the first has to do with the development of an “appetite or desire” and the second is the creation of an “aversion.” Even queer subjects, just like any other, but also differently from any other, are involved in this project of *dressage*, which is both chronopolitical and biopolitical, and they are thus obligated to choose a position in the face of it. This task may be simplified, or perhaps complicated, by once again reflecting on Hobbes’s text using the instruments that have been sharpened by Foucault’s famous “toolbox.”



Fig. 5.2 Original frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651)

5.2 THE BUTCHERY OF *LEVIATHAN*

Before Schmitt, Hobbes produced a figural representation of his theory that today could be considered a classic with respect to the German jurist's cubist reinterpretation (Fig. 5.2):

Original frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651)

Image taken from *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth, ecclesiasticall and civill*. Originally published/produced in Andrew Crooke: London, 1651.

Source: British Library Flickr Commons <https://www.flickr.com/photos/britishlibrary/12458803675/in/photolist-YWCgV-idCXC9-iciQf4>

In the famous frontispiece that our author wanted for the first edition of his masterpiece (Malcolm 2004; Tralau 2007), the state-Leviathan does not appear as a flaming dragon or sea monster as tradition would have it, but like a great man whose body is made up of human beings that are all equals: of individuals. The meaning of the image is clear: for Hobbes, affirming that the sovereign state represents the people is equivalent to affirming that he *is* the people, because there is no people without a sovereign that bestows it with unity by representing its will. The state therefore does not govern *over* individuals; it is *made* of individuals, who are subjects in that they are governed, and citizens in that they are represented by the sovereign. In the frontispiece, this great man of men dominates over a fortified city, surrounded by fertile hills. He carries a sword in his right hand, which represents his right to make decisions on war and to punish those who break his laws. In his left hand, he holds the pastoral staff, the symbol of the connection between the religious and political communities, and of the submission of the Church to the state that, in the 1600s, our author hoped for so as to justify the risk of civil religious wars. Overlapping this classical representation of the sovereign with what I have called Hobbes's biopolitical crystal, the pastoral staff could, however, become the symbol of the sovereign's opening up to transcendence. Through the course of the secular history of the state, this opening coincided more and more with the sovereign's opening up to human nature—namely, to those biopolitical functions that Foucault points to with his notion of “pastoral power,” without, however, realizing they were already present in Hobbes's text, beginning with his frontispiece.

Foucault coins this concept in *The Will to Knowledge*, analyzing the central role that confession assumes in the sexuality apparatus, to bring

to light—as Max Weber and Carl Schmitt had done before him—that the modernization process maintained complex relationships with the Christian religion.³⁷ In particular, he maintains that the advent of capitalism and the secularization of the contents of moral life (from its salvation to security to well-being) coincided not with extinction, but with the extension of the form of power that was most characteristic of the Catholic Church. Through its administrative, police and charitable systems, the modern state, especially in its liberal version, governs the civil society as the pastor governs the community of believers: not viciously, with the instrument of terror, but benevolently, taking care of individuals one by one, hearing their confessions to better get to know them, educating them to obedience and at the same time promising them security and well-being, giving shape to their lives so they can freely realize their natural goals and guarantee the continuation of future generations. As I will now attempt to show, it is precisely the presence of these pastoral jobs within the functions of the sovereign that reveals how the biopolitical dimension is already contained in Hobbesian theory, woven into the theological–political dimension of a theory from the seventeenth century.

In virtue of the formulation of the fundamental pact—that is stipulated between individuals for but not by him—the Hobbesian sovereign has no duty toward his subjects, and nevertheless, in virtue of that opening toward transcendence that Schmitt drew attention to, he has duties toward God, because he will be judged by God just like every other human being. In Chap. IX of *De Corpore Politico*, and Chap. XIII of *De cive*, as well as in Chap. XXX of *Leviathan*, the objective of the political power is not just “security,” but “the “health” of the people as well, and this is understood not as mere survival, but as a pleasurable life “as much as their humane condition would afford,” including that “they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased from their own industry” (Hobbes 1991, XIII: 224, 226). The duty of the sovereign is thus to create the conditions for natural happiness as well as for the eternal life of each of his subjects. To this end, the first duty of the sovereign, as Schmitt rightfully stresses, is to firmly and completely maintain his powers by force (Hobbes, 1994: XVIII)—without which Behemoth would prevail over Leviathan and the state would dissolve into civil war.³⁸ But the majority of the other tasks of the sovereign are practiced not so much with force as with the pastoral, persuasive action, of a power-knowledge designed to shape the subjectivity of individuals. Such action requires a prior knowledge of the reality that the sovereign is called upon to govern, and thus the production of truth

relative to his subjects, to the territory and to the economic relationships on which what Hobbes symptomatically calls *nutrition* and *procreation of a commonwealth* depend.³⁹ As I have already illustrated with respect to Hobbes's disconcerting opinions about the problem of the "child with an unwonted shape," the authority of "appointing teachers and examining what doctrines are conformable or contrary to the defense, peace, and good of the people" (1994, XXX: 220)⁴⁰ is of central importance, as if Hobbes's polemics against Aristotle's *Politics* had, as a curious consequence, an implicit Platonism—on the level of those educative systems and eugenics that are notoriously present in Plato's *Republic*.

In Chap. XXX of *Leviathan*, Hobbes presents the laws that the sovereign must impart on his subjects by making an analogy with the Ten Commandments.⁴¹ After a risky comparison between the adoration that the believer owes to the singular God and the obedience that the subject owes the singular sovereign (first, second, third commandments⁴²), he takes the role of the watchperson of the Oedipal civilization and calls for teaching the subjects to honor their parents (fifth), and for avoiding the committing of wrongdoings (sixth, eighth, ninth), among which adultery merits special mention (seventh).⁴³ Hobbes reformulated the fourth commandment—that called for the Hebrews to celebrate "every seventh day a *Sabbath*, in which the law was read and expounded, and [...] they were put in mind that [...] God was their king, which redeemed them from their servile and painful labour in *Egypt*" (1994, XXX: 223)—in his regulation that the sovereign periodically organize civil ceremonies wherein his subjects "may assemble together and (after prayers and praises given to God, the sovereign of sovereigns) hear those their duties told them, and the positive laws, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh them laws." In addition to having as an ultimate aim "the *good of the people*" (229), and consequently not having to limit the behaviors of the subjects unless it is indeed necessary,⁴⁴ each law decreed by the sovereign must in fact also be "*perspicuous*" (229), that is to say easily comprehensible to all subjects, clear in formulation and in the "declaration of the causes and motives for which it was made" (229; cf. also Hobbes 1994, XXVI). For the *Leviathan*, it is not, in fact, sufficient that the population is informed of his will, which is law: he demands that each singular cell of his large body approves his will, that they be intimately convinced, that they know the truths that rationally justify it. With the aim of providing the proper education, in *Leviathan*, as was already the case in *De cive* and *De corpore politico*, a central role is performed by the universities, which were

then, as they are today, considered an instrument of the formation of the ruling class.⁴⁵ With false modesty, in Chap. XXX, Hobbes declares his only interest is that the “principles” he has set forth “come [...] into the sight of those that have power to make use of them” (221), but what clearly emerges from the polemic against university teaching in England during his time, which extended through the entirety of his work, is that the didactic programs that the sovereign must impose consist of both the secularized version of the ten commandments and of Hobbesian theory. This is so much the case that in the *Review and conclusion of Leviathan*, our author prudently affirms of his “discourse”: “I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities (in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth)” (496).

In some passages of Chap. XXX whose importance was underestimated by Foucault, the functions of the sovereign seem thus to extend from the suppression of the behaviors of the subjects to the production of their will, their desire and their sense of themselves. In fact, while in Chap. XIV, Hobbes maintains that the mere “force of words” are not enough “to compel performance” and it is thus necessary to have recourse to the fear of punishment (84), in Chap. XXX, he insists, instead, on the insufficiency of the mere threat of punishment to persuade subjects to obey.⁴⁶ It is necessary instead, that the sovereign accompany the use of the sword with the use of the pastoral staff, which in addition to eliciting fear, instills hope. In support of the possibility of teaching subjects about the need to submit themselves to the sovereign for their own well-being and salvation, and thus of limiting their behavior as well as their thoughts about the duty of obedience, Hobbes affirms that “the common people’s minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them” (221). To this end, among the list of laws that the sovereign must teach his subjects, Hobbes draws upon the tenth commandment that prohibits not only the taking of your neighbor’s things and wife, but even the *desire* to take them. It is thus the duty of the sovereign to teach his subjects that:

Not only the unjust facts, but the designs and intentions to do them (though by accident hindered) are injustice, which consisteth in the pravity of the will as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth commandment, and the sum of the second table, which is reduced to all this one commandment of mutual charity: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*,

as the sum of the first table is reduced to *the love of God*, whom they had then newly received as their king. (224–225)

In both *De cive* and *Leviathan*, pursuant to the drafting of the fundamental pact, the state is defined as a “one man” who can “use the strength and means of them all” so that he may act “as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence” (Hobbes 1994, XVII: 109); even in *De cive* (Hobbes 1991, V: 169), the “will” of the sovereign is presented as “one will of all men,” but only in *Leviathan* (1994, XVII: 109) does Hobbes maintain that it is the right and duty of the sovereign to “conform the wills of them all” so as to render them docile subjects who are capable of recognizing the will of the sovereign as their own, cooperate among themselves to promote “peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.” The main difference between the two texts is the theory of authorization or of representation, which Hobbes introduces in Chap. XVI of *Leviathan*; this theory makes it possible to imagine the state as a great man made up of men.⁴⁷ In *Elements of Law Natural and Politic* and *De cive*, individuals, in reality, limit themselves to laying down their own right to resist the forces of the sovereign⁴⁸ (unless there is a threat to their lives) when, through the pact between individuals, they relinquish their right to all they enjoyed in the state of nature. In *Leviathan*, instead, at the moment of the pact, the individuals *authorize* the sovereign to *represent them*,⁴⁹ and thus they commit themselves to recognizing as their own not only all the acts of the sovereign, but his will as well (unless these acts or this will threatens their lives). Hobbes (1994, XVII: 109) writes, in fact, that through this pact, the contracting individuals “submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to [the sovereign’s] judgment.”

In Hobbes’s biopolitical crystal, therefore, the top and the base come to coincide, as do the before and the after. The Messiah has already arrived, and in the wait for his definitive return, the temporality of the state remains suspended in the eternal, infinite eschatological present in which newborns substitute the dead in a circular movement during which now and always, from generation to generation, in each singular instant the subject voluntarily submits his will to the sovereign so that the sovereign can shape the will of the subject so that the subject can voluntarily submit his will to the sovereign... Caught in this cycle clearly elaborated upon by Foucault, the will of the individual gets microphysically trained so that the individual discovers the “truth” of his “self” and recognizes himself to be that competitive, passionate and rational individual endowed with a

desiring and vulnerable body that not only needs a social life, but the sovereign power to insure his security, his gains, his well-being, his pleasure and his salvation. Already in *Leviathan*, in fact, the *logic* of sovereignty is only one aspect of the epistemic-political apparatus of the state, which also contains a nonjuridic governmental *technology*, which of sovereignty is the conceptual opposite, the assumed but unspoken, the concrete implementation. Foucault teaches that between knowledge and power there exists a relationship of reciprocal implication: in each political community, the power regulates the production of knowledge, and knowledge results in power. This is particularly true for the state, the theory of sovereignty and human sciences. In full modernity, knowledge takes the shape of scientific knowledge in which there is no direct correspondence between *words* and *things*, but rather a mediated relationship of the work of human thought⁵⁰: for Hobbes, Christ is still situated above the state's crystal, but this Christ does not provide guarantees about knowledge, he poses questions without giving answers, and will soon withdraw from his post, leaving it empty. So, while after Hobbes the belief in an order that is at once transcendent and natural endures, to which the sovereign must refer his own decisions—in an above and a below of the apparatus, in a before and an after, that coincide more and more—this order is not immediately available to human knowledge, but must be interpreted, decided by the sovereign, and at the same time it must be enacted by him through a pastoral action that pervades both the totality of the population and the singularity of each of its members.

The liberal subject against which Bersani, de Lauretis and Edelman polemicize is thus born at least during the seventeenth century. The individual is that particular form of human that inhabits the state and the market and is intimately inhabited by the state and the market, in a circular, suspended, eternal present that is imposed on him not only by Oedipal civilization, but also by the regulation through the use of fear and hope enacted by the modern sovereign in his relationship with Christian theology and the human sciences. Rightly, Bersani accuses Foucault of not having sufficiently distanced himself from this anthropological model, because of his insistence on pleasure as a motive of human action and his underestimation of the role of the drive in masochism. However, it is undeniable that it was Foucault who paved the way for antisocial queer theorists: he, in fact, showed how the sexuality apparatus is at the center of liberal biopolitics' mechanisms, and he recalled that, since where there is power there is the possibility of resistance, in the presence of a forced

sociality a break of the social tie is always feasible. From the guts of the Leviathan that have been dissected with the blade of Foucauldian criticism, what emerges, in particular, is that the search for a way out of the system of modern “individualization” requires the questioning of the value of truth that is usually attributed to natural or human rights as well as the imperative of self-preservation.⁵¹ It requires the courage to break the pact that authorizes the political power to safeguard that “recent invention,” typically modern, that is the life of the human species (Tarizzo 2010), in order to give back to the singular living human being the responsibility of “knowing how to bring conflict and division inside the self” between the life drive and the death drive, no longer understood as reciprocally exclusive (Forti 2012; Eng. trans. 2014: 266). As long as they are thought of according to the logic of the epistemic-political apparatus of modernity, liberal rights, beginning with the right to life (to preservation, to security, to the well-being of life), will remain a vehicle for the submission of individual will, not only to the juridical normativity of the sovereign, but to the scientific normativity of the correlating biopowers.⁵² When antisocial queer theories, especially Edelman’s version, in a univocal and nonnegotiable way, bind the human to his negativity or his real, as opposed to the illusions of the imaginary, they seem once more to be attempting to close the base of the crystal, using psychoanalysis certainly transgressively, but within the dialectic of the epistemic-political apparatus of modernity. Other theoretical strategies of resistance are feasible, however, which free the subject from the weight of the truth and give him back the lightness of imagination by affirming the primacy of ethics over ontology. Because not only is it possible to oppose the knowledge of the sovereign with other knowledge, but it is also possible to regain the hope for a different way of existence that Hobbes—with much competence, though uselessly—tried to take away from the human by manipulating him with fears. In the 1600s, long before Edelman, Blaise Pascal, in speaking ideally with Seneca, warned against hope, which he understood as a planning and waiting for the future.⁵³ Ernst Block then reevaluated this passion in the 1900s; in a passage from Chap. 20 of his monumental work *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, he proposes an interesting redefinition: in a polemic against the economic scientism of Marxism, he suggests that the name “hope,” generally used to indicate the projection of a desire into the future, can also mean the concretely utopian discovery of the potential of the present⁵⁴: the burst of subjectivity here and now, we could say, which breaks the circularity of biological or historical determinism, and its “futurism.”

It is no longer necessary to wait for the Savior, when everyone can be the Messiah, for others and for himself. With the immediacy that belongs to art, LaBruce imagined that the throne left empty by Christ was usurped by melancholy living dead gays. In *L.A. Zombie* in particular, the character played by the porn actor François Sagat proves, before spectators, the possibility here and now of a political apocalypse of the abject. Living on the margins of society, without any way of heeding the laws dictated by the sovereign authorities, obeying only the urgency of his drives, he does not have the patience either to wait for the end of times, when God in person will give the chosen ones delicious Leviathan dishes, or to butcher the monster with the sharpened blades of reason: instead he tears its meat bit by bit as from the great body of the state he subtracts one by one the gay men he happens to chance upon. He does not kill them, but to the contrary revives the dormant subjectivity within them with the healthy shock of sexual enjoyment. In the Gospel according to Luke (24: 1–11), it was a group of women, Mary Magdalene, and Joanna and Mary the mother of James, to bring the news of Jesus's resurrection to the apostles. The morning of the third day of the crucifixion they had gone to the tomb to sprinkle some spices over Christ's body, but the tomb was empty. Then two angels asked them, "Why do you seek the living one among the dead?" That question was all they needed to believe, but the 12 apostles did not trust their testimony. In an essay dedicated to biblical references in the filmography of the living dead, Michael Gilmour (2001: 98) compares these women to the spectators of zombie movies:

When they entered the tomb, these women knew two things for certain. First, that Jesus was physically dead. [...] Second, they knew Jesus spoke of bodily reanimation on a number of occasions before his death (e.g., Luke 9:22). They might not have believed it (they were looking for a corpse in that tomb, after all) but the idea was there. One suspects they must have entertained some *What if...?* scenarios, no matter how incredulous they were. Zombie fans live with a similar dissonance. They *know* bodily resurrections do not occur—they too have witnessed deaths and burials—but they cannot resist flirting with the *What if...?* of the imagination.

Today, the possibility of queer politics depends on an analogous dissonance. Faced with the pervasive fake alternative between the assimilationist familism of mainstream lesbian gay and trans movements, and the clubs or other locales of enjoyment, a reawakening of subjectivities seems impossible. But what if it wasn't?

NOTES

1. It is impossible to give an univocal definition of the concept of liberalism: there are many liberal doctrines that can address the ethical-juridical, the political-institutional or the economic sphere. The distinction between economic liberalism [liberismo] and political liberalism [liberalismo], which exists in the Italian language, does not, in fact, exist in other languages. In the United States, the adjective “liberal” implies an attention to the social question that European classical liberalism lacks: US liberals are thus close in proximity to the European Social Democrats. What links, however, all the liberal political conceptions is the high value that they attribute to the rights of the individual in the private sphere, understood as limits of political power: for liberalism, the state is legitimate only when it safeguards these rights and does not violate them. The ontological foundation of liberalism is thus the modern individual as a bearer of rights who, as I will assert, is completely conceptualized for the first time by the father of political modernity Thomas Hobbes, who was not by any means a liberal but rather an absolutist.
2. The *Elements of Law Natural and Politic* are two different essays, *Human Nature* and *De Corpore Politico*, which Hobbes finished in 1640, and that initially circulated in manuscript form and were published ten years later. Only in 1889 were they published together by Ferdinand Tönnies under the title *Elements of Law Natural and Politic*.
3. “Terror dwells in those rows of teeth! His back is like rows of shields, sealed with a seal of stone, touching each other so close that not a breath could pass between; sticking to one another to make an indivisible whole. When he sneezes, light leaps forth, his eyes are like the eyelids of down. From his mouth come fiery torches, sparks of fire fly out of it” (Job, 41: 6–11, The Jerusalem Bible).
4. “Now think of Behemoth; he eats greenstuff like the ox. But what strength he has in his loins, what power in his stomach muscles! His tail is as stiff as a cedar, the sinews of his thighs are tightly knit. His vertebrae are bronze tubing, his bones as hard as hammered iron [...]. So who is going to catch him by the eyes or drive a peg through his nostrils?” (Job, 40: 15–24, The Jerusalem Bible)
5. “He has no equal on earth, being created without fear” (Job, 41: 25, The Jerusalem Bible). The Latin translation of this verse, “Non est Potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei,” dominates the title page of the first English edition of *Leviathan* from 1651.
6. In 1679, Hobbes publishes a short piece in which he reconstructs the history of the English civil war entitled *Behemoth: The History of the Civil Wars of England*.

7. "The unum necessarium (the only article of faith which the Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation) is this: that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. By the name of *Christ* is understood the king which God had before promised, by the prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world to reign (over the Jews and over such of other nations as should believe in him) under himself eternally" (Hobbes 1994, XLIII: 402).
8. As for the role of hope and the end of the messianic waiting in Hobbes's theoretical construction, see: Farnesi Camellone 2009a and 2010. Also, at least: Polin 1981; Bodei 2003; Hoekstra 2004; Farneti 2007; Weber 2008.
9. Cf. Chap. 2 note 10, *supra*.
10. Isaac Newton's *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* would be published in 1687: Hobbes therefore does not know of the concept of force in physics, he negates the possibility of action from a distance and explains vision with the Democritean theory of the "effluvium" of matter that separates from the body and "touches" the eyes. He (1994, II: 8), however, knows the principle of inertia and defines imagination with these words: "When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) [...] so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal parts of a man, then when he sees, dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call *imagination*, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it *fancy*, which signifies *appearance*, and is as proper to one sense as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but *decaying sense*, and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking."
11. *The Hunting of Leviathan* is the title of Samuel I. Mintz's famous essay (1962) dedicated to the reactions that Hobbes's thought evoked in his English contemporaries.
12. In *Phaedrus*, liked so much by Bersani, Socrates distinguishes two "kinds of things" within the method of philosophy: "The first consists in seeing together things that are scattered about everywhere and collecting them into one kind, so that by defining each thing we can make clear the subject of any instruction we wish to give"; the second "in turn, is to be able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do" (*Phaedrus*, 265 C-E, Eng. trans. 1997: 542).
13. "To grasp the material agency of subjugation insofar as it constitutes subjects would, if you like, be to do precisely the opposite of what Hobbes was trying to do in *Leviathan*" (Foucault 1997; Eng. trans. 2003: 28).
14. Just to give an example, the Foucauldian category of biopolitics is of crucial importance in Negri and Hardt 2002 and 2004.

15. Foucault analyzes the functioning of disciplinary power particularly in his book *Discipline and Punish* (1975), but also in numerous conferences and in his 1974 and 1975 courses *Psychiatric Power* (2003) and *Abnormal* (1999).
16. Foucault develops the concept of biopolitics especially during the last lesson of the 1976 course “*Society Must be Defended*” (1997), in the last chapter of *The Will to Knowledge* (1976), and in this two courses from 1978 and 1979 *Security, Territory, Population* (2004a) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2004b). Following the publication of his courses, the category was met with great success and was taken up by a now unrestrained literature. For Italian texts that deal with the history of the concept before and after Foucault, see, at least, Esposito 2004 and Bazzicalupo 2010. There is a particularly interesting interpretation in Forti 2012.
17. Cf. Chap. 1 note 6, *supra*.
18. As I mentioned in Chap. 2 note 12, Foucault’s judgment of psychoanalysis is not univocal: in *The Will to Knowledge* (1976), the philosopher does not criticize the clinical practice, but the use of psychoanalytic theory as a depository of human truth made by the liberation movements of the seventies, inspired by the Freudomarxism of Reich and Marcuse. In that same book, he gives Freud the credit of having produced a psychological thought that was alternative to the biologist psychiatry of the 1800s that was relied on for Nazi-Fascist eugenics (Simonazzi 2013). Already in *Madness and Civilization* (1961; Eng. trans. 1988: 196), Foucault affirmed that “we must do justice to Freud” giving him credit for having given back the voice to the lunatics that positivist psychiatry had reduced to silence. And in *The Order of Things* (1966; Eng. trans. 1994: 376) referring to Lacan, he goes so far as to define psychoanalysis a “counter-science” that contests the possibility of formulating general anthropological truths, since knowledge of the individual is “invincibly linked with a praxis, with that strangulation produced by the relation between two individuals, one of whom is listening to the other’s language.”
19. Governmentality is the operational method that “allow[s] the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault 2004a; Eng. trad. 2007: 108).
20. Foucault’s interpretation of Freudomarxism is also limiting, beginning with the fact that he uses this category generically, without examining the differences, that are at times quite substantial, between the authors associated with it (f. Chap. 1 note 5, *supra*).
21. Aristotle, *Politics* Book I, part 2 1253 a. See also *Nicomachean Ethics* I, 1169 b 18.

22. As I will show in the next chapter, the use of the term “man” instead of “human being” or “man and woman” here is not an oversight.
23. Hobbes draws on the famous expression “*homo homini lupus*” from *Asinaria* by Plautus (1630: 63) “Lupus est homo homini, non homo, quom quails sit non nouit.” Jacques Derrida (2008) reflects extensively on the figure of the wolf in Western thought.
24. “*Homo homini deus*” is an expression that the statesman Quintus Aurelius Symmachus (1601: 571) attributed to the comic poet Cecilius: “Recte Cecilius comicus, Homo, inquit, homini deus est, si suum officium sciat.”
25. “Non est un patriae pudeat, sed tempus iniquum conqueror, et mecum tot quoque nata mala. Fama ferebat enim diffusa per oppida nostra, extremum genti classe venire diem. Atque metum tantum concepit tunc mea mater, *ut pareret geminos, meque metumque simul*. Hinc est, ut credo, patrios quod abominor hostes, pacem amo cum musis, et faciles socios” (1839, vol. 1: lxxxvi).
26. “Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the abstract) of the seat of power (like to those simple and unpartial creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they were they, but there)” (Hobbes 1994, *Letter Dedicatory*: 2). Foucault picks up this passage ironically in “*Society Must be Defended*” (1997; Eng. trans. 2003: 99) “When the State Capitol was in danger, a goose woke up the sleeping philosophers. It was Hobbes.”
27. Cf. also Hobbes 1996, XV: 89: “For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has a right to every-thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust, and the definition of INJUSTICE is no other than *the not performance of covenant*. And whatsoever is not unjust, is *just*.”
28. “The truth according to which *Jesus is the Christ* that Hobbes so frequently and so clearly expressed as true faith and conviction [...] does not sound at all like a simple strategic affirmation, like an exploited lie dictated by the necessity to save himself from incrimination and censure. [...] This truth, instead, constitutes the element of closure, and the expression *Jesus is the Christ* calls by name the God present in public worship” (Schmitt 1963; translation by Julia Heim from the Italian 1972: 150–151).
29. “This ‘Hobbes’ crystal’ [...] manifestly contains a neutralization of the contrasts of the religious war between Christians. Immediately the question arises if such a neutralization can be extended, beyond the common belief in Jesus Christ, to the common belief in God as well—in this case the first point could even sound like: Allah is grand –, or even *to one of the many truths in need of interpretation, to social ideals, to values and supreme*

- principles from which conflicts and wars get their realization and fulfillment*" (Schmitt 1963; translation by Julia Heim from the Italian 1972: 151).
30. Derrida (2008; Eng. trans. 2009: 55 et seq.) insists on the fact that in Chap. XIV of *Leviathan* this double exclusion occurs with the same words: "To make Covenant with God, is impossible," "To make Covenant with brute Beasts, is impossible" (cf. Hobbes 1991 II: 128).
 31. Today, this question gets reformulated in cases of contemporary bioethics, in which, in our societies, the conflict is still open: when does an embryo become human? When is it murder if a pregnancy is voluntarily interrupted? And: is a person in a coma still human, and still a living human? If devices that allow this person to breathe are turned off is that murder? Even today, as it would seem, "no man doubts, but the city shall judge it."
 32. Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates, Iran, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and some states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
 33. The notion of the state's racism is not exclusively tied to the biological concept of race. For Foucault (1997; Eng. trans. 2003: 255), racism occurs every time an internal enemy is identified within the population of a state: not just a race, but a class, or a category of people that contaminates the health of the state by their mere existence.
 34. [Translator's Note] Nì is a mixture of yes [sì] and no [no] with a leaning toward no. It is used when people do not want to make decisions.
 35. "One might say that the ancient right to *take* life or *let* live was replaced by a power to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death" (Foucault 1976, Eng. trans. 1990: 138; cf. also 1997, Eng. trans. 2003: 257)
 36. Cf. note 2, *supra*.
 37. Foucault sketches a bit of the history of pastoral power in his 1978 course *Security, Territory, Population* (2004a; cf. Pandolfi 1999 and Bernini 2008).
 38. "According to Hobbes, the quintessential nature of the state of nature, or the behemoth, is none other than civil war, which can only be prevented by the overarching might of the state" (Schmitt 1938; Eng. trans. 2008: 21).
 39. This is the title of Chap. XXIV of *Leviathan*, which begins with these words: "The nutrition of a commonwealth consisteth in the *plenty* and *distribution of materials* conducing to life" (1994: 159).
 40. To this end, it is necessary to take note of a difference between *De Cive* and *Leviathan*. While in the former, Hobbes theorizes the suppression of individuals with disabilities, in the latter (1994, XXVI: 177) while continuing to compare "natural fools, children or madmen" to "brute beasts," he specifies that these people must be "excused" when they do not obey civil or natural laws, and furthermore he calls for the cure of the "impotent," understood this time as "some who [...] because of accidents they could

not have foreseen, fall into misfortunes, so that they cannot provide for their maintenance by their own industry” (1994, XXX: 228). Even in these passages, however, it is implied that the sovereign has the right, and even the duty, to eliminate, as an enemy of the state, whoever represents, as Foucault would say, a “biological danger” to it, and that the right to decide on, as a last resort, the actual presence of such a danger is up to him.

41. The reference to the ten commandments is constant in Hobbesian works: cf. also 1994, XLII: 351; 1991, XVI: 316. In *De cive*, Hobbes maintains that it is the task of civil laws, and not of natural laws, to interpret the commandments, establishing thus “what is to be called *theft*, what *murder*, what *adultery*, what *injury* in a citizen” (1991, VI: 185). In fact, “the natural laws command the same things, but implicitly” (1991, XIV: 277), and “if the civil Law command us to invade anything, that invasion is not theft” (1991, XIV: 278).
42. Hobbes lists the commandments in the order in which they appear in Exodus, 20: 2–17, and not according to the dogma that is valid for the Catholic and Lutheran churches: he considers the second commandment (Exodus, 20: 4–5: “you shall not make yourself a carved image or likeness of anything in heaven or on earth beneath or in the waters under the earth; You shall not bow down to them or serve them”) as part of the first and, following the formulation of Deuteronomy, he divides the tenth commandment (Exodus, 20: 17: “you shall not covet your neighbour’s house. You shall not covet your neighbour’s wife, or his servant, man or woman, or his ox, or his donkey, or anything that is him.”) in two: “You shall not covet your neighbour’s wife” and “you shall not set your heart on his house, his field, his servant—man or woman—his ox, his donkey or anything that is his” (Deuteronomy, 5:21).
43. According to the biblical formulation Hobbes followed, the seventh commandment reads “You shall not commit adultery” (Exodus, 20: 14; Deuteronomy, 5: 18) and not “Do not commit impure acts,” and can thus be considered a prohibition of wrongdoing toward others, and not a manner of relating with one’s self.
44. “Liberal governmentality” seems thus to be already present in Hobbes, though according to Foucault’s reconstructions in *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2004b), it would have been born only in those physiocratic theories of the eighteenth century, according to which, in order to guarantee the maximum power and well-being of the population, the state must make the functioning of the free market possible by abstaining from an excessive legislation of the economic sphere. In this vein, see: Agamben 2007; Bazzicalupo 2006 and 2009.
45. “It is, therefore, manifest that the instruction of the people dependeth wholly on the right teaching of youth in the universities” (Hobbes 1994, XXX: 225; cf. 1991, XIII).

46. "It is against his duty to let the people be ignorant or misinformed of the grounds and reasons of those his essential rights [...], because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law that shall forbid rebellion (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty) is not (as a civil law) any obligation but by virtue only of the law of nature that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which natural obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the right of any law the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it but for an act of hostility, which, when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavor by acts of hostility to avoid" (Hobbes 1994, XXX: 220).
47. Since there is not enough space in this book to give a more detailed analysis of the doctrinal differences that lie within Hobbes's political works, and of the English and Latin editions of *Leviathan* (I have limited myself in this study to a reading of the English version), I must refer to the essays of Shuhumann, Hoekstra, Miller and Foisneau collected in the first part of the volume *Leviathan after 350 Years* (2004), edited by Foisneau and Sorel, entitled *Leviathan among Hobbes's Political Writings*.
48. "When a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey" (Hobbes 2013, I, XIX: 72). "This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one man or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that is, that he refuse him not to use of his wealth and strength against any others whatsoever" (Hobbes 1991, V: 169).
49. "*I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner*" (Hobbes 1994, XVII: 109).
50. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault maintains that a fertile epistemological field only opened up for human sciences at the end of the eighteenth century. Before then, within that system of knowledge that he calls the "classical episteme," between words and things, between language and being, there was a relationship of direct representation: the man did not constitute the transcendental source of signification, but appeared as a place of clarification of the order of the world created by God. Access to this order depended only on the use of the correct method of knowledge, as Descartes's philosophical research shows. Kant, however, is the inaugural author of the *modern episteme*: trust having failed in its mirroring of things in words, the relationship of representation becomes a problem, and *man*—with his cognitive faculties—becomes the subject, the object and the guarantee of his own knowledge. In a certain sense, the discontinuist method that Foucault applies to the history of knowledge, just like the constructivist theory that he applies to sexuality, presents important

affinities with Hobbesian nominalism—which is not, however, possible for me to analyze here.

51. “[T]he political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the state’s institutions but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries” (Foucault 1982b: 216).
52. Furthermore, with the intention of showing the failure of Schmitt’s attempt to use Hobbes against the liberal culture of rights, Strauss already maintained: “Hobbes’ foundation for the natural-right claim to the securing of life pure and simple sets the path to the whole system of human rights in the sense of liberalism, if his foundation does not actually make such a course necessary” (2007: 107).
53. Explicitly referencing *Epistle I* and *XIII* by Seneca, Pascal, for example, writes: “Let each of us examine his thoughts; he will find them wholly concerned with the past or the future. We almost never think of the present, and if we do think of it, it is only to see what light it throws on our plans for the future. The present is never our end. The past and present are our means, the future alone our end. Thus we never actually live, but hope to live, and since we are always planning to be happy, it is inevitable that we should never be so” (1954; Eng. trans. 1995: 13)
54. “Thus nothing is more repugnant to utopian conscience itself than utopia with unlimited travel endless striving is vertigo, hell. Just as there should be a hold instead of the repeatedly fleeting moments or merely tasted points in time, so too there should be present instead of utopia, and within utopia at least present in spe or utopian present tense. If utopia is no longer necessary, there should at long last be Being as utopia. *The essential content of hope is not hope, but since it does not allow precisely the latter to be wrecked, it is distanceless Being-Here present tense*. Utopia works only for the sake of the present which is to be obtained and so in the end present as the finally intended distancelessness is sprinkled into all utopian distances” (Bloch 1959; Eng. trans. 1995: 314, italics mine; cf. Farnesi Camellone 2009b). In queer theory, José Esteban Muñoz referenced Bloch in *Cruising Utopia* (2009).

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Becoming Animals

Travel is useful, it exercises the imagination. All the rest is disappointment and fatigue. Our journey is entirely imaginary. That is its strength. It goes from life to death. People, animals, cities, things, all are imagined. It's a novel, just a fictitious narrative. Littré says so, and he's never wrong. And besides, in the first place, anyone can do as much. You just have to close your eyes. It's on the other side of life.

(Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Journey to the End of the Night)

Christian Bacchus, the Canadian Egyptologist in whom I recognize the God of the Indies—just as others saw Athena in a swineherd—, in April of '76 he said to me: "The world is completely worn out, but there is one hope: something is moving in Northern Italy... Otherwise it is the end..." The jadedness seemed to betray that hope. Yet I, a Milanese man, believed I incarnated the Change: was I or was I not Jesus resurrected?

(Mario Mieli, Il risveglio dei Faraoni, The Awakening of the Pharaohs)

6.1 ZOMBIES VERSUS LYCANTHROPES

The reconstruction of the seventeenth-century text carried out in the previous chapter may seem strange in a work dedicated to contemporary queer theories, but it proves useful not only in clearing up the chronobiopolitical nature of the liberal subject, but in adding something about

Translation by Julia Heim

the strategic role that the sexual question plays in its production as well. A now established tradition of feminist criticism has denounced how, in the founding narrations of political modernity, heterosexual males, in reality, enter into the state-instituted pact, and the presumed sexual neutrality of individuals is none other than an expedient to leave women's subordination to men unaltered and unthematized. This is the subordination asserted by Aristotle, which would have no reason to linger in an egalitarian landscape. In the now classic *The Sexual Contract*, Carole Pateman, using a timely textual analysis, shows how this occurs not only in the absolutist Hobbes, but in Locke, Rousseau and Kant as well, considered the founding fathers of the liberal tradition, the democratic one and juridical pacifism, respectively. It's as if, in their works, the social contract presupposed a tight sexual contract between men designed to regulate the possession of women, and keep them in a state of submission. The contrast between the false contractualist egalitarianism of sexual difference—understood as the only difference between men and women—and the insistence on the dissymmetry of the sexes in the reproductive process has at times, however, led feminist thought to an uncritical adoption of that sexual binarism that is both the prerequisite and the product of the “social contract” (Bernini 2010a).¹ Pateman herself (1988; 223, italics mine) shows, for example, a cruel insensitivity in the face of intersex, transsexual and transgender people when she writes that “a human body, except through *misfortunes* of birth, is not male and female at the same time,” and then adds that “if dissatisfied with their ‘gender orientation’, men can become ‘transsexuals’ and turn themselves into simulacra of women.” Like the sovereign in *De cive*, the author claims the authority to decide who has the right to be recognized as fully human: not only does she uncritically declare that intersexuality is a misfortune, and that female identity is not accessible to trans women, she also negates the existence of trans men.²

Adding the Foucauldian discourse on the sexuality apparatus to the theory of gender performativity, and making the drag queen the heroine of the subversion of the regime of compulsory heterosexuality (Rich 1980), Butler (1990, 2004b) thus will join, as Bersani affirms, the multitude of intellectuals who attempt to redeem the sexual through the notion of “sexuality”; though she must surely be given credit for denouncing the complicity of a certain kind of feminism in the sexual binarism of the patriarchal tradition. Furthermore, she shows that the perspective of women is not, in itself, enough to call political modernity radically into question: the view of those sexual subjects outside the norm is also necessary, those subjects whose difference, moreover, in the texts of the great philosophers, is not

always masked by the false neutrality of individuals. For example, in *Lectures on Ethics* (1775–1780), inserting himself into a well-established Christian tradition since Paul the Apostle, Kant (1963: 162–171) openly condemns homosexual practices. In his opinion, in fact, sexuality contains something “which is contemptible and contrary to the dictates of morality,” “a principle of degradation of human nature” that “exposes mankind to the danger of equality with the beasts” (164–165), and only the pact known as heterosexual matrimony is capable of redeeming it, by achieving a “unity of will” between the two parties.³ Kant excludes the existence of a human propensity for cannibalism,⁴ and for him, sex is the only inclination in virtue of which man makes other men “an object of [immediate] enjoyment” (162). Nevertheless, when an account must be given of the disturbing nature of the sexual drive, he resorts to culinary metaphors: outside marriage, he maintains, every sexual act degrades the human to a “thing on which another satisfies his appetite, just as he satisfies his hunger upon a steak” (165), since the occasional partner, once possessed, will be “cast aside” the same way that “one casts away a lemon which has been sucked dry” (163). For these reasons, for Kant, all sexual acts outside marriage are *crimina carnis*, namely, the “abuse[s] of one’s sexuality” that “are contrary to self-regarding duty because they are against the ends of humanity” (169)—unless “in respect to sexuality,” they consist in the conservation of the species without degrading one’s person. There exists, however, a hierarchy of abomination: *adulterium*, the *vaga libido* in its two subspecies of *scortatio* and *concubinitatus*, prostitution,⁵ and even incest are *crimina carnis secundum naturam*: they are thus “contrary to sound reason,” but not “contrary to our animal nature” (169). This, instead, is an offense of onanism, homosexual acts (the union between *sexus homogenii*), and zoophilia,⁶ namely of *crimina carnis contra naturam*, for which Kant (1963: 170) reserves even harsher judgment:

All *crimina carnis contra naturam* degrade human nature to a level below that of animal nature and make man unworthy of his humanity. He no longer deserves to be a person. From the point of view of duties toward himself such conduct is the most disgraceful and the most degrading of which man is capable. Suicide is the most dreadful, but it is not as dishonourable and base as the *crimina carnis contra naturam*. It is the most abominable conduct of which man can be guilty. So abominable are these *crimina carnis contra naturam* that they are unmentionable, for the very mention of them is nauseating, as is not the case with suicide.

The homosexual act, therefore, for the enlightened Kant, is the endless degradation that the sexual carries with it. It is human subjectivity’s act of

self-dissolution. It calls to mind suicide but is even more serious, since it elicits more than just condemnation; it evokes disgust.

There's so much water for Bersani and Edelman's well, that in *De cive* and in *Leviathan* is left, instead, to dry! There is, in fact, no trace of homosexuality in Hobbes's texts. This is not about simple silence, however, but about self-censorship, dictated perhaps more by prudence than by embarrassment. The question, in fact, appears in Chap. XXVIII of Hobbes's first political work, *De corpore politico* (1640),⁷ where he (1967: 380 italics mine) expresses opinions that sound fairly anticonformist, especially when compared to Kant's:

In them who have sovereign authority, not to forbid such copulations as are against the use of nature; not to forbid the promiscuous use of women, not to forbid one woman to have many husbands, not to forbid marriages within certain degrees of kindred and affinity, are against the law of nature. For though it not be evident, that a private man living under the law of natural reason only, doth break the same, by doing any of the things aforesaid; yet it is manifestly apparent, that being so prejudicial as they are to the improvement of mankind, that not to forbid the same, is against the law of natural reason in him, that hath taken into his hands any portion of mankind to improve.

When it comes to the duties of the sovereign, the passage is quite clear: he must prohibit "copulations as are against the use of nature" along with promiscuous sex, female polygamy and matrimony between blood relations, because, if he didn't, he would fail to meet his duties. However, Hobbes does not maintain that these practices in and of themselves constitute a transgression of the natural norms: there is, in fact, no evidence that, in abandoning oneself to these transgressions, an individual who lives "under the law of natural reason only," as happens to the individual in the state of nature, would violate this law. Unlike what Kant would later sustain, homosexual acts are thus not categorically considered crimes against nature for Hobbes: the ban is part of the social pact from the moment in which the individual renounces his singularity in order to be absorbed into the great collective body because these people would be obstacles to the "improvement" of the population—or rather, to the biopolitical and pastoral functions of the state, as Foucault would say, and thus to its projection into the future. There is, in other words, a natural law that regulates the life of the individual outside of society and one that regulates the life of the collective, that "portion of mankind" that

the sovereign “hath taken into his hands.” And sex that is not normativized by marriage is the reagent that causes the contradictions between the two to explode.

In all of his works, Hobbes—who, among other things, like Kant, in the irony of fate, died a bachelor⁸—never tires of repeating that outside the State, the life of human beings is “solitary.” From reading the passage of *De corpore politico* cited above, it would thus be easy to conclude that for him the sexual, more than any other “passion,” most represents the antisocial element of the human. It is fitting, once more, to stress that this passage constitutes an exception. Perhaps foreseeing the accusations of heresy and atheism that would be cast at him from all sides (Mintz 1962), in his later political works, as we have already seen, Hobbes prefers to mitigate the scandal by resolving the question of sexual ethics using references to the commandments, which—at least in the version he used—ban neither homosexual acts nor masturbation.⁹ Already in *De cive*, which came out only two years after *De corpore politico*, there is less talk about sex, and in Chap. VIII, the act of birth is even substituted with the cropping up of a mushroom. It is as if, with the passing of time and the growth of his reputation, the champion of modern political realism felt the pressing need to expunge the disturbing reality of the sexual from his theory. Feminist criticism (Pateman 1988) has noted that in *De cive* and *Leviathan*, Hobbesian individuals have neither penises nor vaginas; they even lack anuses. No bulges, no sexual orifices: just the smooth skin of a fungus—and sharp fangs. Despite his materialist and rationalist methodological premises, despite his insistence on the truth, Hobbes prefers to make use of abstract figurative language and dedicate himself to an imaginative (and specious) reading of the Scriptures instead of accounting for the carnal nature of the human. Despite his efforts to limit the cognitive faculties of the human to a materialist metaphysics, his works speak of the imaginary.¹⁰ For a moment, we could thus allow ourselves to set this imaginary free, to “delirium”—as the queers, more than any others, have always known how to do. We could begin by remembering that, while in the Hobbesian narrative, there is no place for zombies, wolf-men are the masters, and in the company of enormous beasts. Since much has already been said about the Leviathan, we could say a few more words about its primordial enemy, the symbol of terrestrial powers according to the medieval cabalistic interpretations revisited by Schmitt, and of the dissolution of the state into civil war, for Hobbes (Fig. 6.1).

Fig. 6.1 Behemoth, illustration by Louis Breton, from Jacques Collin de Plancy's *Dictionnaire infernal* (1863)



In the illustrated second edition (1863) of the famous demonology manual *Dictionnaire infernal*, by occultist Jacques Collin de Plancy, Behemoth is depicted as a potbellied elephant, and described as the butler and cup-bearer of hell: like a bulimic demon who mixes truth with lies, and presides over the sins of gluttony that, as Kant shows, can easily be taken as a symbol of sexual enjoyment. In a scene from *World War Z*, the film produced and starred in by Brad Pitt, a mass of zombies unite into one singular creature that is able to climb the wall dividing Israel and Palestine. Marc Forster, the director (2013), declared that the sequence, inspired by the images of soccer fans trampling one another that are sometimes depicted on television, contains an edifying message: in an increasingly crowded world, humanity can only survive by uniting. While waiting for the film to be released in theaters, one could imagine the macro-zombie taking the shape of a starved Behemoth, ready, with his appetite, to face that large werewolf of werewolves that is the Leviathan on the frontispiece of Hobbes's homonymous book. I don't believe, however, that gay zombies would feel comfortable in that great decaying body, those zombies who, by choice or necessity, are largely segregated in LaBruce's films.¹¹ Their

refusal of company is not however comparable to Genet's ascetic of evil in *Pompes Funèbres*, their ability to tolerate solitude is not solipsism: they certainly don't aspire to the stability of marriage, but they do not disdain occasional encounters—not even with werewolves, if they could get down with resurrection.

We don't know what destiny awaits the fragile Otto. The film forces us to abandon him on the side of the road, beneath the rainbow, waiting for a generous driver to give him a ride north. We know, however, that after the disappointment of Rudolf's superficiality, not only does the hope that the cold "preserves his flesh" push him in that direction; it is also a vague desire to meet "more of his kind." If it were up to me to continue the story, I would make him travel to the past (what else, after all, is the apocalypse, the end of times, if not the *collapse* of times¹²?), or better yet, I would make one of the two 25-year-old precursors of queer theory rise from the dead for him. As I have already mentioned, Mieli and Hocquenghem did not have easy dispositions, and they also detested one another (Prearo 2012).¹³ Since it would be more prudent to have Otto meet them one at a time, I would opt for the first: not only because after the Freudomarxist indoctrination that Medea imposed on Otto, the two would have a lot to discuss, but also because in his disorienting autobiographical novel *Il risveglio dei Faraoni* [*The Awakening of the Pharaohs*],¹⁴ in addition to sacrilegiously and provocatively telling his stories of sex, drugs, delirium (in the clinical sense) and coprophagy, Mieli raves a lot about resurrections, and even goes so far as to introduce himself—he, of Egyptian-Hebrew descent—as Christ resurrected.¹⁵ Of course, Mieli would be disappointed to discover how many of the transgressive acts that he considered expressions of freedom would later become norms of the gay enjoyment industry. He would explain to Otto that his aspirations were others. And perhaps he would recount that the first European gay liberation movements, like FHAR, like FUORI! at the beginning, and like COM, not only were not really revolutionary, but in a certain sense weren't even democratic.¹⁶ Like many of the feminist groups of the time, in fact, they refused the principle of representation and the mechanism of the proxy, and they preferred smaller collectives to the masses. But above all, they did not aspire to convince others of their motives: they limited themselves to making public scandals by talking about sex and *having* it. In other words, they weren't democratic in the sense of the liberal democracy, but in the radical democracy sense.¹⁷ And their radicalism was

not a planning one; they were a part of the temporality of the revolt. This is not to say that they continually tried to clash with the police: that was, if anything, the style of a muscular militancy that they voluntarily left to the males (June 28, 1969, at the Stonewall Inn, it was still and always a question of self-defense). The gay revolt against the state, for them, consisted in refusing to ask institutions for the rights that heterosexuals already had, and in affirming out loud that people don't need the authorization of any institution to enjoy their bodies, immediately.¹⁸

The young zombie could, however, remain indifferent to this flood of words. Nonliving 40 years later, he would merely need to do a Google or Wikipedia search to quickly find out about that sexual freedom for which many would pay dearly. Hocquenghem died of AIDS on August 28, 1988, at the age of 42. Mieli didn't even see the epidemic: a victim of mental health problems, he committed suicide on March 12, 1983, at the age of 31.¹⁹ Six years later, the Berlin Wall would fall, dragging intolerable regimes and, however, an entire political imaginary along with it. What is to be done, today, with those prehistoric ravings? Ours is a dead time, the end of history. "Honey!"—Mieli (1994: 102, translation Julia Heim) could then spur him on—"the dead await your sign to rise from their tombs." As if to say that the value of political action is not measured by its failures and that, as Queer Nation has shown, and as other movements with the name "queer" have shown, once access to transcendence is closed, others, different ones, can open. From his perspective, Otto could also incarnate that particular hope that relented at a certain point in Mieli. Telling his story, and lingering on the differences between the end of LaBruce's films, he could show that, while—as Edelman teaches—embracing the negativity that the queer represents in a homo/transphobic society can be salvific, a fatal swerve separates the death drive from real and actual death.²⁰ The two unlikely interlocutors would then say goodbye, each one going down his own path to search for other encounters. Or they might use the occasion to enjoy themselves, or each other, a bit.

6.2 CELINE'S HENS, OR ON PROPHETIC VOICES

Kant was utterly wrong. As Hobbes suggests, from the point of view of the single subject, suicide and homosexual practices are immeasurable behaviors. Furthermore, only an outdated version of what Foucault calls biopolitics can lead one to indiscriminately condemn the nonproductive

sexuality of sexual minorities as if, en masse, these people refused to aid in the perpetuation of humanity: nowadays, the increasingly manifest desire for maternity and paternity expressed by lesbian and gay couples contradicts any accusation of the kind. For queers, as with hetero people, working to promote the future of the species is thus a matter of opportunity and choice. Unfortunately, it is still true that many would like queer people dead, and that consequently, these queers—especially the young ones, as with what happened to Andrea and could have happened to Marco²¹—too often kill themselves. It happens, for that matter, that even homophobes commit extreme acts. On May 21, 2013, for example, the 78-year-old extreme right-wing intellectual Dominique Venner shot himself in the mouth right in front of the altar of the tourist-filled Cathedral of Notre Dame. He had published one last message on his blog:

Protesters on May 26 will cry out in their impatience and anger.²² A infamous law, once passed, can always be repealed. I just listened to an Algerian blogger: “In any case,” he said, “in 15 years the Islamists will be in power in France and will remove this law.” Not to please us, we suspect, but because it is contrary to Sharia (Islamic law). This is the only superficially common point between the European tradition (that respects women) and Islam (which does not respect them). But the bald assertion of the Algerian is chilling. [...]

It certainly will require new, spectacular, and symbolic gestures to stir our somnolence, shake our anesthetized consciousness, and awaken the memory of our origins. We are entering a time when words must be authenticated by deeds.

We should also remember, as brilliantly formulated by Heidegger in *Being and Time*, that the essence of man is in his existence and not in “another world.” It is here and now that our destiny is played out until the last second. And this final second is as important as the rest of a lifetime. That is why you must be yourself until the last moment. It is by deciding, truly willing one’s destiny, that one conquers nothingness. And there is no escape from this requirement, because we only have this life, in which it is our duty to be fully ourselves – or to be nothing.

If Freud is telling the truth about the ambivalence of *Eros* and *Thanatos*, in addition to homophobia and a religious integralism prone to extreme generalization, a tortuous, pejorative, irrational and perverse feeling could be hidden in these heroically toned words. The cruelest invectives against this or that category of persons have forever been enlivened by a love for

humanity that is so absolute it turns into contempt: in turn, or all at once, the disabled, the Jews, the Roma people and the homosexuals take on the kind of scapegoat role of mutagen viruses, and once these are annihilated, the human race can achieve ideal purity (Forti 2012). Only those who are both modest and ironic enough to recognize the animal nature of the human within themselves are immune to such paranoia. Those who refuse this animal nature, on the other hand, particularly excel at it (Forti and Revelli 2007). An example, to this end, is Louis-Ferdinand Céline (1987; Eng. trans. 1979: 33): the overly high expectations of the polemic novelist, which are betrayed by the events of the story in a timely way, often elicit in him a furious hatred toward those like him. In his eyes, they seem like animals because they behave like them, showing that they are not worthy of the title “humans” which is, for causality at birth, attributed to them. Here is a cutting example:

Man is, after all, “human” just about as much as a chicken is a flier. When a hen gets a good swift kick in the tail, or when a motor car sets her to waltzing, she can sometimes make it about as high as a roof but flops right back down into the mud, to resume pecking at the dung. That’s her nature and her ambition. For the rest of us in human society, it is exactly the same. We can cease being completely swinish only when some catastrophe strikes us. When the emergency passes, the natural comes galloping back. For this very reason, a Revolution should be judged twenty years later

Compared to the message Venner used to convey his spiritual legacy, Céline’s judgment seems even more peremptory: his wrath is not aimed at specific human categories, but at humanity in its entirety. While Venner uses the first person plural and compares “the European tradition (that respects women)” to “Islam (which does not respect them)” and to the promoters of marriage for all, in Céline’s quotation, which is taken from a pamphlet against the Russian Revolution, there is no “us” and “them,” no virus to annihilate: it is the very nature of humanity that is irreparably corrupted by evil. Why, then, have such rancor and not comprehension for this common condition? Perhaps an answer is hidden in the zoological metaphor, which seems too significant to be random. After the analysis of the Hobbesian texts, what is initially striking is the distance that separates the ferocious predatory nature of the wolf from the innocuous awkwardness of the hen. But if the rushed comparison is followed by a more profound semiotic analysis, in using the winged farmyard creature to

symbolize human stupidity, it is possible to see well-known characteristics of C  line's disposition manifest in his words. The author of *Journey to the End of the Night* was irredeemably misogynist, in addition to being a homophobe: it is therefore unlikely that, in writing these lines, it escaped him that the French word for "hen" can be used to offensively refer to a woman.²³ There is thus a scapegoat here as well, or a "scape-doe" rather, equipped with wings like a chimera, but unable to fly. In many languages, furthermore, the names of female animals become insults when they are attributed to human females.²⁴ In Italian, for example, in a degrading metamorphic process, women can become not only *galline* (hens), but *oche* (geese), *cagne* (bitches), *vacche* (cows), *maiale* (pigs), *troie* (sows) and *zoccole* (sewer rats) as well. And by extension, trans women, trans men and lesbians can also become them, when people want to violently attribute feminine identity to them. In the camp subculture, that Bersani (2010: 14) intentionally accuses of complicity with male chauvinism, it is often gays and drag queens that reappropriate their feral femininity (their anus-mality²⁵), and use these epithets to insult one another, to a freeing and comical effect. Incapable of joining the flocks of Hitchcockian birds, just as LaBruce's zombies are of merging into a large behemoth body, C  line's hens could thus also activate a long chain of significations, and become a queer symbol. Their nonsensical pendular motion, from the mud and the dung, to the roof and back, could become a metaphor for that rhythmic and tragic barging in of the drive of enjoyment, of that eternal return to which the subject is condemned by fate—and of which he or she continually, nevertheless, backs out.

The journey taken by this book has also returned to its point of departure (from Mieli to Foucault to Butler to antisocial queer theories, to Hocquenghem, Bulter Foucault and Mieli via LaBruce and Hobbes), and yet its author hopes to have produced something more than just a vicious circle. Bersani's criticisms of Foucault hit the mark: having so flip-pantly dismissed psychoanalysis, accusing it of complicity with the modern pastoral power, Foucault ended up neglecting those disturbing characteristics of the sexual that psychoanalysis more than any other twentieth-century area of knowledge brought to light, and as such, he remained caught within the grips of that liberal subject from which he wanted to separate himself. But then, an excessive trust in psychoanalysis risks leading Edelman to make dogmatic and even normative use of it; following Foucault one could position him within the epistemic-political apparatus of modernity. In *No Future* psychoanalysis seems at times, in fact, to

assume the theoretical foundations of a science, the drive of an undeniable truth about the human, of his antipolitical reality. And the queer is condemned to interrupt the brief history of his re-significations to become a keeper of this truth. For that matter, a simple recognition of the facts is enough to realize that this sentence was not, and will not be, respected. In fact, although Edelman's words have made proselytes, and surely they will convert others, there are many authors that—while putting the sexual at the center of their reflections and without negating the inescapability of the drive—contrast their utopianism (Muñoz 2006, 2009; Dean 2006), or their optimism (Sneadiker 2009) with the queer's identification with the death drive. In the last few years, another branch of study, especially in lesbian and women's studies, has taken foot in the United States, one that runs parallel to antisocial queer theory (Kosofsky Sedgwich 2003; Cvetkovich 2003; Ahmed 2004 and 2010), and insists on queer passions and relationships. There has even been talk of queer theories taking an "affective turn" (Staiger et al. 2010; Arfini and Lo Iacono 2012b), and in February 2009, at the University of California at Berkeley, the evocative title *Queer Bonds* was given to a conference about the debates created by antisocial queer theories (Young and Weiner 2011). A whole series of research has focused on interrogating the specificity of queer ties, which is not necessarily in contradiction to (but rather, frequently in continuity with) the break that the sexual causes in the compulsory sociality of Oedipus and Leviathan. Butler (2012a) has, instead, laid out critical agendas that are different still. Borrowing from the title of her last books, *Parting Ways*, one could thus conclude that the roads of the queer are as divergent today as they have always been.

In the 1900s, with the "blind faith in progress" of Humanity having run out in the face of the tragedies of totalitarianism, many philosophers preferred to look to the past instead of to the future. Meaning to exhibit the possibility of a model of subjectivity that was an alternative to liberal individualism—not unlike Bersani, who took to rereading Plato—Foucault, for example, began a journey backward in time, beginning with the analysis of the modern power apparatuses, continuing with the examination of the Christian pastorate, he then closely examined Ancient Greek, Hellenistic and Roman ethical philosophy.²⁶ Other authors who share a Hebrew ancestry with Butler and Mieli, have retrospectively turned their gaze, not only toward Athens, but toward Jerusalem as well,²⁷ namely toward that root of Western culture that knows rabbis and not pastors. It is indeed with them that Butler has opened a dialogue, in particular with

Emmanuel Lévinas,²⁸ Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin. To conclude, I will evoke them as well, as I did earlier with Mieli, and listen to what they have to say.

In the fifth chapter, I tried to show how, with such enormous obstinacy, Hobbes tried to preserve the political unity of the State by getting rid of the possibility of prophetism²⁹; to respond, Lévinas (1991; Eng. trans. 1998: 168) invited him, instead, to linger in what he allusively called “the interstices of politics,” from where—he proclaims—new prophecies could rise up in the form of “voices,” “cries,” and even “songs”³⁰:

An anachronism that may bring a smile to the lips! But prophetic voices probably mean the possibility of unforeseen acts of kindness of which the *I* is still capable in its uniqueness preceding all genus or freed from all genera. They are sometimes heard in the cries that rise up from the interstices of politics and that, independently of official authority, defend the ‘rights of man’; sometimes in the songs of the poets; sometimes simply in the press or in the public forum of the liberal states, in which freedom of expression is ranked as the first freedom and justice is always a revision of justice and the expectation of a better justice.³¹

It is impossible to omit the fact that this radical insistence on justice never scratched the surface of Lévinas’ extremist Zionism; Palestinians, for him, were almost not authentically human. Aside from this glaring contradiction, what might make supporters of antisocial queer theories smile might not so much be the anachronism, but the “*buonismo*,” or bleeding-heart nature of these words which reveal the naivety of a philosopher who put faith in the liberal political doctrines’ depictions of liberalism, and who used the concept of “human rights,” without asking too many questions. Despite all this, the citation elicits important questions (that Lévinas would never have posed³²). Who more than the queers, is capable of both lingering within the “interstices of politics,” and assuming their abjection? And what do Mieli’s call to transsexuality, Hocquenghem’s call to anality and Bersani’s call to impersonality represent if not proclamations, openings and “prophecies” of unforeseen ways of being human? These calls, in the end, are three answers to the very same demand for justice that Butler and Cavarero (Bernini and Guaraldo 2009) tried to provide with their ontology of vulnerability—which owes much to Lévinas and is so opposed by Edelman. After the fall of socialism, the “prophetic voices” of the queers needn’t necessarily content themselves with the liberal solution that Lévinas reaches. After the economic crisis (Floyd 2009; Penney

2013), but even before (Hennessy 2000), many brought back Marx, at times in open polemic with Foucault and Butler. Making justice—which as Lévinas affirms “is always a revision of justice and the expectation of a better justice”—a floating signifier, an opening to transcendence that is constantly renewing itself, however, makes an “anarchic” outcome also possible, in the literal sense. This outcome frees the human both from the *arché*, in the sense of foundation, of epistemic truth (the real of the subject), and from the *arché* in the sense of government or power. Arendt was the one to suggest that, if anything, the human could be defined by the verbal use of the term *arché*: not exactly by the *arché*, but by the *archein*, by the principle understood as beginning, as the “beginning something new,” something unique, with one’s own actions and thoughts.³³ To this end, Benjamin, who was so admired by Arendt (1968), contrasted the eternal present of truth that perpetuates into the future—which is characteristic, in his opinion, of modern politics, both liberal and Marxist—with a nonlinear but punctual time he called “*Jetztzeit*” [“now-time”]. Claiming the contemporary nature of prophetism, he pointed to the possibility of a non “futurist” way of thinking of the future, by connecting it “every second” to the present:

We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogenous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter. (Benjamin 1955; Eng. trans. 1999: 264)

As Butler emphasized (2012a: 103 and 106), for Benjamin prophetic time is thus “on the order of the ‘might enter.’” More than a time of the event, it is a time of the “occasion” or the “wager.” And “perhaps the Messiah is merely another name for *this* time.” Using the past as a resource for the imaginary, Benjamin—like Arendt and Lévinas—taught that, even though the human is caught in the maze of the modern epistemic-political apparatus, he can always think of himself or herself as that being that is capable of initiative: of reacting, of thinking, of freely imagining within the relationships in which he is inserted or by breaking them, if necessary against the binding force of power, of the truth professed by those keeping it—even of the real of his own drive and of death. Though we live in the “homoge-

nous and empty” eschatological time of the Leviathan state-market, in our contemporary crisis, Benjamin’s *Jetztzeit* and Arendt’s *ärchein* could reappropriate those queers who, like LaBruce’s zombies, refuse to submit to the alternative between the biopolitical future of Oedipal civilization and the solipsistic *no future* of a society of enjoyment. These queers choose to embody an ever-contingent law, which no one can ever represent. In his goodbye message, making a specious reference to “brilliant” Heidegger, Venner notes that “the essence of man is in his existence and not in ‘another world.’” Even the devout women at Jesus’s tomb knew that you only come to the world one time, and that no one can return from the dead. And nevertheless, they put their faith in the impossible (those gullible hens!). Queers, who are rarely devout, could more modestly content themselves with proving that, if it isn’t possible to come back to life, it is possible, instead, to come back to *another* life. The heteronormative symbolic order of Oedipal civilization assigns sexual minorities the role of representing the end of civilization and the breaking of social ties: it is thus their destiny to be orphans of a community. Nevertheless, they can meet with one another up north, or in a Tuscan agritourism: in the interstices of the political, where it’s not just possible to look obliquely at the world, but it is also possible to create another world within the world—sometimes simple gestures like singing beneath the moon are enough. For those who do not resign themselves to heteronormativity or to homonormativity, the past can be an occasion to imagine a communitarian shape of the LGBTQIA movements of which, in different ways, Mieli, Hocquenghem and Foucault were prophets. Among its multiple meanings, queer includes a community that continually constructs and deconstructs itself, against the Community.

Let us stop here, therefore, in the interstitial spaces of the *Queer Apocalypses*, where times collapse, the children we were have never stopped living in us (little zombies)—and every single heartbeat proclaims resurrection. Here, the hens have always learned to fly. Once in a while, however, they allow themselves to stay “down into the mud, to resume pecking at the dung.”

NOTES

1. The mother’s “inclination” toward her defenseless child, as compared to the independent “verticality” of the individuals-mushrooms (Cavarero 2014), was the position from which numerous thinkers developed what

could be called “feminist ontologies.” The ethics of interest to Carol Gilligan (1982), discussed again by Joan C. Tronto (1993) and Martha Nussbaum (2000), and taken up once more by the Italian “thought of sexual difference” (Muraro 1991, 2006), and Adriana Cavarero’s ethics of vulnerability (1997, 2003, 2007, 2014) also discussed by Judith Butler (2004a, b, 2005, 2009), all represent radical challenges issued against liberal individualism. While antisocial queer theories insist on the solitude of the subject of the drive, these feminist proposals, to the contrary, affirm the ontological primacy of relationship over individuality and of ethics over ontology. The distance seems endless, and yet is reduced considerably, if one remembers—as I have repeatedly tried to do—the paradoxical foundations that Laplace, from which Bersani as well as de Lauretis draw, carves out for the sexual: if, on the one hand, the drive isolates the subject, condemning it to solitude, on the other hand, it represents an ontological debt of the subject and even of his or her body toward a whole web of human relationships that precede him or her—not only toward his caretakers, but even toward the symbolic and social order that conditions his caretakers’ projections on him or her. It is thus necessary to keep in mind that the Child against whom Edelman inveighs is a rhetorical fetish, while that which feminism puts at the center is an incarnated individual, a vulnerable living human infant.

2. Trans women are transsexual and transgender mtf (male to female) people born with male bodies that develop a feminine identity. Vice versa, trans men are transsexual and transgender ftm (female to male) people born with female bodies that develop masculine identities.
3. “Matrimony is the only condition in which use can be made of one’s sexuality. If one devotes one’s person to another, one devotes not only sex but the whole person; the two cannot be separated. [...] I have given myself up as the property of another, but in turn I take that other as my property, and so win myself back again in winning the person whose property I have become. In this way the two persons become a unity of will” (Kant 1963: 167).
4. “It is true that man has no inclination to enjoy the flesh of another—except, perhaps, in the vengeance of war, and then it is hardly a desire” (Kant 1963: 163).
5. The term *scortatio* indicates occasional heterosexual relationships. *Concubinatus* is defined as: “one person surrendering to another only for the satisfaction of sexual desire whilst retaining freedom and rights in other personal respects affecting welfare and happiness” (Kant 1963: 166). Prostitution, in the end is defined thus: “to offer themselves, for profit, as things for the use of others in the satisfaction of their sexual propensities” (Kant 1963: 159).

6. The three crimes *contra naturam* are defined thus by Kant: the first of these, onanism, is the “abuse of the sexual faculty without any object, the exercise of the faculty in the complete absence of any object of sexuality. [...] A second *crimen carnis contra naturam* is intercourse between *sexus homogenii*, in which the object of sexual impulse is a human being but there is homogeneity instead of heterogeneity of sex, as when a woman satisfies her desire on a woman, or a man on a man. [...] The third *crimen carnis contra naturam* occurs when the object of the desire is in fact of the opposite sex but is not human. Such is sodomy, or intercourse with animals. This, too, is contrary to the ends of humanity and against our natural instinct” (Kant 1963: 170).
7. Which, as I have already written, Ferdinand Tönnies would publish in 1889 along with another one of Hobbes’ works written that same year, *Human Nature*, with the title *Elements of Law Natural and Politic*.
8. This fate is common to many illustrious philosophers. Nietzsche, in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* [*On the Genealogy of Morality*] (1998: 75) notes this with the intention of condemning the asceticism of philosophy: “What great philosophers thus far has been married? Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer—they were not; still more, one cannot even imagine.” Cavarero (2014) observes, instead, that Kant didn’t even like children.
9. Cf. notes 42 and 43 from Chap. 5, *supra*.
10. Quentin Skinner (1996), more than any other, emphasized the rhetorical value of Hobbesian reasoning, especially in *Leviathan*. The political rationality to which our author appeals is, if you will, both *ratio* and *oratio*.
11. And who, not by chance, rarely like soccer. In that same vein, remember Medea’s words, reproduced in note 63 of the fourth chapter, *supra*.
12. Mieli (1994: 96, translation Julia Heim) thinks similarly, and when speaking of his “travels” he writes: “My revolution around the sadistic Star lasted about two months—two months and a few millennia,” and in a note he adds: “I am alluding to the expansion of time, which is one of the prerogatives of ‘delirium’: the elasticity of magic time opens a crack in the luminous eternity of the kingdom.”
13. Cf. chapter three, note 7, *supra*.
14. The novel—published posthumously in 1994 by a group of Mieli’s friends (among whom Lia Cigarini, Corrado Levi, Marc de’ Pasquali and the editors Umberto Pasti, Francesco Santini and Catia Tommasini)—is characterized by a highly disorienting and mysticism-filled prose. In Milan, at the time, Mieli was not the only one to unite the struggle for homosexual liberation, Marxism and magic, as the work of Luciano Parinetto on alchemy and witchcraft shows (1989, 1990, 1998).

15. Mieli (1994: 174, translation Julia Heim) describes his mood when listening to a sermon of a rabbi in a London synagogue like this: “Deferent before the world like the regal Bride before the gift of Her Spouse, I tasted the revelation in silence, with tears in my eyes. I knew that I was Christ resurrected. It was no coincidence that I had received a Catholic education, though on my father’s side I came from the greatest Hebrew lineage. The two religions reconciled with one another, blended with each other, cancelled each other out, there was no longer a need for any religion since I, a pagan, was there to hear that sermon that spoke of me.” And this is how he describes the end of times (178, note, translation Julia Heim): “To avoid excessive crowding in San Pietro square, on the day of Judgment only those representatives of the poor, the disabled, the ugly, the prostitutes, and outcast transvestites of all kinds, ages, countries, and *historical times* (since the Resurrection of the Dead will occur at the same time) will be allowed: to begin with, as a tribute to Italian soil, beneath their eyes I will judge the warmongers of the superpowers and their local lackeys. Judgment will proceed in the following days, and a few examples of absolution or condemnation on worldwide TV will be enough for everyone to *recall* their knowledge of what is good.” Mieli recalls, among other things, that already during his first coming, Jesus invited those who wanted to follow him to leave their families, subverting the traditional morals of the Hebrew culture to which he belonged. The exegesis (Rescio 2012), in fact, insists on discipleship as an instrument of social transformation, and some bold ones have pushed further and have even proposed “queering the body of Christ” (Ward 2010; Cf. also Ammicht Quinn 2010).
16. Founded in the spring of 1971, in the autumn of 1974 FUORI! federated with the radical party. Mieli did not approve of this decision and founded COM—Collettivi Omosessuali Milanesi [Milanese Homosexuals Collectives] (Rossi Barilli 1999). In the eighties, he definitively left the revolutionary left, to assume pacifist and antinuclear positions.
17. Mieli (1994: 219, translation Julia Heim) tells of the reactions that the launching of *Elements of a Gay Critique* (1977) elicited: “Some people did not like that I announced gay communism. An editor from the publishing house told me that, yes, he agreed with the theses that I had put forth, but he found it counterproductive that I turned only to communists and not to radicals, for example. [...] He hadn’t even understood that speaking of communism I was referring to the kingdom of Freedom, and certainly not to the so-called real socialism or the political line of the PCI. In fact, I was mad at the PCI in specie—and in the name of the species—since the party kept the proletariat at bay, instead of pushing them to refuse the kind of work that was ruining the planet and would have annihilated humanity. [...] The Messiah should have been pleasing to the Fascists, to the Christian Democrats and to the Socialists, to everyone, and so take heed: defining

- himself communist, he risked being misunderstood. But I knew that—misunderstood or not—one day I would reign over all the ex-victims of democracy or of another prehistoric system.”
18. That’s why FHAR and FUORI! did not expect that on May 17, 1990, homosexuality would be erased from the DSM by some medical authority (cf. note 3 of the overture, *supra*), and the 5th and 6th of April 1972, as I have already mentioned, they organized a joint action to sabotage the international congress of sexology on “deviant behaviors of human sexuality” in Sanremo (Rossi Barilli 1999).
 19. The suicide is disclosed in a dramatic and ironic passage of *The Awakening of the Pharaohs*: “I wanted to kill myself. Piero wrote saying that I wouldn’t do it: ‘You like sashaying along with life too much!’. Without barbiturates or a pistol, I thought about cutting my veins. But in the end, between Mario, Paolo, and the Madonna, as well as the beckoning of things to come, they took away the strength I had to cut the wrist of my right hand with the blade that I held between my thumb, pointer, and middle fingers of my sweaty unstable left hand... And what if the bloody, trembling right hand would refuse to return the favor to its twin, leaving me disastrously in the balance between life and death? Like that, in the open country?” (Mieli 1994: 310, translation Julia Heim).
 20. The final chapter of this book should also be considered a response to the letter of the 17-year-old Italian, Davide Tancredi (it’s an invented name) published in *la Repubblica* on May 25, 2013, following the death of Dominique Venner, which I will reflect on now. The boy affirms that writing to the newspaper for him represents “the last alternative to suicide in a troglodyte society, in a world that does not accept me even though I was born this way,” and he invites readers to reflect on the fact that “real courage is not killing oneself when one is on the brink of eighty years old, but surviving adolescence bearing a weight of this kind, knowing that you have not done anything wrong except follow your feelings without vices or depravations.” He thus asks the Parliament for “a law against homophobia,” explaining that it would seem “inconsiderate” to demand “a law allowing for gay marriage,” and to his fellow citizens, he asks for “a bit less discrimination and a bit more commiseration or Christian compassion.” I feel very close to the young Davide, but in my opinion what he seeks is not enough. Instead, what is needed is to take charge of the negativity that one represents: being “inconsiderate,” therefore, much more than those for whom marriage equality for all would be enough.
 21. Cf. notes 66 and 67 of Chap. 4, *supra*.
 22. The “*manifest pour tous*” was held in Paris. According to organizers, one million people participated. According to law enforcement, there were 150,000 people. Some extreme right-wing militants caused clashes with the police.

23. In France, an attentive mother can be called a *poule*, as in a “mother hen” or “overprotective mother,” to her children, and by extension a man can call his companion this word and ironically show his affection. But “*poule*” can also mean a frivolous and not very intelligent woman; a group of gossip and garrulous women can form a *poulailler*, a henhouse. Even more pejoratively, the term can be used to point to the dark side of femininity: *poule* is also a woman with loose values, or a prostitute.
24. The woman, furthermore, has always been considered closer to animal nature than man. Think, for example, of what Proudhon (1979: 44, translation Julia Heim), one of the founders of anarchic thought—and an anti-Semite—affirms: “To limit oneself to only considering sexual relations, it is a law of nature in all animals that the female, urged by the procreative instinct, and while making herself pray a lot, use all methods to search for the male. The woman cannot escape this law. She has, by nature, a higher inclination toward obscenity than man, most of all because she is weaker, and the freedom and intelligence within her fight against her inclinations toward animality with less force; also because love is the biggest, if not the only occupation of her existence and, in love, the ideal always implies a physicality.”
25. [Translator’s note] In Italian “ani-malità.”
26. Foucault dedicated his two last books to sexual ethics in Antiquity, the only volumes that he was able to publish before dying of the ones that were planned for his *History of Sexuality* were *The Use of Pleasure* (1984a) and *The Care of the Self* (1984b). The last of Foucault’s courses at the *Collège de France* were, instead, dedicated to ancient ethics in general, with particular attention to the relationship that it has to truth (2001, 2008, 2009). On the Foucauldian interpretation of Antiquity, allow me to reference Bernini (2011c) and (2013c).
27. The reference is to the apt title of the Italian collection of essays by Leo Strauss, by Roberto Esposito entitled *Gerusalemme e Atene: Studi sul pensiero politico dell’Occidente* [*Jerusalem and Athens: Studies on Western Political Thought*] (1998).
28. The Jewish Lithuanian philosopher is a constant reference in Butler’s work (2004a, 2005, 2009). Cf. Bernini 2009.
29. The contrast between Levinasian ethics and contractualist individualism is explicit in the 1984(b) conference “Paix et proximité,” which was then elaborated in the essay *De l’unicité* (1991). Of particular importance to Butler are, furthermore, Lévinas (1974) and (1984b).
30. Many other Jewish philosophers of the 1900s investigated the concept of prophetism. See, at least: Benjamin 1955; Buber 1950 and 1996; Neher 1950 and 1955; Scholem 1957 and 1971. Recently, in addition to Judith Butler (2012b), Bonnie Honig (2009) has also reflected on this theme.

31. Lévinas' challenge (1961, 1982, 1995) to political modernity was also geared toward the absolute value of life and the essential character that Hobbes accorded to the self-preservation instinct. Through the analysis of the Talmudic interpretation of the commandment "thou shall not kill," the Jewish Lithuanian philosopher reached a contrast between the individual who aspires to protect himself from the violence of the other by way of the institution of the sovereign, and a human being whose love for the other (in flesh and blood, not as an example of an abstract humanity) can arrive at self-sacrifice.
32. While insisting on the "an-archic" nature of ethical experience, and attempting to radically distance himself from Hobbesian anthropology, Lévinas (1984b; Eng. trans. 1999: 144) remains attached to a heterosexist and ethnocentric patriarchal imaginary (Cavarero 2014) and continues to think of politics in the form of statehood.
33. "To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word *árchein*, 'to begin,' 'to lead,' and eventually 'to rule,' indicates), to set something in motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin *agere*). Because they are *initium*, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted to action. [...] With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was created but not before" (Arendt 1958: 177). To connote the human faculty of beginning something new, Arendt speaks of "miracle" and "hope" (246).

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